

Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 2024 Elections

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The Group For Analyzing and
Measuring Attitudes in IRAN
(GAMAAN)

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SURVEY SUMMARY

- The survey “Iranians' Attitudes Towards the 2024 Elections” was conducted from January 31st to February 7th, 2024. The results of this report are based on balancing and weighting a sample of 58,015 respondents from within Iran. The findings reflect the views of the literate population above 19 years old (around 90% of Iran's adult population), and can be generalized with a 95% credibility level and credibility intervals of 5%.
- Approximately 15% of respondents intend to vote in the upcoming Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, while 77% say they will not vote, and about 8% are undecided. Comparison with a survey conducted in July 2023 shows that those undecided decreased from about 18% to 8%. These undecided voters became non-voters as the percentage of voters only increased by 1%.
- About 38% of the population were unaware of the timing of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections scheduled for March.
- A comparison of electoral behavior shows that 39% of those who voted in the 2019 Islamic Consultative Assembly elections do not intend to vote this year. Among first-time voters, 65% do not intend to vote, while approximately 27% do.
- If a free referendum with the question “Islamic Republic: Yes or No?” were held today, around 75% would vote “No,” 16% “Yes,” and about 9% are unsure.
- Participants were asked about their preferred method for change—elections or protests. One-third view protests as more effective, 13% favor elections, and another one-third see neither method as effective.
- The survey also gauged views on the Israel-Hamas conflict, with about 35% blaming Hamas as the primary party responsible for the conflict, 20% Israel, and 31% both parties.

SECTION ONE: KEY SURVEY FINDINGS

In this report, all results and tables are calculated based on the weighted sample of respondents within the country. The target population was the literate population above 19 years old (approximately 90% of the adult population in Iran). Complete information on the methodology and sample specifications is provided in Section Two.

1-1 The Islamic Consultative Assembly Elections

Approximately one month prior to the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections or parliamentary elections of the Solar Hijri year 1402 (2023-2024 CE), respondents were asked between January 31st and February 7th, 2024, whether they intend to vote. This question was also posed in a GAMAAN survey conducted in July 2023. According to the survey results (Figure 1), about 15% intend to vote in the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, while 77% stated they would not vote, and about 8% were still undecided.

Comparison with a survey conducted in July 2023 shows that those undecided decreased from about 18% to 8%. These undecided voters became non-voters as the percentage of voters only increased by 1%. Additionally, the survey revealed that about 38% of the population were unaware of the timing of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections (in March 2024) (Figure 2).

Figure 1






Figure 2



The survey also inquired about participants' involvement in the previous Islamic Consultative Assembly elections in 2019. Comparing the electoral behavior of respondents in the previous election with their decision for the upcoming election reveals that 39% of those who voted in the 2019 elections do not intend to participate this year. Among first-time voters eligible to participate in the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, 65% do not plan to vote, while about 27% intend to vote (Figure 3).


Figure 3



1-2 Islamic Republic: Yes or No?

Respondents were asked if they would vote for or against the Islamic Republic if a free referendum were held today with the question “Islamic Republic: Yes or No?”. The results indicate that approximately 75% would vote “No to the Islamic Republic,” 16% “Yes to the Islamic Republic,” and about 9% would choose “I don't know” (Figure 4).


Figure 4



1-3 Elections or Protests?

Respondents were asked which of two methods they consider more effective for creating change in Iran, participating in protests (like those of last year) or participating in elections (like the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections). Around one-third of the target population (33%) considers participating in protests a more effective method, while about 13% see participating in elections as more effective. Another one-third (33%) do not find either method effective for creating change. About 18% said they had no opinion on this question (Figure 5).

Figure 5




1-4 The Conflict between Israel and Hamas

The survey also explored Iranian views on a significant global and regional matter: the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Respondents were asked to identify the party they consider mainly responsible for the conflict.

As shown in Figure 6, about 35% believe Hamas is the primary party at fault for the conflict, while approximately 20% attribute the primary responsibility to Israel. Additionally, about 31% consider both parties responsible for the conflict.

