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IRANIANS' POLITICAL PREFERENCES IN 2024

An Analytical Report on GAMAAN's Survey Findings



August 2025



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Summary of Key Findings

The findings of this report are based on GAMAAN's June 2024 survey. In this survey, 77,216 respondents from inside Iran participated. After weighting, a representative sample of Iran's literate adult population, with an effective sample size of 20,492, was used to derive the results presented in this report.

Section One: The Islamic Republic and Political Orientations

- A significant majority of Iranians (around 70%) oppose the continuation of the Islamic Republic. The highest level of opposition (81%) occurred during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising.
- The dominant political orientation in society is “regime change as a precondition for change” (approximately 40%), followed by “structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic.” Support for regime change is more prevalent among the youth and the educated population.
- Support for “the principles of the Islamic revolution and the Supreme Leader” has decreased (from 18% in 2022 to 11% in 2024).
- Opposition to the Islamic Republic is higher among the youth, urban residents, and the highly educated.

Section Two: Forms of Governance

- An overwhelming majority of Iranians (89%) support democracy.
- About half of the population (43%) is open to authoritarian rule by a strong individual leader; this view is more common among rural residents and people with lower levels of education.
- Governance based on religious law and military rule faces widespread opposition (66% and 71% respectively).

Section Three: Preferred Political System and Structure

- Only about 20% of Iranians support the continuation of the Islamic Republic; the majority want a different political system, such as a (secular) republic, a (constitutional) monarchy, or a more decentralized democracy.
- When it comes to preferred alternatives, about 26% favor a secular republic and around 21% support a monarchy. For 11%, the specific form of the alternative system is not important. About 22% report lacking sufficient information to choose an alternative system.
- Around 15% support a federal system—either as a federal republic (10%) or federal monarchy (5%). Support for a federal structure is especially high in ethnic regions such as Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, and Sistan and Baluchestan.

- Support for a republican and decentralized structure is higher among the youth and educated individuals. Support for monarchy is higher among men than women, and among those without higher education.
- Supporters of the Islamic Republic and a non-federal monarchy show a higher tendency toward preferring individual authoritarian rule. In contrast, supporters of a non-federal secular republic, a federal republic, and a federal monarchy significantly oppose the idea of authoritarian governance.

Section Four: Party and Ideological Preferences

- Iranians mostly favor hypothetical parties that prioritize individual freedoms and human rights (37%); seek social justice and workers' rights (33%); or emphasize national pride and Iranian nationalism (26%).
- Preferences for parties focusing on environmentalism (10%), free-market economics (9%), and decentralization and minority rights (8%) follow. Only about 5% support parties that prioritize traditional and religious values.
- The youth and educated individuals show the highest support for parties promoting human rights, environmentalism, and free-market economics.
- Support for social justice is higher among women (35%) than men (31%), while men show more support for a nationalist party (29% vs. 23%).
- A general conception of human rights, with emphasis on individual freedoms, is the most popular ideological orientation among supporters of the secular republic (51%), federal republic (50%), and federal monarchy (53%).
- Support for nationalism is most pronounced among monarchy supporters (43%).
- Parties focused on human rights, the environment, free markets, and decentralization receive the least support among supporters of the Islamic Republic.

Section Five: Popularity of Civil and Political Figures

- Among ruling-affiliated individuals, Ali Khamenei (9%), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (9%), and Mohammad Javad Zarif (6%) receive the most support. Among opposition figures, Reza Pahlavi (31%), Toomaj Salehi (6%), and Narges Mohammadi (5%) are the most popular.
- Reza Pahlavi's popularity has experienced a slight decline compared to past years, reflecting a relatively stable selection rate in recent years. At the same time, support for figures such as Toomaj Salehi, Narges Mohammadi, and Fatemeh Sepehri has grown.
- Around 15% of the public express no preference for any of the political figures mentioned, higher than in previous surveys.
- Support for Reza Pahlavi is higher among men (36%) than women (27%), among older individuals (34%) more than youth (29%), and among the less educated (33%) more than the educated (27%).

- Reza Pahlavi garners the most support among monarchy (81%) and federal monarchy (74%) supporters. Among those who have no specific political system preference, 30% choose him, whereas only about 20% of republicans support him.
- Reza Pahlavi's highest levels of support are observed in Gilan (42%), Alborz (40%), and North Khorasan (38%). His lowest support is seen in Kurdistan (15%), West Azerbaijan (17%), and East Azerbaijan (20%).
- A clustering of political figures based on public opinion reveals 11 distinct political groupings in society:
 1. Principlists (Khameneis, Ahmadinejad)
 2. Reformists (Mousavi, Khatami, Zarif, Tajzadeh, Faezeh Hashemi)
 3. Pahlavi supporters (Reza Pahlavi, Amir Taheri, Ali Karimi)
 4. Liberal nationalists (Hossein Ronaghi, Majid Tavakoli, Bahareh Hedayat)
 5. Civil/Human rights activists (Narges Mohammadi, Shirin Ebadi, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Kaveh Madani, Reza Alijani, Faraj Sarkouhi)
 6. Solidarity Council (Esmaeilion, Alinejad, Mehtadi, Bonyadi)
 7. Imprisoned civil activists (Fatemeh Sepehri, Mohammad Nourizad)
 8. Labor activists and protest artists (Sepideh Gholian, Esmail Bakhshi, Toomaj Salehi, Mehdi Yarrahi)
 9. Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (Rajavi)
 10. Sunni representative (Molavi Abdolhamid)
 11. Supporters of other individuals

Conclusion: A Diverse Society, Largely Discontented with the Religious Regime, and Seeking Change


- Iranian society is politically and ideologically diverse and deeply transformed.
- The majority of the population opposes religious rule and military governance; the demand for a democratic government is widespread among Iranians, though at the same time, a notable portion of society shows an inclination toward individual authoritarianism.
- A majority of the population opposes the Islamic Republic and supports changing or transforming the political system.
- Ideologies supporting individual freedom, human rights, and social justice enjoy the greatest support.
- Nationalist orientations, centered on an idea of Iran, receive notable support; however, demands for decentralization, especially among ethnic and regional communities, are also significant.
- No political or civil figure currently enjoys majority support in society. Each political cluster represents only a portion (between 5% to 35%) of the population, and no single opposition force is capable of representing the full diversity present within the country.

Introduction

In June 2024, the snap presidential election was held to determine the successor to Ebrahim Raisi, who had died in a helicopter crash. One week before the election (the first round), between the 17th and 19th of June, GAMAAN conducted a survey to assess people's willingness to participate in the election, the popularity of the candidates, and the reasons for voting or abstaining. The findings of that survey were published in a separate [report](#).

The results showed that the expected turnout in the Islamic Republic's presidential election would range between 22% to 35% (accounting for undecided respondents). In contrast, other domestic and international polling institutes using conventional survey methods (such as phone or face-to-face interviews) predicted turnout rates above 50%. According to the official election results announced by the Islamic Republic authorities, the voter turnout was about 40%.

