Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 2022 Nationwide Protests

FEBRUARY
2023

The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in IRAN (GAMAAN)

AMMAR MALEKI
POOYAN TAMIMI ARAB

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

GAMAAN is grateful to the Psiphon team, and to the television channels Iran International and Voice of America Persian, for their voluntary assistance in disseminating this survey. We extend our gratitude also to all colleagues and volunteers who assisted us in one way or another.

Any use of this research or parts thereof is permitted only if properly cited:

Maleki, Ammar, and Tamimi Arab, Pooyan. 2023. *Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 2022 Nationwide Protests.* Published online, gamaan.org: GAMAAN.

The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) is an independent, non-profit research foundation registered in the Netherlands.
Copyright © 2023 GAMAAN. All rights reserved.

Website: www.gamaan.org
WhatsApp: +31644860224
Telegram: /gamaanresearch
E-mail: info@gamaan.org
Twitter: @gamaanresearch
Instagram: /gamaanresearch

SURVEY SUMMARY

- The survey “Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2022 Nationwide Protests” was conducted between December 21–31, 2022. Around 200,000 respondents participated in and completed this survey. Over 158,000 respondents were inside Iran, and over 42,000 respondents were outside the country. The survey results based on respondents inside the country represent the target population of literate Iranian adults above 19 years old (equal to 90% of the total adult population), with respective credibility levels and credibility intervals of 95% and 5%. This report’s results cannot be said to be representative of all Iranians in the diaspora; however, given the large sample size, the balanced distribution of the sample, and the participation of respondents from 130 countries, the report’s results can be seen to reflect the views of a significant part of Iranians outside the country.
- In response to the question “Islamic Republic: Yes or No?” 81% of respondents inside the country responded “No” to the Islamic Republic, 15% responded “Yes,” and 4% were not sure. Of the Iranian respondents abroad, 99% responded “No,” opting against the Islamic Republic.
- Those who answered “No” to the Islamic Republic or “I do not know” in the question on a referendum about the Islamic Republic were asked a follow-up question about their preferred democratic and secular alternative regime type. Of those, 28% inside Iran and 32% outside Iran would prefer a presidential republic, 12% inside Iran and 29% outside Iran would prefer a parliamentary republic regime type, and 22% inside Iran and 25% outside Iran would prefer a constitutional monarchy.
- Regarding the nationwide protests of the past months, 80% of those inside the country support the protests; 67% believe the protests will succeed, while 14% think they will not succeed. Around 15% of the population inside the country oppose the protests. Respondents outside the country overwhelmingly support the protests; of these, 90% think they will succeed, and only 9% think they will not succeed.
- When asked about different protest actions, 22% of those inside the country say they have participated in street protests, and 53% state that they might participate in protests. Also 22% participated in nightly chanting in support of the protests, and 46% say they might do so. Of those inside the country, 35% have engaged in acts of civil disobedience such as removing headscarves or writing slogans, while 35% state they might do so in the future; 44% say they joined strikes, while 38% say they might do so; 75% approve of boycotting and not buying certain products; and 66% have participated in protesting on the Internet. Furthermore, around 8% say they have committed acts of “civil sabotage” [kharābkārī-i sharāfatmandānah], and 41% claim they might do so in the future.
- In response to a question about the 2022 FIFA World Cup, 46% of Iranians inside the country and 56% of Iranians outside the country state that they feel happy that the soccer team of the Islamic Republic of Iran lost against the United States’ team. In contrast, 23% of those in the country and 8% of those outside report having felt sad about the game’s outcome.

- Returning to the protests, 85% of respondents inside the country who support the protests agree with the formation of a so-called solidarity council (or opposition coalition), comprising prominent activists of various political orientations; 42% believe that such a council should definitively include prominent activists inside and outside the country, and 34% would agree with the formation of such a council being made up of individuals outside the country if those inside support them. Another 9% believe that such a council should be composed exclusively of activists who live in the country. Around 4% of those who support the protests disagree with forming such a council and think it is unnecessary. Of the respondents outside Iran, 47% agree with the idea of a solidarity council or opposition coalition if it is supported by activists inside the country, while 45% think that such a council should consist of activists inside and outside the country.
- Of those Iranians who reside in the country and support the protests, 59% expect the solidarity council to form a transition council and a provisional government; 53% think the council should represent protestors in the world and negotiate with foreign countries; 45% think the council should call for protests inside the country; and 35% think the council should help organize protest rallies abroad.
- In another question about which prominent figures should come together in a solidarity council—from a list of 34 individuals who are active in society and politics and represent diverse political orientations—respondents chose the following people in order of popularity: Reza Pahlavi, Ali Daei, Ali Karimi, Hamed Esmaeilion, Hossein Ronaghi, Nazanin Boniadi, Fatemeh Sepehri, Masih Alinejad, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Toomaj Salehi, Narges Mohammadi, Molavi Abdolhamid, Golshifteh Farahani, a Kurdish Parties' representative (not named), Shirin Ebadi, Mohammad Nourizad, Kaveh Madani, Dariush Eghbali, Majid Tavakoli, Esmail Bakhshi, and others.
- Regarding prominent figures that should come together in a solidarity council, the results show that, on average, respondents inside the country selected 7 individuals, and respondents outside the country selected 9 individuals. The 20 most-selected individuals would represent 85% of the selections. It is noteworthy that, of these 20 persons, 10 reside in Iran and 10 reside outside Iran. The 10 most-selected individuals who reside in Iran make up 40% of the total selections, and the 10 most-selected individuals who reside outside Iran make up 45% of the selections.
- Also, 73% inside the country believe that Western countries should defend the protestors' rights by seriously pressuring the Iranian government. Of the Iranian respondents outside the country, 96% support this view. In contrast, around 19% of respondents inside the country think that Western powers should not intervene, as the protests are an internal matter.
- A majority of 70% agree with Western governments proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, expelling the ambassadors of the Islamic Republic, allowing international foreign intervention to protect protestors, sanctioning officials who played a role in suppressing the protests, and seizing Iran's property and assets to cut the government's access to them. Moreover, 66% think that Western governments should support civil leaders and engage with opposition activists and groups. Around 62% agree with ending negotiations to revive the joint nuclear deal (JCPOA), while 6% disagree with ending the negotiations.