Figure 6




1-5 Political Orientations

Similar to previous GAMAAN surveys, this survey included a question about participants' political orientation. The results show that about 40% of the population favors overthrowing the Islamic Republic as a precondition for any change, 25% desire structural transformations and a transition from the Islamic Republic, 11% support preserving the principles and values of the revolution along with the policies of the regime and leadership, and 9% support gradual reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic system. Approximately 14% do not identify with any of these orientations.

Figure 7 illustrates the social base of political orientations within Iran as revealed in the last four GAMAAN surveys over the past two years. It is observed that after the subsidence of last year's nationwide protests, political orientations in Iran have reverted to the state of previous years, with no significant change in the support base of either the reformist or conservative political streams.

Figure 7



SECTION TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2-1 Sampling Method

The survey “Iranians' Attitudes Towards the 2024 Elections” was conducted by the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) from January 31st to February 7th, 2024. This survey was carried out online, utilizing a specialized and secure platform for sampling.

GAMAAN has employed innovative methods to systematically and scientifically measure and record viewpoints and opinions that, due to the nature of authoritarian regimes, cannot be openly questioned or measured using conventional survey methods.


The online questionnaire reached diverse demographic groups across Iran through random sampling via the popular Internet censorship circumvention platform Psiphon VPN, as well as ensuing sharing by respondents on social networks (Telegram, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Twitter).

According to the latest statistics from the [International Telecommunication Union](#), about 82% of Iran's population are internet users, and [research within Iran](#) indicates that 80% of these internet users utilize Internet censorship circumvention tools. Between 5 to 11 million people in Iran use [Psiphon](#) on daily basis. Distributing the survey through random sampling among users connected to Psiphon mitigated network bias (i.e., the likelihood of participants sharing similar views with the organizers).

Moreover, the [International Telecommunication Union data](#) shows that only about 55% Iranian households have a landline telephone. This means that random sampling via the internet and internet censorship circumvention tools can cover a broader segment of society than telephone surveys can (through landlines).

Figure 8 shows the distribution of respondents' access to the survey questionnaire. One survey question revealed that only 14% of respondents had previously participated in GAMAAN's surveys, indicating that the random sampling method was effective in distributing the questionnaire among a wide range of demographic groups, reaching far beyond networks familiar with GAMAAN.

Figure 8



2-2 Questionnaire and Sample Characteristics

In this survey, in addition to the main questions, respondents were asked about their demographic characteristics (gender, age group, level of education, province of residence, urban or rural area, employment status, household income level, spoken language at home, type of health insurance); respondents were also asked about their political orientation and past electoral behavior. Since respondents participated in the survey anonymously without questions about personal characteristics, it is estimated that they felt more secure in expressing their genuine opinions.

Over 60,000 respondents from inside and outside the country fully completed the survey questionnaire. Given the distribution of the questionnaire through a circumvention platform that only targeted users inside Iran and based on what respondents have stated about their place of residence, 99% of the respondents were residents of Iran. Iranians inside the country from all 31 provinces and from urban and rural areas participated in this survey (Table 5).

2-3 Sample Refinement

A question was placed to identify random or bot-entered responses. Incorrect responses to this question, as well as contradictory cases were removed from the refined sample (such as those who stated they were not of voting age in 2017 or 2021 but mentioned their age group as over 30 years, or those who said they were not of voting age in 2021 but had voted in 2017). After the refinements, the final sample size from inside Iran was 58,015 respondents. In this report, the term “raw sample” refers to the refined sample from within the country. Considering the standard age groups in publicly available census characteristics and statistical data, the final sample used in this analysis only includes respondents above 19 years old.

2-4 Extracting a Representative Sample

Online survey samples usually do not fully match the demographic characteristics of the target population; therefore, various balancing methods such as weighting and the sample matching method are used to balance the raw sample and align it with the

main characteristics of the target population. The target population for this survey are literate individuals above 19 years old residing in Iran (those who have the ability to use the internet and read survey questions, covering 90% of the adult population of Iran). In this research, the raking weighting method was used to extract a representative sample from the raw sample. According the [Pew Research Center](#), this weighting method, considering appropriate demographic variables, is one of the most effective and reliable methods for balancing online survey samples.