Figure 1



It should be noted that official figures in the Islamic Republic are generally considered unreliable due to the lack of transparency, the absence of independent electoral oversight, and [documented cases](#) of vote manipulation and turnout inflation in previous

years. In this case, however, the official turnout does not differ sharply from GAMAAN's predicted range, assuming that a majority of undecided respondents eventually voted. Moreover, unlike the surveys conducted by ISPA and Stasis, GAMAAN's results did not inflate turnout and provided the close approximation to the officially announced figures (Figure 1).

Aside from the election-related questions, that same survey also included several questions about political preferences, covering Iranians' attitudes on the Islamic Republic, political orientations, preferred forms of governance, favored political systems and structures, party ideological leanings, and support for civil and political figures in the imagined context of a free election.

This report presents an analysis of the findings from those questions, offering a deeper portrait of the political preferences of Iranians in the year 2024. It also includes comparisons with GAMAAN's previous surveys to examine how Iranians' political attitudes and preferences have shifted over time.

The findings of this report reveal the heterogeneity of Iranian society and the differences in attitudes across various demographic groups. They can serve as a basis for a more nuanced understanding of a society on the brink of fundamental change. It should be noted that these results are based on the June 2024 survey, and developments over the past year may have affected public opinion on some of the topics covered. GAMAAN aims to continue tracking these changes in future surveys to better assess and document shifts in attitudes over time.

Section One: The Islamic Republic and Political Orientations

1-1 Iranians' Attitudes on the Islamic Republic

In the June 2024 survey, similar to previous GAMAAN surveys, respondents were asked about the popularity of the Islamic Republic. The key question posed was: “If a free referendum were organized on the question ‘Islamic Republic: Yes or No?’ what would you vote?” Figure 2 shows the level of support for the Islamic Republic across four past GAMAAN surveys. The results indicate that the percentage of those voting “Yes” to the Islamic Republic has remained relatively stable, ranging from 15% to 19%. In contrast, the “No” vote has fluctuated more significantly. The highest level of opposition (about 81%) was recorded during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. Importantly, the decline in the “No” vote does not reflect an increase in the “Yes” vote; instead, it correlates with a rise in those who responded “It depends on the circumstances,” indicating uncertainty or hesitation.

Figure 2: Iranians' attitudes on the question “Islamic Republic: Yes or No?” in a free referendum





Figure 3 breaks down support for the Islamic Republic, in the June 2024 survey, by demographic groups.

In terms of age, young people aged 20–29 show a high level of opposition (71%), similar to those aged 50 and older (72%). The middle-aged group (30–49) shows the lowest opposition (66%). Interestingly, the youth also show the lowest level of indecision (about 9%), while indecision is higher among middle-aged population (14%). This suggests greater political decisiveness among younger individuals and more caution among older groups.

Regarding region of residence, opposition is higher in urban areas (about 72%) than in rural areas (about 55%). Conversely, the “Yes” vote is nearly twice as high in rural areas (28%) compared to cities (17%). Indecision is also more prevalent in rural communities (17% vs. 11%), likely due to limited access to free information, economic dependence on state institutions, or more conservative political cultures in smaller communities.

Figure 3: Iranians’ attitudes on the question “Islamic Republic: Yes or No?” by demographic groups



In terms of education, people with a university degree show the highest “No” vote (about 74%), the lowest “Yes” vote (16%), and the lowest level of indecision (10%).

Among those without higher education, opposition is lower (66%) and indecision higher (14%).

By gender, men oppose the Islamic Republic more than women (73% vs. 64%). In contrast, support for the Islamic Republic is higher among women (24%) compared to men (15%). During the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, due to the revolutionary atmosphere prevailing in society and the central role of women in the movement, women’s opposition to the Islamic Republic rose dramatically; only about 13 percent defended a “yes” vote to the Islamic Republic. Although shifts in the social climate and broader socio-political developments undoubtedly influence people’s views, such a marked change in women’s attitudes toward the Islamic Republic will require closer examination, to determine how much it stemmed from genuine changes in societal attitudes and how much it may be attributed to sampling differences and challenges.

In summary, although a clear majority of Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic, the intensity of opposition varies significantly based on age, location, education, and gender.

1–2 Political Orientations Among Iranians

Figure 4 illustrates political orientations in Iran from 2021 to 2024. The most common position throughout this period has been the view of “regime change [barandāzī-yi nizām] as a precondition for change.” Support for this stance has fluctuated in response to political developments and peaked at 60% during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising.

The second most prevalent orientation is the call for “Structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic.” Under normal circumstances, about one-quarter of society supports this view, but during the 2022 protests, support for it dropped to 16%, suggesting that some transformists temporarily joined the pro-ouster camp.

Support for “Gradual reform within the framework of the Islamic Republic” has ranged between 7% and 13% over the years.

Meanwhile, support for preserving “the principles of the Islamic revolution and the Supreme Leader” has dropped significantly, from about 18% in 2021 to 11% in 2024.

One notable finding is the growth of those who selected “None of them.” This group represented only about 6% of society during the 2022 uprising but nearly tripled to 17% in the 2024 election period. This fluctuation suggests that a significant portion of society aligns with protest movements during moments of social upheaval but later becomes politically disillusioned or apathetic.

Figure 4: Political orientations among Iranians (2021–2024)





Figure 5 shows political orientations in June 2024 broken down by demographic groups.

By gender, men are more likely than women to support regime change (37% vs. 34%) and structural transition (26% vs. 22%). In contrast, the share of women who support Principlists (conservatives) is significantly higher than that of men (15% vs. 7%). This may reflect women’s higher levels of religiosity, as in this survey a larger proportion of women than men identified themselves as Shia (45% vs. 33%). [A study](#) based on GAMAAN’s findings across surveys found that support for the Islamic Republic’s values is higher among those who identified as Shia.

In terms of place of residence, 38% of urban population support regime change, compared to just 26% in rural areas. Support for the Principlists (Conservatives) is nearly twice as high in villages (18%) compared to cities (9%). Additionally, rural residents are more likely to select “none of them” (22% vs. 15%).

When segmented by age, youth aged 20–29 are the most supportive of regime change (42%). This support declines with age, falling to 34% among middle-aged and older adults. Interestingly, support for structural transition is highest among those aged 50 and above (27%), while middle-aged population express the most support for gradual reform (14%). The youth are also the least likely to choose “none of them.”

Figure 5: Political orientations among Iranians by demographic groups




Education level also proves to be a strong predictor of political orientation. Those with university degrees are most likely to support regime change (40%) and structural transition (29%). Among individuals without a university degree, support for principlists is higher (13%), and indecision is more common (19% vs. 10%).

Section Two: Forms of Governance

This section presents and analyzes Iranians’ perspectives on various forms of governance. The questions used are the same as those periodically posed in many countries through the [World Values Survey](#).