- Even though the majority of the population in Iran does not have confidence or trust [i'timād] in the regime's institutions, confidence in the army, at 29%, is relatively higher than confidence in other institutions. Banks, at 24%, are the second-most trusted institution. On the other hand, the parliament, with 8%; and the state media and the government, with 10%; are deemed the most untrustworthy. Confidence in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader reaches about 14%; likewise, around 13% say they have confidence in the courts and judicial system, and 17% say they trust the police.
- Respondents were also asked a question about punitive measures for officials responsible for killings. Of the respondents inside the country, 16% say they would agree with revolutionary executions of officials responsible for the killings, 29% agree with the death penalty should a court reach the verdict after a fair trial, and 24% say they would seek punishments other than the death penalty. Only 3% inside the country agree with the option of forgiveness and general amnesty, and 27% say they think that legal experts should decide on the matter. Of those who reside outside Iran, 8% agree with revolutionary executions, 25% agree with the death penalty for those responsible for the killings should a court reach the verdict after a fair trial, while 48% disagree with the death penalty.
- In response to a question about their political orientations, 60% of respondents inside the country describe themselves as proponents for regime change as a precondition for any meaningful change; 16% are proponents of a structural transformation and transition away from the Islamic Republic; 11% are proponents of the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader; 6% are proponents of gradual reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic; and 6% don't identify with any of these political orientations. In comparison with GAMAAN's previous surveys, after the 2022 nationwide protests the percentage of those who support regime change increased by 20%.

SECTION ONE: MAIN SURVEY RESULTS

The survey results described in this report regard Iranians who reside both inside and outside Iran. The results that describe the views of the target population inside Iran—that is, literate adults above 19 years old who comprise approximately 90% of the total population—are all based on a representative sample generated after sample matching and weighting (raking). Part 2 of this report provides information about the methodology, raw sample and representative sample, and testing with external data to corroborate representativity. The results that describe the opinions of Iranians outside Iran are based on the total sample of those who participated across the globe; these results were not weighted and cannot be said to represent all Iranians in the diaspora.

1.1 Islamic Republic: Yes or No?

This survey asked respondents, “If a free referendum were organized on the question ‘Islamic Republic: Yes or No?’ what would you vote?” Figure 1 shows the results for respondents in Iran: 81% choose “No” to the Islamic Republic, around 15% choose “Yes,” and around 4% is not sure. Of the Iranian respondents abroad, 99% opt against the Islamic Republic.

Figure 1



A cross-tabulation of demographic variables for answers by respondents inside Iran to the question on a referendum (Figure 2) shows that the option “No to the Islamic Republic” is significantly more often selected by the population below 30 years old. Furthermore, women oppose the Islamic Republic more than men do, and the urban population is more in opposition than is the rural population.

Figure 2



The question on a hypothetical referendum was also asked in a previous survey, conducted by GAMAAN in March 2019 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the 1979 referendum on the Islamic Republic in Iran. A comparison of the two surveys shows that in the period between the two surveys the percentage of those who select “No” to the Islamic Republic increased by 10%.

Figure 3



1.2 Alternative Regime Types

This survey asked those who answered “No to the Islamic Republic” or “I do not know” in the question on a referendum about the Islamic Republic a follow-up question about their preferred democratic and secular alternative regime type. (A short explanation was provided to clarify the choice between a presidential republic, a parliamentary republic, or a constitutional monarchy.) Figure 4 shows the results for both Iranians inside and outside Iran. Around 28% of those inside Iran and 32% of those outside Iran prefer a presidential republic; and 12% of those inside Iran and 29% of those outside Iran prefer a parliamentary republic regime type. The latter result indicates that, between Iranians inside the country and in the diaspora, there is a significant difference in preference for a parliamentary republic. On the other hand, 22% inside the country and 25% outside the country prefer a constitutional monarchy; and 5% of respondents inside the country and 4% of those outside the country choose “other options” for their preferred regime type. Furthermore, around 17% of those inside the country and 9% of those outside the country state they are insufficiently informed to answer the question.

Figure 4



1.3 The 2022 Nationwide Protests

This survey asked respondents their views about the nationwide protests of the past months. Figure 5 shows that 81% of those inside the country support the protests; 67% believe the protests will succeed and 14% think they will not succeed. Also, around 15% of the population inside the country oppose the protests. Respondents outside the country overwhelmingly support the protests, with 90% thinking that they will succeed and only 9% thinking they will not succeed.

Figure 5



Respondents inside the country additionally answered a question about various protest actions of the past months (Figure 6). Around 22% of those who support the protests say they have participated in street protests, and 53% state that they might participate in protests. Around 22% participated in chanting in support of the protests at night, and 46% say they might do so; 35% have engaged in acts of civil disobedience such as removing headscarves or writing slogans, while 35% state they might do so in the future; 44% say they have joined strikes, while 38% say they might do so; 75% approve of boycotting and not buying certain products; and 66% have participated in protesting on the Internet. Furthermore, around 8% say they have committed acts of "civil sabotage" [kharābkārī-i sharāfatmandānah] and 41% claim they might do so in the future.

Respondents outside the country answered a similar question about protest actions, but with other options relevant to the protests outside Iran (Figure 7). Of these, 87% say they have participated in protesting online; 52% say they have participated in protest rallies; 44% reached out to officials of their respective countries of residence; and 33% supported the protests financially.

Figure 6



Figure 7



1.4 Reactions to the Soccer Team Losing

In response to a question about the soccer team of the Islamic Republic of Iran losing against the team of the United States in the 2022 FIFA World Cup, 46% of Iranians inside the country and 56% of Iranians outside the country state that they felt happy about the defeat (Figure 8). In contrast, 23% of those inside the country and 8% of those outside report having felt sad about the game's outcome.

Figure 8



1.5 Solidarity Council (or Opposition Coalition)

This survey asked those who support the protests about the formation of a so-called solidarity council (or opposition coalition) comprising prominent activists of various political orientations (Figure 9). Of the Iranians residing in the country who agree with the protests, 85% also agree with the formation of such a council. On the one hand, 42% believe that such a council should definitively include prominent activists inside and outside the country; on the other hand, 34% agree with the formation of such a council being made up of individuals outside the country—if those inside support them. Another 9% believe that such a council should be composed exclusively of activists who live in the country. Around 4% of those who support the protests disagree with forming such a council and consider it unnecessary.

Of the respondents outside Iran, 47% agree with the idea of a solidarity council to be made up of activists outside the country—if those inside support them. However, 45% think that such a council should consist of activists inside and outside the country.