To convert the raw sample of respondents within the country into a representative sample of the target population, the raking method was used based on five demographic variables: age group, gender, level of education, residential area (urban or rural), and provincial population. Given that the sampling method using a circumvention platform is similar to random sampling, this survey's raw sample had a balanced distribution and high quality.

After the weighting calculations, the effective sample size was 14,573, a very high sample size for a 95% credibility level and a 5% credibility interval. The sample weighting calculations were performed using a specialized tool of the Dutch company [Sample Weighting](#). To determine the most up-to-date demographic characteristics of the Iranian population, GAMAAN relied on the [2022 Labor Force Survey](#).

2-5 Sample Demographics

The tables below depict the distribution of population variables in the raw survey sample, the weighted sample, and the target population. It can be observed that the demographic characteristics of the weighted sample closely match those of the target population.

Table 1: Sex Distribution

Sex	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population above 19 years old (work force statistics 2022)
Female	18.4% (10,692)	47.9%	47.9%
Male	81.6 (47,323)	52.1%	52.1%

Table 2: Rural/Urban Distribution

Region	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population above 19 years old (work force statistics 2022)
Rural Areas	6.2% (3,574)	19.7%	19.7%
Urban Areas	93.8% (54,441)	80.3%	80.3%

Table 3: Age Group Distribution

Age groups	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population above 19 years old (work force statistics 2022)
Between 20 and 29 years old	7.6% (4,374)	19.9%	19.9%
Between 30 and 49 years old	58.8% (34,137)	53.9%	53.9%
At least 50 years old	33.6% (19,504)	26.2%	26.2%

Table 4: Education Level Distribution

Education level	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population above 19 years old (work force statistics 2022)
Non-university educated	29.1% (16,902)	72.3%	72.3%
University educated	70.9% (41,113)	27.7%	27.7%

Table 5: Province Distribution

Province of residence	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population above 19 years old (work force statistics 2022)
East Azerbaijan	5.1% (2,966)	4.8%	4.8%
West Azerbaijan	2.4% (1,400)	3.7%	3.7%
Ardabil	1.4% (798)	1.4%	1.4%
Isfahan	10.0% (5,831)	6.9%	6.9%
Alborz	4.2% (2,435)	3.8%	3.8%
Ilam	0.7% (405)	0.7%	0.7%
Bushehr	1.0% (590)	1.4%	1.4%
Tehran	26.0% (15,110)	18.7%	18.7%
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	1.4% (780)	1.1%	1.1%
South Khorasan	1.2% (684)	0.9%	0.9%
Razavi Khorasan	7.6% (4,424)	8.0%	8.0%
North Khorasan	0.9% (532)	0.9%	0.9%
Khuzestan	2.8% (1,596)	5.5%	5.5%
Zanjan	1.0% (603)	1.3%	1.3%
Semnan	0.7% (424)	1.0%	1.0%
Sistan and Baluchistan	0.8% (452)	2.4%	2.4%
Fars	8.2% (4,782)	6.2%	6.2%
Ghazvin	0.9% (521)	1.6%	1.6%
Qom	1.1% (651)	1.6%	1.6%
Kurdistan	2.2% (1,287)	1.8%	1.8%
Kerman	2.1% (1,215)	3.9%	3.9%
Kermanshah	2.1% (1,213)	2.3%	2.3%
Kohgiluyeh and BoyerAhmad	0.7% (414)	0.8%	0.8%
Golestan	2.2% (1,271)	2.1%	2.1%
Gilan	3.1% (1,826)	3.4%	3.4%
Lorestan	2.1% (1,226)	2.0%	2.0%
Mazandaran	2.4% (1,395)	4.5%	4.5%
Markazi	1.5% (874)	1.8%	1.8%
Hormozgan	1.1% (612)	2.1%	2.1%
Hamadan	1.4% (800)	2.0%	2.0%
Yazd	1.6% (898)	1.5%	1.5%