Figure 6 illustrates the levels of public approval for four different forms of governance or rulership: democratic, individual authoritarian, religious, and military.



Based on the data presented in this figure, there is a national consensus in favor of democracy. Around 89% evaluate such a system as “very good” or “fairly good,” while only about 4% consider it “very bad” or “fairly bad.” Approximately 8% expressed no opinion.

On the other hand, opinions regarding authoritarian rule by a powerful political leader are deeply divided. About 43% rate such a system as “very good” or “fairly good,” while roughly the same proportion (42%) oppose it. Another 15% have no opinion. This division suggests that although there is overwhelming support for democracy, a significant portion of society is also open to some form of individual authoritarianism.


The results concerning religious rule (i.e., governance based on religious laws) reveal a critical public stance toward such a model. Only about 26% of the population view it positively, while 66% are opposed. These figures indicate broad public discontent with the theocratic nature of Iran’s current political system.

Military rule receives the lowest level of public support among all forms of governance. Only about 16% of the target population evaluate it positively, while over 71% consider it “very bad” or “fairly bad.” This indicates that militarized approaches to governance have minimal support within Iranian society.

2–1 Attitudes Toward Democratic Rule by Demographic Group

Figure 7 presents attitudes toward the idea of having a “democratic political system,” broken down by demographic characteristics.

Figure 7: Iranian attitudes toward democratic political system by demographic groups



Support for democracy is extremely high across all age groups. Among respondents aged 50 and above, 91% view democracy positively – the highest level of support among the age groups – and only 2% oppose it. Among those aged 30 to 49, support stands at 88%, and among those aged 20 to 29, it is 87%. These figures suggest that

older individuals are somewhat more supportive of democracy, but the following findings on authoritarian rule show this is only a prima facie conclusion.

In terms of gender, men show the highest level of support (90%), with only 3% opposing it. Among women, the share of respondents without a clear opinion is higher (9%) compared to men (6%).

Education plays a significant role in shaping attitudes toward democracy. The higher the level of education, the greater the support. Respondents with higher education show 92% support and only 4% opposition to democratic rule. Even among those without higher education, support remains high at 88%. However, in this group, the share of undecided respondents (9%) is about double that of those with higher education (4%).

When looking at the place of residence, urban respondents show approximately 90% support and only 3% opposition to democracy. Among rural residents, support is still high at 85%, but somewhat lower than in cities. The share of opposition is slightly higher (4%), and the percentage of respondents without a clear opinion is notably larger in rural areas (11%).

These patterns reflect a strong national preference for democratic governance, with only slight variation across demographic lines.

2–2 Attitudes Toward Individual Authoritarian Rule by Demographic Group

Figure 8 presents Iranians' attitudes toward the concept of a political system where "a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections," commonly referred to as individual authoritarian rule.


Age differences are particularly striking. Among respondents aged 20 to 29, opposition to such a system is much higher than support: more than half (53%) oppose it, while only 34% approve. In contrast, among older age groups (30–49 and 50+), support increases to around 45%, while opposition stands between 38% and 41%. These differences suggest that support for authoritarian rule grows somewhat with age, although substantial opposition remains even among older groups.

In terms of gender, the differences are less pronounced. Around 42% of men and 44% of women support individual authoritarian rule. However, opposition is slightly higher among men (43%) than women (40%). Women are slightly more likely to report having no opinion.

Education level is a significant factor. Among respondents with higher education, only 33% support authoritarian rule, while 56% oppose it. Among those without higher education, support rises to 47%, and opposition drops to 36%. This contrast shows that higher education is associated with more democratic and anti-authoritarian attitudes.

Urban-rural differences are also apparent. Support for authoritarian rule is higher among rural residents (49%) than among urban residents (42%). Meanwhile, opposition is stronger in cities (44% vs. 33% in rural areas). The proportion of undecided respondents is also higher in rural areas (18%), potentially indicating political disengagement or lower access to political information.

Figure 8: Iranian attitudes toward authoritarian rule by demographic groups




In summary, public opinion on authoritarian governance is highly polarized. While democratic governance enjoys broad majority support across society, rule by a powerful authoritarian leader is viewed favorably by a substantial minority, particularly among older, less-educated, and rural populations. At the same time, opposition to this model remains strong among younger, educated, and urban groups.

2–3 Attitudes Toward Religious Rule by Demographic Group

Figure 9 presents how different demographic groups evaluate the idea of a political system “governed by religious law.”

Across all age groups, a clear majority opposes this model. The strongest opposition is among respondents aged 20 to 29 (around 71%), while the lowest is among the 30 to 49 age group (64%). This small difference indicates that even among middle-aged Iranians, religious rule is not widely supported.

Figure 9: Iranian attitudes toward a political system governed by religious law, by demographic groups



By gender, women show more support for religious governance than men: 31% of women rate it positively, compared to 21% of men. As argued earlier, this may be associated with women’s higher levels of religiosity. The 2020 survey results by the [World Values Survey](#) for the same question showed similar differences between men

and women. Nonetheless, in both groups a strong majority opposes religious rule (especially among men, where more than 71% are opposed).

Education again plays a critical role. Among those with university education, only 19% support religious rule, while opposition reaches 72%. Among those without higher education, 33% support it, and opposition falls to 58%. These results show that educated respondents hold more critical attitudes toward theocratic governance.

The urban-rural divide is again significant. In urban areas, only 24% support religious governance, while 66% oppose it. In rural areas, support rises to around 40%, while 50% oppose it. Even in rural communities, religious rule fails to gain majority support.

Overall, religious rule is not widely popular in Iranian society and is supported primarily among specific subgroups, such as rural residents and those with lower education levels.

2–4 Attitudes Toward Military Rule by Demographic Group

Figure 10 presents attitudes toward a system in which the country is governed by the military.


Across all age groups, a strong majority rejects this idea. Among youth aged 20 to 29, only 15% support military rule, while 75% oppose it. Among those aged 30 to 49, 18% support it and 68% oppose it. In the 50+ age group, support drops further to 13%, while opposition climbs to 73%. This trend shows that while rejection is strong across the board, younger respondents are especially likely to disapprove of military governance.

In terms of gender, men are more strongly opposed to military rule than women: 12% of men support it and 76% oppose it, while 20% of women support it and 65% oppose it. Women are also slightly more likely to express no opinion. The 2020 [World Values Survey](#) results for the same question revealed a similar pattern between men and women. The higher support among women than men for military rule could be an interesting subject for further research.

Educational differences remain consistent with previous patterns. Among those with university degrees, only 11% support military rule and 81% oppose it. Among those without higher education, support increases to 18% and opposition falls to 67%. Thus, education continues to correlate strongly with resistance to undemocratic rule.

The urban-rural divide also shapes opinion. In rural areas, 20% support military rule and 62% oppose it. In urban areas, support drops to 15%, while opposition rises to 73%. The share of undecided respondents is highest in rural areas (17%) compared to cities (12%).