Figure 9



In another question, those who support the protests were asked about their expectations of a solidarity council (Figure 10). Respondents could choose multiple answers. Of those who support the protests, 59% of Iranians inside the country express support for “forming a transition council and a provisional government”; 53% think the council should represent protestors in the world and negotiate with foreign countries; 45% think the council should call for protests inside the country; and 35% think the council should help organize protest rallies abroad.

Figure 10



In another question, supporters of the protests were asked which prominent figures they would like to see in the solidarity council—those who represent their perspectives and way of thinking. They could choose from a list of 34 individuals who are active in society and politics and represent diverse political orientations, thereby selecting their preferred composition for a solidarity council. It was also possible to select “none” or to write other figures’ names by selecting “other option.”

Respondents could choose multiple options, and there was no limit to how many they could select. Figure 11 shows the percentage of selected individuals deemed suitable for participating in a solidarity council, based on the total number of respondents. Given that multiple options could be selected, the total percentage in this figure exceeds 100%. Each respondent inside the country selected on average 7 prominent figures, while the average for respondents outside the country was 9.

Figure 11



Figure 12 shows the percentage of selected figures as potential members of a solidarity council, based on the total number of selections. The sum is 100%. The 20 most-selected individuals would represent 85% of the selections. It is noteworthy that, of these 20 persons, 7 are women, 13 are men, 10 reside in Iran, and 10 reside outside Iran. The 10 most-selected individuals who reside in Iran make up 40% of the total selections, and the 10 most-selected individuals who reside outside Iran make up 45% of the selections.

Figure 12



The respondents were also asked which person of those they selected for a solidarity council is their first choice. Table 1 shows the results for respondents inside and outside the country. (By adding the 12.4% inside the country who oppose the protests, the total percentage for those inside the country will be 100%.)

Table 1: Respondents' First Choice of Individuals for the Solidarity Council

Of those you selected for a solidarity council, who is your first choice?	**Respondents inside Iran**	**Respondents outside Iran**
Reza Pahlavi	32.8%	40.7%
Ali Daei	9.3%	1.8%
Hamed Esmaeilion	7.3%	12.9%
Ali Karimi	5.3%	3.0%
Hossein Ronaghi	4.8%	5.6%
Nasrin Sotoudeh	2.1%	6.6%
Masih Alinejad	1.9%	5.7%
Mir Hossein Mousavi	1.4%	0.8%
Representative of Kurdish Parties	1.4%	1.1%
Molavi Abdolhamid	1.1%	0.1%
Nazanin Boniadi	0.9%	3.7%
Mohammad Nourizad	0.8%	0.5%
Narges Mohammadi	0.7%	1.6%
Dariush Eghbali	0.6%	0.2%
Shirin Ebadi	0.6%	1.4%
Fatemeh Sepehri	0.5%	0.9%
Toomaj Salehi	0.5%	0.6%
Kaveh Madani	0.4%	0.9%
Representative of the Teachers' Association	0.4%	0.2%
Firouz Naderi	0.4%	0.4%
Hassan Shariatmadari	0.3%	0.2%
Majid Tavakoli	0.3%	1.2%
Abbas Milani	0.3%	0.7%
Esmail Bakhshi	0.3%	0.4%
Golshifteh Farahani	0.2%	0.2%
Mehdi Yarrahi	0.2%	0.0%
Faraj Sarkohi	0.1%	0.7%
Atena Daemi	0.1%	0.2%
Soroush Lashkari (Hichkas)	0.1%	0.0%
Maryam Rajavi	0.1%	0.3%
Fariba Balouch	0.0%	0.0%
Bahareh Hedayat	0.0%	0.2%
Saeed Ghaseminejad	0.0%	0.0%
Mahdieh Golroo	0.0%	0.0%
Other names (suggested by respondents)	4.0%	2.6%
None	8.4%	4.0%

Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients of selections for the solidarity council made by respondents inside the country. The correlation coefficients show the chance that respondents chose combinations of two individuals. A higher number (such as 0.6) indicates a greater association between the two choices. In contrast, a correlation coefficient of 0.1 or 0 shows that the combination of individuals is highly unlikely to be selected. Table 2 shows the extent of the correlation in colors: a higher correlation is a darker green, and a lower correlation is a darker red.

The correlation coefficients table can show which selection of individuals for a solidarity council can represent a greater part of society, and which individuals represent similar parts of society. The relatively low correlation coefficients in this table (mostly less than 0.5) show the diversity of the individuals in the list presented to respondents, and also show the diversity of respondents' choices.

Table 2: Correlation Coefficients of Selections for the Solidarity Council Made by Respondents Inside the Country