In this survey, unlike GAMAAN's previous surveys, the variable of the 2017 election behavior was not used to weight the final sample. This was because, due to the passage of time, many respondents claimed not to remember their election behavior from six years ago. Additionally, many young respondents did not have voting rights during that election. On the other hand, the use of random sampling methods through

the VPN platform ensured that the raw survey sample included a balanced distribution of respondents with various political orientations in society. To test this claim, it is possible to examine responses to a question about respondents’ political orientation. It was determined that those who support “the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader” (known as Principlists or conservatives) constitute 11% of the weighted sample, which is consistent with the social base of this group based on the results of [previous GAMAAN surveys](#) and recent surveys by [other institutions](#).

2-6 Reliability Checks

2-6-1 Comparison of Economic and Social Statistics

One of the methods that can be used to assess the credibility and representativeness of the weighted sample is to compare the results of the weighted sample with external evidence. Table 6 displays the employment status of individuals in the weighted sample compared to the target population at two levels, urban and rural, for the literate population above 19 years old, based on the annual [labor force report](#). As can be observed, the employment ratio for the weighted sample is consistent with the target population.

Table 6: Employment Status

Employment status	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Workforce statistics (literate individuals above 19 years old; 2022)
Whole country	57.7%	41.6%	42.2%
Urban areas	58.6%	42.3%	40.8%
Rural areas	44.5%	39.1%	47.8%

In this survey, participants were also asked about their household income status to compare the distribution of economic status in the sample with the target population. Table 7 illustrates the distribution of household income status. According to the definition, ten percent of households in the country are placed in each decile. As can be seen, the distribution of household income status for three groups, low income (comprising the first three deciles), medium income (comprising the middle three deciles), and high income (comprising the top four deciles) in the weighted sample aligns with the recent [official statistics](#) on household income levels in society.

Table 7: Household Income Distribution in Iran (official exchange rate, [1 USD = 285,000 Rials](#))

Income level of different deciles according to the Statistical Center of Iran in 2023	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Distribution in society
First three lower deciles (household monthly income below 7 million Rials)	17.5%	31.3%	30%
Middle three deciles (household monthly income between 7 and 13 million Rials)	39.1%	42.8%	30%
Upper four deciles (household monthly income above 13 million Rials)	43.4%	25.9%	40%

In this survey, participants were also asked about the language spoken at home. As shown in Table 8, the distribution of spoken languages in the weighted sample closely matches the statistics provided by [Ethnologue](#) encyclopedia for Iran.

Table 8: Home Language Distribution in Iran

What language do you normally speak at home?	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Ethnologue statistics (2021, 24th ed.)
Farsi	73.7%	68.5%	60.1%
Azerbaijani/Turkic	10.5%	11.3%	12.9%
Kurdish	5.2%	5.7%	5.7%
Luri	3.8%	4.3%	4.8%
Baluchi	0.4%	1.4%	1.4%
Gilaki	1.3%	1.8%	2.9%
Mazandarani	0.8%	1.5%	2.7%
Arabic	0.4%	0.9%	1.8%
Laki	0.8%	0.9%	1.4%
Qashqai	0.4%	0.4%	1.1%
Turkmeni	0.4%	0.4%	0.9%
Dari (Afghan Persian)	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%
Tati	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%
Lari	0.2%	0.4%	0.1%
Armeni	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Other	1.7%	2.1%	3.0%

The distribution of the type of health insurance of respondents is another external evidence used for the validation of the weighted sample. In this survey, participants were asked about the type of health insurance they have. This question was also asked through a telephone survey by [ISPA in March 2022](#). Since the type of insurance coverage of individuals is considered a non-sensitive question, a comparison with the results can serve as a criterion for validating the weighted sample. As seen in Table 9, the distribution of health insurance coverage in the weighted sample closely aligns with the statistics provided by the ISPA survey.