Figure 10: Iranian attitudes toward having the army rule, by demographic groups




In conclusion, the idea of military rule is widely unpopular among Iranians. Strong opposition exists across nearly all demographic groups, indicating society’s preference for civilian, non-militarized forms of governance.

Section Three: Preferred Political System and Structure

This section examines Iranians' attitudes toward different political systems and structures, based on the results of the June 2024 survey. Figure 11 illustrates the public's preferences for the country's political system.

Figure 11: Iranian preferences for different political systems



The results of this figure indicate that only about one-fifth (19.5%) of the population prefers the continuation of the Islamic Republic. In contrast, the majority of respondents favor a change in the Islamic Republic and seek a different form and structure, such as a (secular) republic, a (constitutional) monarchy, or systems with less centralized power.

Approximately 26% prefer a secular republic—16% favor a unitary republic and 10% a federal republic—while around 21% support a monarchical system, including 16% who support a unitary monarchy and 5% a federal monarchy.

A group amounting to 11% of the population stated that “the form of the alternative system doesn’t matter,” which essentially reflects a desire for change without a specific preference for the alternative system.

Over 22% of the target population said they lacked sufficient information to answer the question regarding the “preferred alternative political system.” This may reflect apathy


or a general lack of public knowledge about the features, benefits, and challenges of different political systems.

Additionally, about 15% expressed support for a federal structure—either as a federal republic (10%) or a federal monarchy (5%). This reflects meaningful support for decentralization and the distribution of power across the country.

3-1 Preferences for Political System by Demographic Groups

Figure 12 shows the distribution of preferences for political systems across different demographic groups. The results reveal meaningful divisions among various demographic segments, reflecting differences in attitudes that may be rooted in socio-cultural, historical, or experiential factors.

Figure 12: Iranian preferences for different political systems by demographic groups



Among the 20–29 age group, about 31% prefer some form of republic (federal or non-federal), which is above the national average. Also, the share of those who said “the form of alternative system to the I.R. doesn't matter” is lowest in this group, indicating younger people have more defined political preferences.

Preferences in the 30–49 age group closely mirror the overall societal average. This group may be viewed as representative of the broader population. Notably, this group also has the highest rate of indecision or unwillingness to respond.

Among those aged 50 and above, support for the Islamic Republic is lowest (around 16%). This may be due to their firsthand experience with the pre-1979 regime and their ability to draw historical comparisons. Interestingly, this group shows above-average support for a (secular) republic (19%), perhaps also due to their awareness of the monarchy's shortcomings in Iran.

From a geographic perspective, there is a significant divide between urban and rural residents. Rural respondents show the highest level of support for the Islamic Republic (29%), while in urban areas, that figure is around 17%. Conversely, preferences for secular and decentralized systems are more pronounced in urban settings.

Education is a highly determining factor. As Figure 11 also showed, individuals with higher education (university degree holders) are more supportive of republicanism (22%) and federal structures (13%), and least supportive of monarchy (12%). In contrast, those without higher education show greater support for the Islamic Republic (21%) and monarchy (18%).

Gender also plays a decisive role. Men support the monarchy significantly more than women (20% vs. 12%). Meanwhile, women are far more likely than men (28% vs. 18%) to say they lack sufficient information to decide on a preferred alternative system. This may suggest that women, compared to men, have had fewer opportunities to access information, or it may indicate that they are more willing to acknowledge having insufficient knowledge about this complex subject.

3-2 Political System Preferences by Province


Figure 13 offers a comparative view of political preferences across nine provinces with the highest levels of support for different types of political systems.

In Figure 14, alternative systems to the Islamic Republic with shared characteristics are aggregated: the republic and monarchy categories each include both federal and non-federal variants, while the federal category encompasses both a federal republic and a federal monarchy.

Key findings from the figures show that the highest levels of support for a non-federal republic are found in the provinces of Semnan (21%), Qazvin (21%), Gilan (20%), and Tehran (20%). Support for a federal republic is highest in Kurdistan (33%), followed by West Azerbaijan (21%) and Sistan and Baluchestan (16%).

The greatest overall support for any form of republic—whether federal or non-federal—is observed in Kurdistan at 41%, followed by West Azerbaijan (32%), Semnan (31%), Sistan and Baluchestan (30%), and Gilan (30%).

Figure 13: Preferences for different political systems in selected provinces (top supporters by type)




Support for a non-federal monarchy is highest in Gilan (21%), Alborz (20%), and Hormozgan (19%). When federal monarchy is also taken into account, Gilan again ranks first with 27%, followed by Alborz (26%) and Hormozgan (25%). In contrast, monarchy receives the least support in Kurdistan (10%) and West Azerbaijan (11%).

Support for a federal structure—regardless of the political system—is also highest in Kurdistan (37%), followed by West Azerbaijan and Sistan and Baluchestan, each at 24%.

The Islamic Republic receives the lowest levels of support in the provinces of Qazvin, Kurdistan, Gilan, Alborz, and Tehran.

These differences underscore the diverse political preferences across provinces.

Figure 14: Aggregated preferences for political systems in selected provinces (top supporters by type)



3-3 Relationship Between Political System Preferences and Authoritarian Rule

Figure 15 shows the degree of support for individual authoritarian governance among supporters of each political system type. The data demonstrate a meaningful association between preference for a political system and attitudes toward the idea of individual authoritarianism:

At the top of the figure, supporters of the Islamic Republic show by far the strongest support for such governance: about 62% rate authoritarian leadership as “very or fairly


good,” while only 23% oppose it and 15% express no opinion. These figures highlight a strong tendency among supporters of the Islamic Republic toward exclusive and authoritarian rule.

Supporters of the monarchy come next, with about 49% approval and 36% opposition. Approximately 14% express no opinion.

Among those who stated that “the form of the alternative system doesn’t matter,” support for authoritarian governance is also relatively high (about 45%), with 37% opposed and 18% neutral. This suggests that even among undecided individuals, there is a notable inclination toward accepting concentrated power.

Among those who lacked sufficient knowledge to respond to the alternative political system preference question, about 42% supported authoritarian rule, 34% opposed it, and 25% had no opinion, the highest rate of non-response among all groups. These results reflect significant levels of apathy or lack of information in this segment of society.

Figure 15: Inclination toward authoritarian rule among supporters of different political systems



On the other end of the spectrum, supporters of the republic, federal republic, and federal monarchy show the highest levels of opposition to authoritarianism: Among republic supporters, only 26% view authoritarian governance positively, while two-thirds (66%) oppose it. Among federal republic supporters, only 28% are in favor, while 63% oppose it. Federal monarchy supporters show a more mixed stance, with 37% in favor and 50% opposed, indicating that a preference for federalism diminishes authoritarian tendencies.


In sum, the data indicate that the more individuals lean toward systems that are less dependent on a single leader and feature greater democratic distribution of power (e.g., republics and federal models), the more they oppose authoritarian leadership. Conversely, supporters of centralized and leader-focused systems in Iran, like the Islamic Republic and the monarchy, are significantly more inclined to accept authoritarian governance.