Table of correlation coefficients	Hamed Esmaeilion	Dariush Eghbali	Esmail Bakhshi	Fariba Balouch	Nazanin Boniadi	Reza Pahlavi	Majid Tavakoli	Atena Daemi	Ali Daei	Maryam Rajavi	Hossein Ronaghi	Fatemeh Sepehri	Nasrin Sotoudeh	Faraj Sarkohi	Hassan Shariatmadari	Toomaj Salehi	Shirin Ebadi	Molavi Abdolhamid	Masih Alinejad	Golshifteh Farahani	Saeed Ghaseminejad	Ali Karimi	Mahdieh Golroo	Soroush Lashkari (Hichkas)	Narges Mohammadi	Kaveh Madani	Abbas Milani	Mir Hossein Mousavi	Firouz Naderi	Representative of Teachers' Association	Representative of Kurdish Parties	Mohammad Nourizad	Bahareh Hedayat	Mehdi Yarrahi	Other names (suggested by respondents)
Hamed Esmaeilion	1.00	.20	.28	.18	.46	.22	.25	.31	.35	.10	.48	.33	.37	.18	.18	.34	.29	.20	.40	.35	.08	.36	.14	.20	.35	.27	.20	-.01	.19	.23	.22	.24	.16	.22	-.03
Dariush Eghbali	.20	1.00	.27	.26	.24	.19	.21	.25	.23	.10	.19	.23	.23	.19	.20	.31	.21	.14	.25	.22	.16	.25	.20	.26	.24	.17	.21	.05	.16	.12	.14	.22	.20	.22	.00
Esmail Bakhshi	.28	.27	1.00	.35	.25	.15	.36	.44	.20	.12	.30	.36	.42	.31	.29	.28	.27	.18	.28	.15	.18	.21	.26	.19	.40	.42	.26	.07	.27	.36	.30	.33	.29	.18	.03
Fariba Balouch	.18	.26	.35	1.00	.21	.13	.31	.36	.16	.14	.21	.27	.28	.30	.23	.26	.23	.23	.24	.18	.17	.18	.33	.18	.32	.25	.22	.03	.18	.28	.27	.24	.34	.19	.07
Nazanin Boniadi	.46	.24	.25	.21	1.00	.29	.34	.33	.30	.06	.43	.39	.31	.19	.14	.36	.28	.17	.37	.29	.14	.34	.15	.25	.26	.21	.19	-.02	.28	.19	.19	.17	.17	.27	-.04
Reza Pahlavi	.22	.19	.15	.13	.29	1.00	.18	.18	.28	.04	.25	.29	.18	.11	.13	.20	.18	.17	.31	.16	.10	.37	.09	.15	.19	.11	.14	-.03	.17	.10	.08	.20	.05	.11	-.08
Majid Tavakoli	.25	.21	.36	.31	.34	.18	1.00	.47	.16	.13	.37	.40	.33	.31	.20	.29	.21	.11	.29	.12	.23	.19	.28	.26	.31	.40	.28	.07	.26	.27	.22	.29	.36	.24	.06
Atena Daemi	.31	.25	.44	.36	.33	.18	.47	1.00	.17	.12	.34	.40	.40	.38	.27	.27	.25	.14	.32	.18	.20	.21	.32	.25	.41	.40	.28	.07	.25	.30	.23	.31	.33	.20	.04
Ali Daei	.35	.23	.20	.16	.30	.28	.16	.17	1.00	.07	.38	.27	.21	.15	.12	.36	.23	.27	.25	.29	.07	.63	.11	.18	.24	.15	.13	.09	.17	.18	.11	.20	.09	.15	-.03
Maryam Rajavi	.10	.10	.12	.14	.06	.04	.13	.12	.07	1.00	.07	.06	.10	.15	.16	.07	.09	.10	.08	.10	.24	.08	.25	.11	.11	.11	.12	.11	.12	.19	.19	.09	.11	.08	.01
Hossein Ronaghi	.48	.19	.30	.21	.43	.25	.37	.34	.38	.07	1.00	.44	.36	.18	.17	.43	.26	.25	.33	.33	.10	.44	.18	.23	.34	.29	.20	.02	.21	.22	.21	.20	.19	.23	-.02
Fatemeh Sepehri	.33	.23	.36	.27	.39	.29	.40	.40	.27	.06	.44	1.00	.41	.22	.19	.39	.26	.24	.36	.19	.18	.34	.19	.20	.38	.28	.21	.02	.22	.24	.19	.34	.19	.25	.00
Nasrin Sotoudeh	.37	.23	.42	.28	.31	.18	.33	.40	.21	.10	.36	.41	1.00	.30	.30	.25	.49	.18	.34	.18	.14	.21	.24	.14	.63	.43	.36	.14	.29	.34	.26	.43	.32	.11	.01
Faraj Sarkohi	.18	.19	.31	.30	.19	.11	.31	.38	.15	.15	.18	.22	.30	1.00	.43	.18	.26	.15	.20	.11	.29	.14	.35	.14	.28	.33	.42	.10	.26	.27	.23	.33	.36	.10	.01
Hassan Shariatmadari	.18	.20	.29	.23	.14	.13	.20	.27	.12	.16	.17	.19	.30	.43	1.00	.14	.25	.22	.18	.12	.31	.10	.32	.12	.27	.27	.39	.07	.21	.26	.22	.33	.25	.10	.04
Toomaj Salehi	.34	.31	.28	.26	.36	.20	.29	.27	.36	.07	.43	.39	.25	.18	.14	1.00	.17	.24	.30	.40	.11	.42	.15	.35	.25	.17	.15	-.03	.18	.17	.17	.21	.15	.30	.01
Shirin Ebadi	.29	.21	.27	.23	.28	.18	.21	.25	.23	.09	.26	.26	.49	.26	.25	.17	1.00	.22	.32	.16	.14	.21	.18	.12	.44	.23	.31	.12	.23	.26	.18	.31	.19	.12	.01
Molavi Abdolhamid	.20	.14	.18	.23	.17	.17	.11	.14	.27	.10	.25	.24	.18	.15	.22	.24	.22	1.00	.23	.16	.11	.29	.14	.09	.23	.15	.18	.14	.09	.20	.26	.24	.10	.14	.04
Masih Alinejad	.40	.25	.28	.24	.37	.31	.29	.32	.25	.08	.33	.36	.34	.20	.18	.30	.32	.23	1.00	.27	.13	.33	.16	.16	.34	.21	.20	-.01	.14	.20	.23	.31	.16	.21	.00
Golshifteh Farahani	.35	.22	.15	.18	.29	.16	.12	.18	.29	.10	.33	.19	.18	.11	.12	.40	.16	.16	.27	1.00	.06	.36	.09	.28	.21	.10	.09	.02	.13	.16	.13	.09	.08	.19	-.03
Saeed Ghaseminejad	.08	.16	.18	.17	.14	.10	.23	.20	.07	.24	.10	.18	.14	.29	.31	.11	.14	.11	.13	.06	1.00	.09	.37	.10	.14	.20	.30	.06	.23	.22	.18	.17	.24	.14	.03
Ali Karimi	.36	.25	.21	.18	.34	.37	.19	.21	.63	.08	.44	.34	.21	.14	.10	.42	.21	.29	.33	.36	.09	1.00	.10	.23	.23	.13	.12	.03	.15	.16	.13	.20	.09	.22	-.05
Mahdieh Golroo	.14	.20	.26	.33	.15	.09	.28	.32	.11	.25	.18	.19	.24	.35	.32	.15	.18	.14	.16	.09	.37	.10	1.00	.13	.24	.27	.36	.08	.17	.19	.17	.23	.36	.13	.05
Soroush Lashkari (Hichkas)	.20	.26	.19	.18	.25	.15	.26	.25	.18	.11	.23	.20	.14	.14	.12	.35	.12	.09	.16	.28	.10	.23	.13	1.00	.15	.15	.11	.01	.17	.10	.12	.13	.12	.27	-.01
Narges Mohammadi	.35	.24	.40	.32	.26	.19	.31	.41	.24	.11	.34	.38	.63	.28	.27	.25	.44	.23	.34	.21	.14	.23	.24	.15	1.00	.40	.34	.15	.26	.35	.29	.41	.30	.17	.04
Kaveh Madani	.27	.17	.42	.25	.21	.11	.40	.40	.15	.11	.29	.28	.43	.33	.27	.17	.23	.15	.21	.10	.20	.13	.27	.15	.40	1.00	.37	.15	.28	.34	.25	.32	.31	.14	.04
Abbas Milani	.20	.21	.26	.22	.19	.14	.28	.28	.13	.12	.20	.21	.36	.42	.39	.15	.31	.18	.20	.09	.30	.12	.36	.11	.34	.37	1.00	.12	.28	.36	.27	.36	.34	.10	.05
Mir Hossein Mousavi	-.01	.05	.07	.03	-.02	-.03	.07	.07	.09	.11	.02	.02	.14	.10	.07	-.03	.12	.14	-.01	.02	.06	.03	.08	.01	.15	.15	.12	1.00	.06	.19	.10	.13	.12	.05	.08
Firouz Naderi	.19	.16	.27	.18	.28	.17	.26	.25	.17	.12	.21	.22	.29	.26	.21	.18	.23	.09	.14	.13	.23	.15	.17	.17	.26	.28	.28	.06	1.00	.22	.16	.24	.15	.14	.01
Representative of Teachers' Association	.23	.12	.36	.28	.19	.10	.27	.30	.18	.19	.22	.24	.34	.27	.26	.17	.26	.20	.20	.16	.22	.16	.19	.10	.35	.34	.36	.19	.22	1.00	.46	.28	.36	.13	.03
Representative of Kurdish Parties	.22	.14	.30	.27	.19	.08	.22	.23	.11	.19	.21	.19	.26	.23	.22	.17	.18	.26	.23	.13	.18	.13	.17	.12	.29	.25	.27	.10	.16	.46	1.00	.20	.28	.14	.20
Mohammad Nourizad	.24	.22	.33	.24	.17	.20	.29	.31	.20	.09	.20	.34	.43	.33	.33	.21	.31	.24	.31	.09	.17	.20	.23	.13	.41	.32	.36	.13	.24	.28	.20	1.00	.26	.14	.04
Bahareh Hedayat	.16	.20	.29	.34	.17	.05	.36	.33	.09	.11	.19	.19	.32	.36	.25	.15	.19	.10	.16	.08	.24	.09	.36	.12	.30	.31	.34	.12	.15	.36	.28	.26	1.00	.18	.09
Mehdi Yarrahi	.22	.22	.18	.19	.27	.11	.24	.20	.15	.08	.23	.25	.11	.10	.10	.30	.12	.14	.21	.19	.14	.22	.13	.27	.17	.14	.10	.05	.14	.13	.14	.14	.18	1.00	.01
Other names (suggested by respondents)	-.03	.00	.03	.07	-.04	-.08	.06	.04	-.03	.01	-.02	.00	.01	.01	.04	.01	.01	.04	.00	-.03	.03	-.05	.05	-.01	.04	.04	.05	.08	.01	.03	.20	.04	.09	.01	1.00