Table 9: Health Care Insurance Types in Iran

Which health care insurance do you currently have?	Refined sample	Weighted sample	ISPA Survey 2022 (March)
Social Security Organization	52.8%	48.9%	50.7%
Iran Health Insurance Organization	9.2%	10.9%	7.2%
Salamat	13.7%	9.9%	7.8%
Roostaa	2.4%	6.8%	9.8%
Armed Forces Insurance	2.7%	2.9%	3.4%
Other insurance	1.7%	1.5%	2.9%
I am not insured	17.4%	19.1%	17.6%

2-6-2 Validation Using the World Values Survey (WVS)

The [World Values Survey \(WVS\)](#) conducted a survey in Iran using face-to-face interviews in the spring of 2020. In the Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2024 Elections survey, some questions from the WVS survey were included alongside other questions to compare the results of the two surveys. To this end, a set of non-sensitive questions, alongside one sensitive question, were asked to compare the results of the two surveys.

Table 10: “Importance in Life” in WVS (spring 2020) and GAMAAN (February 2024) Surveys

For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life.		Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not Know
Family	WVS	93.9%	5.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	94.0%	4.1%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%
Friends	WVS	28.6%	54.4%	11.2%	5.7%	0%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	31.8%	51.0%	12.3%	3.5%	1.4%
Work	WVS	78.0%	18.6%	1.9%	1.3%	0.2%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	86.4%	9.3%	1.4%	1.4%	1.5%
Religion	WVS	69.4%	22.8%	3.5%	4.2%	0.1%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	27.9%	17.8%	16.4%	34.8%	3.1%

As seen in Table 10, the overall importance ratings of non-sensitive topics (family, friends, and work) in both surveys show minor differences, while regarding a sensitive topic, religion, in the political and social context of Iran, the responses in the two surveys are entirely different.

This comparative analysis corroborates the hypothesis that measuring people’s real opinions regarding sensitive questions faces serious challenges if based on common survey modes like telephone and face-to-face interviews.

With the confirmation of multiple validation tests, the weighted sample can be considered representative of the target population (literate individuals above 19 years old), and the results obtained from it can be generalized to the majority of the Iranian target population (about 90% of the adult population of the country) with a [95% credibility level and a 5% credibility interval](#).

We at the non-profit research foundation GAMAAN would like to express our sincere gratitude to all of those who took the time to contribute to this survey.

We are professionally committed to sparing no effort in collecting the opinions and attitudes of Iranians from all levels of society and all walks of life. GAMAAN commits itself to ethical guidelines with regard to protecting respondents' submitted data and strives to employ scientific methods in extracting representative samples. We pledge to be transparent to the public and in explaining probable error levels.

Our team gladly receives any comments, suggestions, and criticisms. Scientists and scholars working at universities and research institutes can collaborate with us and request survey data, which can be granted upon agreement with GAMAAN's terms.

GAMAAN can be reached at info@gamaan.org.

ABOUT GAMAAN

GAMAAN, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran, is an independent, non-profit research foundation registered in the Netherlands. We study Iranians' attitudes towards different social and political topics.

GAMAAN conducts online surveys to extract the (real) opinions of Iranians about sensitive topics. The rationale for GAMAAN's innovative approach, spreading surveys on a large variety of digital channels and collaborating with VPN-platforms, is the fact that conventional survey modes like face-to-face and telephone interviewing cannot yield valid results in the existing Iranian context. To obtain representative samples, we use matching and weighting methods; we then compare our results with external data and other survey institutes' results for non-sensitive questions. In this way, we strive to understand the extent to which our results can be said to be representative.

GAMAAN's findings have been cited and discussed in many international outlets, including The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, The Conversation, Deutsche Welle, New York Magazine, and Newsweek, and have been widely covered by Persian media. In 2022, GAMAAN was awarded the Market Research Society's President's Medal in London for making an "extraordinary contribution to research."

GAMAAN operates under the supervision of a board including Dr. Ammar Maleki (founder and director), an assistant professor of comparative politics at Tilburg University, and Dr. Pooyan Tamimi Arab, an assistant professor of religious studies at Utrecht University.