Section Four: Preferences for Political Parties and Ideologies

This section explores Iranian public opinion on various party orientations and political ideologies.

In the June 2024 survey, respondents were asked about hypothetical political parties to measure support for different political ideologies in the country. Each respondent could choose up to two political parties, which is why the total percentages shown in Figure 16 exceed 100%.

Figure 16 – Public preferences for different party orientations



The figure shows that Iranians are most inclined toward parties that prioritize individual freedoms and human rights (37%), those that advocate for social justice and workers' rights (33%), and those that emphasize national pride and Iranian nationalism (26%).

Next in line are parties focused on environmental issues (10%), free-market economics (9%), and decentralization and minority rights (8%). Only about 5% of the population support parties that prioritize traditional and religious values, by far the least popular among all the listed options.

This distribution suggests that the potential party landscape in Iranian society is shaped by three dominant ideological streams: human rights-oriented, pro-labor, and nationalist. In contrast, support for traditional or conservative discourses is remarkably low. It is also worth noting that around 12% of respondents expressed no inclination toward any of the mentioned party orientations.

4-1 Party Orientations by Demographic Groups

The results presented in Figure 17 show that party preferences are strongly influenced by demographic factors such as age, education, and gender.

Figure 17 – Party orientations by age, education, and gender

	Male	Female	Non-university educated	University educated	20- to 29-year-old	30- to 49-year-old	50-year-old+	Total
A party emphasizing individual freedoms & human rights <i>(Human Rights)</i>	36.5%	37.5%	35.0%	43.0%	38.6%	33.6%	42.7%	37.0%
A party emphasizing workers' rights, public jobs & taxing the wealthy <i>(Pro-Labor)</i>	31.2%	34.7%	34.0%	29.4%	33.1%	35.2%	28.0%	32.9%
A party emphasizing national pride & Iranian nationalism <i>(Nationalist)</i>	29.3%	22.6%	26.8%	24.1%	25.2%	26.0%	27.0%	26.1%
A party emphasizing environmental protection <i>(Environmental)</i>	9.0%	11.4%	9.0%	13.7%	11.2%	9.6%	10.3%	10.1%
A party emphasizing free markets, private jobs & lower taxes on the wealthy <i>(Free Market)</i>	10.1%	7.6%	6.5%	16.3%	18.2%	7.5%	4.8%	8.9%
A party emphasizing decentralization & minority rights <i>(Pro-Decentralization)</i>	9.9%	6.9%	8.1%	9.6%	8.2%	8.3%	9.1%	8.5%
A party emphasizing traditional & religious values <i>(Religious)</i>	3.2%	6.6%	5.1%	4.1%	5.6%	4.5%	5.0%	4.8%

Looking at age groups, young people (ages 20–29) are particularly inclined toward individual freedoms and human rights (39%) and social justice (33%). Their support for free-market economics (18%) is also notable.

Among the middle-aged group (30–49), the most popular orientation is social justice and support for workers' rights. This age group, which likely carries more economic and family responsibilities, shows a stronger tendency toward social justice-oriented politics and a relatively lower inclination toward personal freedoms. Yet, overall, their preferences remain closely aligned with the national average.

Respondents aged 50 and above show the highest support for individual freedoms and human rights across all age groups (43%). Their inclination toward nationalism (27%) is also slightly higher than that of younger cohorts.

Interestingly, support for traditional and religious values is generally low across all age groups.

When viewed by educational attainment, clear differences emerge. University-educated respondents are more likely to support parties focused on human rights and

individual freedoms (43%), environmental issues (14%), and decentralization (10%). Those without a university education show stronger support for social justice (34%) and nationalism (27%) and slightly more support for traditional and religious values. A significant gap exists between the two groups in support for free-market economics: 16% among the educated, compared to only 6% among those without higher education.

Gender differences also reveal important patterns. Support for social justice is higher among women (35%) than men (31%), possibly reflecting women’s greater concern with economic hardship and inequality. Women also show more support for environmental parties (11% vs. 9% among men) and are more inclined to defend traditional values (7% vs. 3%). Again, this is in line with women’s higher religiosity, as a larger proportion of women than men identified themselves as Shia in the survey.

On the other hand, men show more support for nationalist parties (29% vs. 23%) and are more likely than women to favor parties advocating free-market economics (10% vs. 8%). They also express greater support for decentralization and minority rights (10% vs. 7%).

Interestingly, support for a party that would focus on individual freedoms and human rights is nearly equal among men and women (37% among women and 36% among men), suggesting a broad consensus across genders on the value of fundamental freedoms.

4–2 Co-Selection Patterns Among Parties

Figure 18 illustrates which combinations of party orientations were selected together by respondents. This helps identify the extent to which different ideological orientations share common support bases.

Figure 18 – Co-selection patterns among parties

	Single Selection	Top Co-selection	Second Co-selection	Third Co-selection	Fourth Co-selection	Fifth Co-selection	Least Co-selection
A party emphasizing individual freedoms & human rights <i>(Human Rights)</i>	32.1%	Pro-Labor (21.6%)	Nationalist (20.5%)	Environmental (9.9%)	Pro-Decentralization (7.9%)	Free Market (7.6%)	Religious (0.4%)
A party emphasizing workers' rights, public jobs & taxing the wealthy <i>(Pro-Labor)</i>	39.6%	Human Rights (24.3%)	Nationalist (15.5%)	Environmental (7.4%)	Religious (5.1%)	Pro-Decentralization (4.2%)	Free Market (3.8%)
A party emphasizing national pride & Iranian nationalism <i>(Nationalist)</i>	33.4%	Human Rights (29.1%)	Pro-Labor (19.6%)	Environmental (5.9%)	Free Market (4.9%)	Religious (4.2%)	Pro-Decentralization (3.0%)
A party emphasizing environmental protection <i>(Environmental)</i>	13.0%	Human Rights (36.0%)	Pro-Labor (24.0%)	Nationalist (15.1%)	Free Market (6.2%)	Pro-Decentralization (4.5%)	Religious (1.2%)
A party emphasizing free markets, private jobs & lower taxes on the wealthy <i>(Free Market)</i>	26.9%	Human Rights (31.5%)	Nationalist (14.3%)	Pro-Labor (14.0%)	Environmental (7.0%)	Pro-Decentralization (4.7%)	Religious (1.5%)
A party emphasizing decentralization & minority rights <i>(Pro-Decentralization)</i>	28.4%	Human Rights (34.5%)	Pro-Labor (16.4%)	Nationalist (9.2%)	Environmental (5.3%)	Free Market (5.0%)	Religious (1.3%)
A party emphasizing traditional & religious values <i>(Religious)</i>	32.3%	Pro-Labor (34.7%)	Nationalist (22.5%)	Human Rights (3.0%)	Free Market (2.7%)	Environmental (2.6%)	Pro-Decentralization (2.2%)

A clear pattern emerges: individual freedoms and human rights not only receive the highest overall support but also appear most frequently as the second choice across all other party preferences. This reveals that civil liberties and human rights represent a kind of ideological backbone that cuts across orientations.