1.6 The West's Response

This survey asked respondents how the West should respond to the protests. Figure 13 shows that 73% of the target population inside the country believe that Western countries should defend the protestors' rights by seriously pressuring the Iranian government. Of the Iranian respondents outside the country, 96% support this view. In contrast, around 19% of respondents inside the country think that Western powers should not intervene, as the protests are an internal matter.

Figure 13



Respondents who did not disagree with Western interventions were asked how Western governments should respond. Figure 14 shows the views of Iranians inside the country.

More than 70% of the target population agree with proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, expelling the ambassadors of the Islamic Republic, allowing international foreign intervention to protect protestors, sanctioning officials who played a role in suppressing the protests, and seizing Iran's property and assets to cut the government's access to them. Moreover, 66% think that Western governments should support civil leaders and engage with opposition activists and groups. Around 62% agree with ending negotiations to revive the joint nuclear deal (JCPOA), while 6% disagree with ending the negotiations.

Figure 15 shows the answers of respondents outside Iran to a similar question. Over 97% agree with proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization and with sanctioning officials who played a role in suppressing the protests. Moreover, over 90% agree with all other punitive measures.

Figure 14



Figure 15



1.7 Confidence in the Islamic Republic's Institutions

This survey asked respondents about their confidence or trust [i'timād] in the Islamic Republic's various institutions. Figure 16 shows the responses of the target population inside the country. Even though the majority do not trust the regime's institutions, confidence in the army (with 29%) is relatively higher than for other institutions. Banks are the second-most trusted institution, with 24% saying they are to some extent or to a large extent trustworthy. On the other hand, the parliament (with 8%), and the state media and the government (with 10%), are deemed the most untrustworthy. Confidence in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader reaches about 14%; likewise, around 13% say they have confidence in the courts and judicial system, and 17% say they trust the police.

Figure 16



1.8 Transitional Justice and the Death Penalty

Respondents were also asked, were there a transition from an authoritarian regime, what kind of punishment they would agree with in punishing the perpetrators of massacres in the previous regime (Figure 17). Of those who reside in Iran, 16% say they would agree with revolutionary executions of officials responsible for the killings, and 29% agree with the death penalty for those responsible for the killings should a court reach the verdict after a fair trial—whereas 24% say they would seek punishments other than the death penalty. Only 3% inside the country agree with the option of forgiveness and general amnesty, and 27% say they think that legal experts should decide on the matter.

Of those who reside outside Iran, 8% agree with revolutionary executions, and 25% agree with the death penalty for those responsible for the killings should a court reach the verdict after a fair trial—while 48% disagree with the death penalty.

Figure 17



Figure 18 shows a cross-tabulation of the demographics of respondents inside Iran and their answers to the question about punishments for officials responsible for killings. As can be seen, individuals below the age of 30 agree with revolutionary executions significantly more often than do respondents of other age groups. Likewise, women and respondents without university education agree more often with revolutionary executions than do men and respondents with a university education.

Figure 18



The same question was asked in a survey conducted by GAMAAN in September 2020. A comparison of the two surveys' results for respondents inside the country shows that the percentage of those who agree with revolutionary executions doubled in this period (Figure 19). In contrast, the percentage of those who would seek punishments other than the death penalty declined from 32% to 24%.

Figure 19



1.9 Iranians' Political Orientations

GAMAAN asked, in this and in previous surveys, about respondents' political orientations. The results of the most recent survey show that 60% of respondents inside the country describe themselves as proponents for regime change as a precondition for any meaningful change; 16% are proponents of a structural transformation and transition away from the Islamic Republic; 11% are proponents of the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader; 6% are proponents of gradual reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic; and 6% don't identify with any of these political orientations.