Among those who selected the human rights–oriented party, 32% chose it exclusively, while 22% also supported a social justice-oriented party, and 20% paired it with a nationalist party. This suggests that a human rights orientation can coexist with both left-leaning economic attitudes and right-leaning nationalist identity politics. In contrast, only 0.4% of these respondents also chose a religious party, indicating a sharp ideological divide between supporters of human rights and religious conservatism.

Among those who prioritized social justice, 39% chose this as their only preference—the highest single-party loyalty among all groups. An additional 24% also selected human rights, and 15% chose nationalism. Overlap with free-market parties is minimal (4%), which is consistent with the ideological divergence between these two approaches: social justice advocates favor state intervention and progressive taxation, while free-market supporters emphasize reduced government and lower taxes for the wealthy.

Among nationalist supporters, 33% supported only nationalism, while the rest also selected human rights (29%) and social justice (20%). Nationalist supporters had minimal overlap with decentralization (3%) and environmentalism (5%), suggesting a greater focus on identity politics than on institutional reforms such as decentralization or on future-oriented issues.

The environmentalist group showed the lowest exclusive loyalty (13%), but had strong overlap with human rights (36%) and social justice (24%), a natural combination, as environmental concerns are often linked with human welfare and social equity. Only 1% of environmentalists also supported a religious party.

Supporters of the free-market party showed 27% exclusive loyalty. Their main overlaps were with human rights (31%) and nationalism (14%). Overlap with social justice was minimal (14%), reinforcing the ideological distance between state-led and market-led economic visions. Traditionalist overlap was also low (1.5%).

Among decentralization and minority rights supporters, 28% chose this as their only preference, but 35% also supported human rights and 16% supported social justice. This shows a moderate ideological blending with liberal and progressive trends.

The religious party had 32% exclusive support among its followers, while others in this group also showed overlap with social justice (35%) and nationalism (23%). Overlap with human rights was just 3%, reinforcing the sharp contrast between religious conservatism and support for civil liberties in Iran.

4–3 The Relationship Between Party Preferences and Political System Choice

Figure 19 shows that people’s preferences regarding the political system are closely related to their imagined party or ideology.

Individual freedoms and human rights are the most popular party orientation among those who support a unitary republic (51%), a federal republic (50%), and a federal monarchy (53%). Even among supporters of the unitary monarchy, 42% prioritize this ideology. In contrast, only 9% of Islamic Republic supporters back the human rights-oriented party.

Figure 19 – Party preferences by political system choice

	Supporters of the Islamic Republic (I.R.)	Supporters of Republic	Supporters of Federal Republic	Supporters of Monarchy	Supporters of Federal Monarchy	Those indifferent to the I.R.	Those lacking knowledge to choose an alternative	Total
A party emphasizing individual freedoms & human rights (<i>Human Rights</i>)	9.2%	51.2%	50.3%	42.3%	52.9%	39.2%	36.7%	37.0%
A party emphasizing workers’ rights, public jobs & taxing the wealthy (<i>Pro-Labor</i>)	48.2%	29.2%	29.9%	25.3%	26.8%	32.1%	31.4%	32.9%
A party emphasizing national pride & Iranian nationalism (<i>Nationalist</i>)	21.7%	24.0%	16.6%	43.5%	40.3%	24.7%	20.9%	26.1%
A party emphasizing environmental protection (<i>Environmental</i>)	4.9%	14.0%	11.9%	10.3%	12.3%	9.8%	10.6%	10.1%
A party emphasizing free markets, private jobs & lower taxes on the wealthy (<i>Free Market</i>)	6.7%	12.7%	13.2%	7.6%	9.4%	8.9%	7.2%	8.9%
A party emphasizing decentralization & minority rights (<i>Pro-Decentralization</i>)	4.0%	10.6%	23.8%	5.7%	8.1%	8.4%	6.6%	8.5%
A party emphasizing traditional & religious values (<i>Religious</i>)	21.2%	0.7%	0.8%	0.3%	1.1%	1.4%	1.4%	4.8%

The pro-labor party is the top ideological preference among Islamic Republic supporters (48%). Among supporters of all other political systems, except monarchists, this party preference ranks second (with around 30% support in each group).

The nationalist party is most strongly supported among proponents of monarchy (43%) and federal monarchy (40%). Nationalism is also popular among unitary republic supporters (24%) and also holds second place among Islamic Republic supporters (22%).

Environmentalism receives its highest level of support among proponents of the unitary republic (14%), and the lowest among Islamic Republic supporters (5%), reflecting the current system’s disregard for environmental concerns.

Free-market ideology is most popular among supporters of both the unitary and federal republic (13%) and least popular among Islamic Republic supporters (7%).

Support for decentralization is strongest among federal republicans (24%), followed by unitary republicans (11%). Islamic Republic and monarchist supporters show minimal interest in decentralization (4% and 6%, respectively).

Finally, traditional and religious values have a significant support base only among Islamic Republic supporters (21%). Among all other political groups, support for this orientation is negligible, under 1% in each case.

These findings highlight the deep connection between people's vision of the ideal political system and their broader ideological worldview. Support for secular and decentralized systems tends to correlate with liberal, rights-based, and pluralism-accepting ideologies, while support for the Islamic Republic or centralized monarchy aligns more closely with conservative and traditionalist worldviews.

Section Five: Popularity of Civil and Political Figures

This section presents an analysis of the selection rate of political and civil figures, the extent to which they are selected together by respondents, and the clustering of these figures based on public choices.

5–1 Popularity of Political and Civil Figures

In the June 2024 survey, participants were asked the following question: “If a free election were held in Iran, in which representatives of various political orientations—including the individuals listed below—were allowed to run, which one(s) would you vote for as your preferred candidate?”

The list included a range of political and civil figures presented in random order. Respondents could choose up to two individuals. The same question, with a similar list of opposition and dissident figures, had also been asked in [the December 2022 survey](#), during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising. In that earlier survey, respondents could choose only one person as their preferred candidate for joining a potential opposition coalition or solidarity council.

Table 1 shows the percentage of respondents in the 2024 survey who selected each figure as one of their two choices. It also compares the data with the percentage who chose that same person as their first choice in the 2022 survey. The final column shows the change in popularity over this period.

It’s worth noting that since respondents in 2024 could select up to two names, the total percentages exceed 100%. Also, some figures listed in 2024 were not present in the 2022 survey and therefore have no previous data. Furthermore, due to the difference in survey design (two choices allowed in 2024 vs. one in 2022), it’s expected that 2024 figures may appear higher.

The results show that support for Reza Pahlavi declined slightly between 2022 and 2024, suggesting a relatively stable selection rate. Support for Hamed Esmaeilion has declined significantly, which may be related to his reduced political activity following the dissolution of the Solidarity Council. Meanwhile, support for figures such as Toomaj Salehi, Narges Mohammadi, and Fatemeh Sepehri has increased significantly, in the case of Mohammadi likely due to receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2023. Another notable trend is the 6.5 percentage point increase in respondents selecting “None of them” over the two-year period, which may reflect growing distrust toward established opposition figures.

Table 1: Selection Rates of Political and Civil Figures as First or Second Choice

Name	Selected as First Choice (%) – Dec 2022	Selected as First or Second Choice (%) – Jun 2024	Change (%)
Reza Pahlavi	32.8	31.4	-1.4
None of them	8.4	14.9	+6.5
Ali Khamenei	–	9.1	–
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	–	8.9	–
Toomaj Salehi	0.5	6.2	+5.7
Mohammad Javad Zarif	–	6.2	–
Other individuals	4.0	5.9	+1.9
Ali Karimi	5.3	5.7	+0.4
Mohammad Khatami	–	5.5	–
Narges Mohammadi	0.7	5.4	+4.7
Fatemeh Sepehri	0.5	4.7	+4.2
Mir Hossein Mousavi	1.4	3.7	+2.3
Mojtaba Khamenei	–	3.5	–
Hossein Ronaghi	4.8	3.5	-1.3
Nasrin Sotoudeh	2.1	3.3	+1.2
Molavi Abdolhamid	1.1	3.0	+1.9
Mostafa Tajzadeh	–	2.3	–
Hamed Esmaeillion	7.3	2.3	-5.0
Kaveh Madani	0.4	2.1	+1.7
Mohammad Nourizad	0.8	2.0	+1.2
Masih Alinejad	1.9	1.9	0.0
Shirin Ebadi	0.6	1.7	+1.1
Fa’ezeh Hashemi	–	1.2	–
Amir Taheri	–	1.0	–
Sepideh Gholian	–	0.9	–
Nazanin Boniadi	0.9	0.9	0.0
Majid Tavakoli	0.3	0.7	+0.4
Saeed Madani	–	0.6	–
Mehdi Yarrahi	0.2	0.5	+0.3
Abdollah Mohtadi	–	0.5	–
Esmail Bakhshi	0.3	0.5	+0.2
Maryam Rajavi	0.1	0.3	+0.2
Faraj Sarkouhi	0.1	0.3	+0.2
Reza Alijani	–	0.3	–
Bahareh Hedayat	0.0	0.2	+0.2
Ali Afshari	–	0.1	–

In Table 2, for each political and civil figure, as well as the “other individuals” option, the percentage of respondents who selected only that individual (single selection) is shown, along with the three individuals most frequently co-selected with them (based on the June 2024 survey). The co-selection table reveals patterns of loyalty, discursive proximity, and socio-political distinction among the figures in the minds of respondents.

For example, among those who selected Reza Pahlavi, about 43% chose only him and did not select a second option; around 8% also selected Ali Karimi; 7% chose Fatemeh Sepehri as their other option; and about 7% chose Toomaj Salehi. Adding up these figures shows that roughly 35% of those who selected Reza Pahlavi also chose other individuals not displayed in the table.

Table 2: Rates of Single and Co-Selection for Political and Civil Figures

Selected Individual	Single Selection	Most Co-Selected	Second Co-Selection	Third Co-Selection
Reza Pahlavi	43.5%	Ali Karimi (8.4%)	Fatemeh Sepehri (7.0%)	Toomaj Salehi (6.8%)
Ali Khamenei	44.6%	Mojtaba Khamenei (23.8%)	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (14.5%)	M Javad Zarif (4.9%)
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	40.5%	Ali Khamenei (14.8%)	Reza Pahlavi (9.4%)	M Javad Zarif (9.1%)
Toomaj Salehi	12.4%	Reza Pahlavi (34.2%)	Ali Karimi (8.3%)	Fatemeh Sepehri (6.7%)
M. Javad Zarif	23.9%	Mohammad Khatami (21.7%)	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (13.1%)	Reza Pahlavi (7.6%)
Other individuals	58.4%	None (12.4%)	Reza Pahlavi (9.5%)	Ali Khamenei (4.1%)
Ali Karimi	11.6%	Reza Pahlavi (46.5%)	Toomaj Salehi (9.1%)	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (4.3%)
Mohammad Khatami	20.9%	Mohammad J. Zarif (24.3%)	Mir H. Mousavi (12.0%)	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (11.5%)
Narges Mohammadi	10.1%	Reza Pahlavi (19.1%)	Nasrin Sotoudeh (13.3%)	Toomaj Salehi (5.6%)
Fatemeh Sepehri	8.6%	Reza Pahlavi (46.9%)	Toomaj Salehi (8.8%)	Hossein Ronaghi (4.7%)
Mir H. Mousavi	17.8%	Mohammad Khatami (18.0%)	Mohammad J. Zarif (12.4%)	Reza Pahlavi (12.0%)
Mojtaba Khamenei	17.9%	Ali Khamenei (61.2%)	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (6.9%)	Mohammad J. Zarif (4.6%)
Hossein Ronaghi	10.6%	Reza Pahlavi (25.2%)	Toomaj Salehi (9.7%)	Narges Mohammadi (8.7%)
Nasrin Sotoudeh	9.3%	Narges Mohammadi (21.8%)	Reza Pahlavi (17.2%)	Shirin Ebadi (6.7%)
Molavi Abdolhamid	20.5%	Reza Pahlavi (25.9%)	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (7.4%)	Ali Karimi (7.0%)
Mostafa Tajzadeh	11.7%	Reza Pahlavi (15.3%)	Mir H. Mousavi (13.0%)	Mohammad J. Zarif (11.7%)
Hamed Esmaeillion	12.6%	Reza Pahlavi (18.1%)	Narges Mohammadi (10.4%)	Hossein Ronaghi (6.8%)
Kaveh Madani	12.7%	Reza Pahlavi (25.8%)	Nasrin Sotoudeh (8.5%)	Narges Mohammadi (8.2%)
Mohammad Nourizad	9.8%	Reza Pahlavi (27.1%)	Narges Mohammadi (11.5%)	Fatemeh Sepehri (8.6%)
Masih Alinejad	9.8%	Reza Pahlavi (31.0%)	Toomaj Salehi (8.8%)	Narges Mohammadi (8.0%)
Shirin Ebadi	12.3%	Reza Pahlavi (24.1%)	Nasrin Sotoudeh (13.0%)	Narges Mohammadi (12.0%)
Fa'ezeh Hashemi	15.2%	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (12.5%)	Mohammad Khatami (11.7%)	Reza Pahlavi (10.2%)
Amir Taheri	4.7%	Reza Pahlavi (73.7%)	Fatemeh Sepehri (3.6%)	Kaveh Madani (3.5%)
Sepideh Gholian	8.8%	Toomaj Salehi (16.5%)	Narges Mohammadi (12.0%)	Reza Pahlavi (11.3%)
Nazanin Boniadi	11.2%	Reza Pahlavi (26.6%)	Narges Mohammadi (9.3%)	Toomaj Salehi (7.1%)
Majid Tavakoli	5.4%	Reza Pahlavi (29.6%)	Hossein Ronaghi (15.2%)	Kaveh Madani (6.8%)
Saeed Madani	8.4%	Narges Mohammadi (20.6%)	Kaveh Madani (14.8%)	Mostafa Tajzadeh (11.5%)
Mehdi Yarrahi	13.8%	Toomaj Salehi (16.1%)	Reza Pahlavi (11.8%)	Ali Karimi (9.7%)
Abdollah Mohtadi	18.7%	Reza Pahlavi (12.8%)	Narges Mohammadi (12.5%)	Masih Alinejad (9.2%)
Esmail Bakhshi	9.3%	Toomaj Salehi (14.7%)	Sepideh Gholian (10.6%)	Reza Pahlavi (9.8%)
Maryam Rajavi	34.5%	Reza Pahlavi (13.2%)	Narges Mohammadi (7.4%)	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (7.0%)
Faraj Sarkouhi	9.8%	Reza Pahlavi (14.1%)	Narges Mohammadi (9.3%)	Toomaj Salehi (8.9%)
Reza Alijani	13.9%	Reza Pahlavi (14.6%)	Narges Mohammadi (12.2%)	Nasrin Sotoudeh (10.0%)
Bahareh Hedayat	4.0%	Reza Pahlavi (16.1%)	Hossein Ronaghi (12.2%)	Mostafa Tajzadeh (11.3%)
Ali Afshari	20.2%	Narges Mohammadi (16.3%)	Mir H. Mousavi (8.4%)	Mostafa Tajzadeh (8.3%)
None of the above	95.1%	Other individuals (4.9%)	–	–