Figure 20 shows the transformation of Iranian society in the past three surveys conducted by GAMAAN. It can be observed that after the 2022 nationwide protests the percentage of proponents of regime change increased by approximately 20%.

Figure 20



SECTION TWO: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Sampling Method

The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) conducted the survey "Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 2022 Nationwide Protests" between December 21–31, 2022. This survey was conducted online using a specialized and secure platform. GAMAAN strives to scientifically measure, document, and analyze Iranians' attitudes toward potentially sensitive social and political topics, which conventional survey modes do not adequately capture in societies under authoritarianism such as Iran.

The online survey reached respondents in Iran and across the globe. It was spread by using the multiple chain-referral sampling method, through a VPN platform widely used in Iran (Psiphon), satellite television channels (Iran International and Voice of America Persian), and diverse pages and channels on social media (Telegram, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Twitter).

According to The World Bank, more than 84% of Iran's population currently use the Internet. According to the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), in May 2022 around 78% of Iranians over 18 used at least one social media platform. Moreover, according to the country's official statistics, around 10% of the population above 18 years old are not literate and cannot read and write—and yet they also use social media. This means that approximately 85% of the literate population above 18 years old uses at least one social media platform. In this context, it is possible to reach a substantial percentage of Iranians through the Internet and ask about their views.

Studies employing opt-in online surveys face methodical challenges that are inherent to online sampling methods. These include the so-called network effect, which means that the survey is more likely to reach respondents who hold beliefs similar to those held by the organizers; as well as self-selection, which means that those with a special interest in the survey topic are more likely to participate. To reduce these effects, the survey was spread through individuals, groups, pages, and channels of diverse social, religious, and political perspectives. Figure 21 shows on which social media platform respondents encountered the survey. These measures also increased the sample size, further minimizing bias.

Figure 21



One of the survey questions' results shows that only 11% of respondents inside Iran and 13% outside Iran said they previously participated in GAMAAN's surveys. This is an indication that the survey circulation strategy among diverse groups reached individuals outside GAMAAN's social network.

2.2 Survey Design and Raw Sample Characteristics

Respondents were asked to answer, in addition to questions regarding the topic of this survey, demographic questions about their sex, age, education, province of residence, urban or rural area of residence, employment, household income, language spoken at home, and health care insurance. Because respondents could participate anonymously, it can be said that they felt more secure to express their genuine opinions.

Over 200,000 respondents inside and outside Iran completed the survey. According to their answers, 89% reside in Iran and 21% live outside Iran. Respondents inside Iran live in all 31 of the country's provinces, in urban and rural areas. Multiple verification methods show that approximately 10% of respondents may have either intentionally or inadvertently misidentified their country of residence.

2.3 Data Cleaning

This survey contained one question to detect random responses and bot submissions. Samples with a wrong response to this question and samples with contradictory answers were excluded. (For example, those who declared that they had not reached the voting age in the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections but also chose their age as being over 30, or those who declared that in 2021 they had not reached the voting age but also claimed to have voted in 2017.)

In this report, "refined sample" refers to the raw sample after data cleaning. This sample's size was 158,395 respondents inside Iran and 42,456 respondents outside Iran. Having taken into account the standard age groups of Iran's population as outlined in the 2016 Census Report, the refined sample to be used for matching and raking includes only respondents above 19 years old who live in Iran.

2.4 Extracting a Representative Sample of Respondents Inside Iran

Samples obtained from online surveys generally do not properly overlap with the target population's characteristics. The target population for Iranians in Iran comprises literate adults above 19 years old who have access to the Internet and can read the survey questions. They make up 90% of the total adult population in Iran.

According to analyses and recommendations by the Pew Research Center, when researchers work with large online opt-in samples, the combination of matching and weighting methods can better adjust the refined sample and correct bias than can either method alone. The same research by Pew shows that weighting online opt-in samples benefits from including a political variable next to demographic variables such as sex, age, and geographic distribution—which decreases sampling bias while increasing generalizability.

To obtain a representative sample, a sample matching method was used, followed by a weighting method called raking. First, in matching, 1,860 samples were randomly selected from the refined sample of respondents inside Iran, based on the interlocked variables of age, education, rural or urban region, and electoral behavior in 2017. (The variables of sex and province were not interlocked.) Second, the weighting method of raking was used, with the same target variables, to obtain the representative sample that approximates the target population.

After matching and weighting, a reliable effective sample size of 1,696 was generated; this can provide respective credibility level and credibility intervals of 95% and 5%. Matching and weighting were carried out using the tools of the Dutch company Spinnaker Research. For extracting the target population's demographics and political behavior, GAMAAN made use of

the 2016 National Population and Housing Census and the results of a survey on the 2017 presidential elections.

2.5 Sample Demographics of Respondents Inside Iran

The following tables compare the demographic variables of the refined sample, the sample after matching and raking, and the target population. The demographic characteristics of the representative sample, after matching and raking, are consistent with those of the target population.

Table 3: Sex Distribution

Sex	**Refined sample (number of samples)**	**Sample after matching and raking**	**Literate population above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)**
Female	38% (54,953)	47%	47%
Male	62% (89,812)	53%	53%
Other	0.7% (1,072)	-	-

Table 4: Rural/Urban Distribution

Region	**Refined sample (number of samples)**	**Sample after matching and raking**	**Literate population above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)**
Rural Areas	3.5% (5,085)	21.2%	21.2%
Urban Areas	96.5% (139,680)	78.8%	78.8%

Table 5: Age Group Distribution

Age groups	**Refined sample (number of samples)**	**Sample after matching and raking**	**Literate population above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)**
Between 20 and 29 years old	17.8% (25,825)	30.1%	30.1%
Between 30 and 49 years old	66.5% (96,202)	51.1%	51.1%
At least 50 years old	18.8% (22,738)	18.8%	18.8%

Table 6: Education Level Distribution

Education level	**Refined sample (number of samples)**	**Sample after matching and raking**	**Literate population above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)**
Non-university educated	20.1% (29,081)	72.3%	72.3%
University educated	79.9% (115,684)	27.7%	27.7%

Table 7: Province Distribution

Province of residence	**Refined sample (number of samples)**	**Sample after matching and raking**	**Literate population above 19 years old (from the 2016 Census)**
East Azerbaijan	3.0% (4,334)	4.8%	4.8%
West Azerbaijan	1.9% (2,803)	3.6%	3.6%
Ardabil	0.7% (950)	1.5%	1.5%
Isfahan	6.4% (9,292)	6.9%	6.9%
Alborz	5.7% (8,195)	3.8%	3.8%
Ilam	0.6% (826)	0.7%	0.7%
Bushehr	1.0% (1,421)	1.5%	1.5%
Tehran	39.9% (57,822)	19.1%	19.1%
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	0.6% (900)	1.1%	1.1%
South Khorasan	0.4% (566)	0.9%	0.9%
Razavi Khorasan	5.9% (8,585)	7.8%	7.8%
North Khorasan	0.6% (897)	0.9%	0.9%
Khuzestan	3.3% (4,798)	5.4%	5.4%
Zanjan	0.8% (1,100)	1.3%	1.3%
Semnan	0.6% (821)	1.0%	1.0%
Sistan and Baluchistan	0.7% (992)	2.1%	2.1%
Fars	5.7% (8,314)	6.3%	6.3%
Ghazvin	1.1% (1,517)	1.6%	1.6%
Qom	1.0% (1,442)	1.6%	1.6%
Kurdistan	1.7% (2,467)	1.8%	1.8%
Kerman	1.5% (2,166)	3.6%	3.6%
Kermanshah	1.9% (2,785)	2.4%	2.4%
Kohgiluyeh and BoyerAhmad	0.4% (606)	0.8%	0.8%
Golestan	1.0% (1,508)	2.2%	2.2%
Gilan	4.2% (6,090)	3.5%	3.5%
Lorestan	1.1% (1,620)	2.0%	2.0%
Mazandaran	3.6% (5,243)	4.5%	4.5%
Markazi	1.2% (1,766)	1.8%	1.8%
Hormozgan	1.3% (1,935)	2.0%	2.0%
Hamadan	1.1% (1,561)	2.1%	2.1%
Yazd	1.0% (1,443)	1.4%	1.4%

Apart from demographic variables, the respondents' voting behavior in the 2017 Iranian presidential election was also used for matching and raking—given that this election's results were not controversial and the reliability of the final, formally declared numbers (Table 8).

Table 8: Voting Behavior of Respondents in Iran

Vote in the 2017 presidential election	**Refined sample (number of samples)**	**Sample after matching and raking**	**Official results of the 2017 presidential election**
Hassan Rouhani (+ Hashemitaba)	48.3% (69,922)	44.1%	42.2%
Ebrahim Raisi (+ Mir-Salim)	2.2% (3,222)	26.9%	28.8%
I did not vote (+ blank vote)	49.5% (71,621)	29.0%	29.0%

2.6 Sample Demographics of Respondents Outside Iran

For Iranians in diaspora as a whole, there is no demographic benchmark that can be used to weight a refined survey sample to represent the target population. However, the high number of samples did result in balanced sex and age distributions of respondents reporting to reside in 133 countries. The refined sample of Iranians in diaspora can be interpreted as a relatively adequate representation of the attitudes of Iranians outside Iran who read Persian and are interested in Iranian politics. The following tables show the demographic distributions of respondents outside Iran.

Table 9: Sex of Respondents Outside Iran

Sex	**Refined sample (number of samples)**
Female	47.9% (20,335)
Male	51.3% (21,788)
Other	0.8% (333)

Table 10: Rural/Urban Distribution of Respondents Outside Iran

Region	**Refined sample (number of samples)**
Rural Areas	1.6% (675)
Urban Areas	98.4% (41,781)

Table 11: Age Group of Respondents Outside Iran

Age groups	**Refined sample (number of samples)**
Between 19 and 29 years old	10.1% (4,273)
Between 30 and 49 years old	66.7% (28,315)
At least 50 years old	23.2% (9,868)

Table 12: Education Level of Respondents Outside Iran

Education level	**Refined sample (number of samples)**
High school diploma and lower education	9.8% (4,151)
University degree	90.2% (38,305)

Table 13: Country of Residence of Respondents Outside Iran

Country	**Refined sample (number of samples)**
Canada	20.3% (8,588)
United States	19.8% (8,379)
Germany	15.1% (6,380)
United Kingdom	6.6% (2,807)
Turkey	5.8% (2,476)
Australia	5.8% (2,448)
Sweden	4.9% (2,064)
Netherlands	3.8% (1,592)
Italy	2.2% (952)
France	2.1% (903)
Austria	1.6% (971)
Norway	1.2% (521)
Denmark	1.0% (425)
Switzerland	0.9% (392)
Belgium	0.9% (370)
United Arab Emirates	0.9% (364)
Spain	0.7% (296)
Finland	0.7% (295)
New Zealand	0.5% (208)
Malaysia	0.3% (135)
Georgia	0.3% (115)
Iraq	0.3% (109)
Cyprus	0.2% (103)
Japan	0.2% (96)
Portugal	0.2% (91)
Mexico	0.2% (85)
Armenia	0.2% (84)
Hungary	0.2% (81)
Oman	0.2% (80)
Poland	0.2% (71)
Other	2.5% (1,192)

Table 14: Voting Behavior of Respondents Outside Iran

Vote in the 2017 presidential election	**Refined sample (number of samples)**
Hassan Rouhani (+ Hashemitaba)	33.5% (14,208)
Ebrahim Raisi (+ Mir-Salim)	0.3% (124)
I did not vote (+ blank vote)	66.2% (28,124)

2.7 Reliability Checks for the Representative Sample of Respondents Inside Iran

2.7.1 Comparison with Social and Economic Factors

One of the methods for examining the reliability and generalizability of a weighted sample is to compare the results from the weighted sample against external evidence.

Table 15 compares the status of economic activity (percentage of employed individuals) in the weighted sample with that of the target population on both urban and rural levels. While the weighted sample includes only literate individuals above 19 years old, the fall 2022 workforce statistics reflects both literate and illiterate individuals above 15. The employment rates of illiterate people and the age group between 15 and 19 are lower than that of the literate population. Taking this into account, Table 15 shows that the employment rate of the representative sample—that is, after matching and raking—is consistent with that of the target population.

Table 15: Employment Rate Distribution in Iran

Employment status	**Refined sample**	**Sample after matching and raking (literate individuals above 19 years old)**	**Workforce statistics (individuals above 15 years old; fall 2022)**
Whole country	62.9%	45.6%	37.7%
Urban areas	63.5%	47.4%	36.9%
Rural areas	47.9%	39.0%	40.5%

The respondents were also surveyed with respect to their household income. This facilitates a comparison between the respondents' economic situation and that of the target population. Table 16 shows the household income distribution of the weighted sample. By definition, 10% of the Iranian households belong to each income decile. As shown in the table, the household income distribution of the weighted sample demonstrates a good overlap with that of the target population. Each income decile of the target population is covered by the weighted sample.

Table 16: Household Income Distribution in Iran (based on the official exchange rate, 1 USD = 42,000 Rials)

Income level of different deciles according to the Statistical Center of Iran in 2021	**Refined sample**	**Sample after matching and raking**	**Distribution in society**
First decile (household monthly income below USD 738)	4.4%	12.8%	10%
Second decile (between USD 738 and USD 952)	3.0%	8.4%	10%
Third decile (between USD 952 and USD 1,142)	5.1%	8.8%	10%
Fourth decile (between USD 1,142 and USD 1,309)	4.7%	7.1%	10%
Fifth decile (between USD 1,309 and USD 1,452)	8.5%	11.5%	10%
Sixth decile (between USD 1,452 and USD 1,667)	12.7%	13.8%	10%
Seventh to tenth decile (more than USD 1,667)	60.6%	37.6%	40%

In this survey, participants were also asked what language they usually speak at home. As Table 17 shows, the distribution of colloquial languages in the weighted sample is highly consistent with the statistics published by Ethnologue.

Table 17: Home Language Distribution in Iran

What language do you normally speak at home?	Refined sample	Sample after matching and raking	Ethnologue statistics (2021, 24th ed.)
Farsi	79.9%	68.5%	63.3%
Azerbaijani/Turkic	6.9%	9.9%	13.6%
Kurdish	4.8%	6.5%	5.8%
Luri	3.0%	4.7%	3.6%
Arabic	0.3%	0.8%	3.5%
Gilaki	1.3%	1.7%	3.0%
Mazandarani	0.8%	1.6%	2.8%
Balochi	0.5%	1.7%	1.5%
Laki	0.5%	0.8%	1.5%
Turkmeni	0.2%	0.4%	0.9%
Armeni	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Tati	0.1%	0.4%	0.1%
Other	1.7%	2.7%	0.3%

This survey asked respondents in Iran about their health care insurance. The results provide another opportunity to compare our representative sample—that is, after matching and raking—with external data. In a telephone poll conducted by the government-affiliated Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) in March 2022, Iranians were asked about their insurance. Considering that insurance types are a politically non-sensitive topic, ISPA's results can be used to additionally check this survey's results. Table 18 shows that the two surveys' results on health care insurance types are highly congruent.

Table 18: Health Care Insurance Types in Iran

Which health care insurance do you currently have?	Refined sample	Sample after matching and raking	ISPA Survey 2022 (March)
Social Security Organization	54.9%	47.9%	50.7%
Iran Health Insurance Organization	8.8%	7.9%	7.8%
Salamat	5.8%	9.6%	7.2%
Roostaa	1.2%	6.3%	9.8%
Armed Forces Insurance	2.7%	2.9%	3.4%
Other insurance	1.5%	1.8%	2.9%
I am not insured	25.0%	23.7%	17.6%

2.7.2 Comparison with Attitudinal Questions of the World Values Survey

In the spring of 2020, the World Values Survey (WVS), which is an international research program, conducted a new survey of Iran through on-site interviews. GAMAAN incorporated several WVS questions in this survey. The aim was to evaluate the used survey mode and representative sample, after matching and raking, by comparing the results from both surveys (probability and non-probability, on-site and online). Both "non-sensitive" and "sensitive" questions were asked to test the hypothesis that there should be a discrepancy with the latter and an overlap with the former.

Table 19's comparison of both surveys shows there is minimal difference between responses to non-sensitive questions (such as the importance of family, friends, and work)—while there is significant difference between responses to a question deemed to be sensitive given the current political and social situations in Iran (in this case about religion). This comparison indicates the validity of GAMAAN's representative sample. It also confirms the hypothesis that conventional methods employing survey modes such as telephone and on-site interviewing cannot be seen to reliably gauge true opinions when measuring opinions about sensitive questions in closed societies such as Iran.

Table 19: "Importance in Life" in WVS (spring 2020) and GAMAAN (winter 2022) Surveys

For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life.		**Very important**	**Rather important**	**Not very important**	**Not at all important**	**Do not Know**
Family	WVS	93.9%	5.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0.0%
	GAMAAN	91.3%	6.7%	0.6%	0.3%	1.0%
Friends	WVS	28.6%	54.4%	11.2%	5.7%	0.0%
	GAMAAN	37.7%	51.0%	7.8%	2.1%	1.4%
Work	WVS	78.0%	18.6%	1.9%	1.3%	0.2%
	GAMAAN	78.1%	17.0%	1.9%	1.3%	1.7%
Religion	WVS	69.4%	22.8%	3.5%	4.2%	0.1%
	GAMAAN	24.4%	15.3%	17.9%	40.2%	2.2%

On balance, the weighted sample adequately represents the target population (literate individuals above 19 years old), and the results obtained can be generalized to a substantial majority of the Iranian population (that is, 90% of the adult population) with a 95% credibility level and credibility intervals of 5%.

We at the non-profit research foundation GAMAAN would like to express our sincere gratitude to all of those who took the time to contribute to this survey.

We are professionally committed to sparing no effort in collecting the opinions and attitudes of Iranians from all levels of society and all walks of life. GAMAAN commits itself to ethical guidelines with regard to protecting respondents' submitted data and strives to employ scientific methods in extracting representative samples. We pledge to be transparent to the public and in explaining probable error levels.

Our team gladly receives any comments, suggestions, and criticisms at info@gamaan.org. Scientists and scholars working at universities and research institutes can collaborate with us and request survey data for research purposes, which can be granted upon agreement with GAMAAN's terms.

ABOUT GAMAAN

GAMAAN, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran, is an independent, non-profit research foundation registered in the Netherlands.

GAMAAN uses digital tools and different methods to extract the (real) opinions of Iranians about (sensitive) social and political topics. The rationale for GAMAAN's innovative approach is the fact that conventional survey methods cannot yield valid results in the existing Iranian context. GAMAAN's findings have been cited and discussed in many international outlets, including The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, The Conversation, Deutsche Welle, New York Magazine, and Newsweek, and have been widely covered by Persian media. In 2022, the Market Research Society in London awarded GAMAAN the President's Medal for making an "extraordinary contribution to research."

GAMAAN operates under the supervision of a board that includes Dr. Ammar Maleki (founder and director), an assistant professor of comparative politics at Tilburg University; and Dr. Pooyan Tamimi Arab, an assistant professor of religious studies at Utrecht University.