5–1–1 Figures with High Levels of Exclusive Support (Single-Choice Selection)

When a respondent selects only one person (even though they could choose two), this may indicate exclusive loyalty or a strong symbolic attachment to that figure.

According to Table 2, 45% of those who selected Ali Khamenei did not choose anyone else. Similarly, 44% of those who chose Reza Pahlavi selected no other individual. These two figures represent opposing symbolic poles in Iranian political discourse, and their support bases exhibit high loyalty.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also has a single-selection rate of about 40%, indicating the presence of an identifiable base of loyal supporters.

Maryam Rajavi, with a single-selection rate of 34.5%, demonstrates that she has a distinct group of supporters and a discourse set apart from other currents.

Additionally, 58% of those who selected “Other individuals” did not choose a second option. This likely indicates that their preferred figure was not listed.

5–1–2 Figures with High Levels of Co-Selection

High co-selection rates indicate ideological or discursive proximity between figures, as perceived by respondents. For example, according to Table 2, about 74% of those who selected Amir Taheri also selected Reza Pahlavi. Similarly, around 47% of those who chose Ali Karimi or Fatemeh Sepehri also selected Reza Pahlavi as their second choice. This co-selection reflects the perceived ideological and political closeness of these figures in the eyes of respondents. In practice, they are indeed aligned with the monarchist and pro-Pahlavi current.

Moreover, about 61% of those who selected Mojtaba Khamenei also selected Ali Khamenei. In contrast, only about 24% of those who selected Ali Khamenei also selected Mojtaba Khamenei. These figures indicate that Mojtaba Khamenei does not have a strong social base among the supporters of the current leader of the Islamic Republic.


Another notable point from Table 2 is that a large portion of those who selected Reza Pahlavi as one of their two choices did not choose their other option from the monarchist or pro-Pahlavi camp. In other words, more than 40% of those who selected Reza Pahlavi as one of their two choices chose their other option from figures independent of the monarchist or pro-Pahlavi current. For example, roughly one-third of those who selected Toomaj Salehi, about 30% of those who selected Masih Alinejad, and around 20% of those who selected Narges Mohammadi also chose Reza Pahlavi as their other option.

While this table reveals important insights, understanding the structural relationships, perceived distances, and actual clusters in the multidimensional space of co-selections requires an analysis of the dendrogram. The dendrogram illustrates which

figures fall within the same cluster, which ones lie on the cluster boundaries (bridging or boundary figures), and which figures are entirely detached from the main clusters.

5–2 Clustering of Political and Civil Figures Based on Respondent Selections

Figure 20, a dendrogram (tree diagram), shows the clustering of political and civil figures based on patterns of co-selection among respondents in the June 2024 survey. The clustering reflects how similar or distinct different figures are perceived within public opinion.



To analyze co-selection patterns, hierarchical clustering was applied using the following steps:

- **Sample selection:** Only respondents who answered the candidate preference question were included (74,142 individuals).
- **Data matrix:** A binary (0/1) variable was assigned for each of the 36 options (34 figures + “None” + “Other”).
- **Correlation matrix:** Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between each pair of figures to measure co-selection strength.
- **Distance matrix:** The correlation matrix was converted to a distance matrix using the formula: $distance = 1 - correlation$.
- **Clustering:** Average linkage hierarchical clustering was applied.

- **Cluster identification:** By cutting the dendrogram at an appropriate height, 11 distinct clusters were identified.
- **Selection rate:** For each cluster, the percentage of weighted respondents who selected at least one of its members was calculated.

Table 3 presents the 11 clusters extracted from the dendrogram, their members, and the selection rate of each group. It should be noted that, since each respondent could select two individuals, the selection rates of some groups overlap; therefore, the total combined selection rate of all groups exceeds 100%. The eleven clusters are explained below.

Table 3: Clusters extracted from the dendrogram based on respondents' co-selection patterns

Cluster Label	Cluster Members	Selection Rate
Cluster 1: Principlists	Ali Khamenei, Mojtaba Khamenei, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	17.8%
Cluster 2: Reformists	Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Mohammad Khatami, Fa'ezeh Hashemi, Mostafa Tajzadeh	15.3%
Cluster 3: Pahlavi Supporters	Reza Pahlavi, Ali Karimi, Amir Taheri	34.8%
Cluster 4: Liberal Nationalists	Hossein Ronaghi, Majid Tavakoli, Bahareh Hedayat	4.2%
Cluster 5: Civil/Human Rights Activists	Narges Mohammadi, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Shirin Ebadi, Kaveh Madani, Saeed Madani, Faraj Sarkouhi, Reza Alijani, Ali Afshari	11.8%
Cluster 6: Solidarity Council	Hamed Esmaeillion, Masih Alinejad, Abdollah Mohtadi, Nazanin Boniadi	5.3%
Cluster 7: Imprisoned Activists	Fatemeh Sepehri, Mohammad Nourizad	6.6%
Cluster 8: Labor Activists & Protest Artists	Toomaj Salehi, Mehdi Yarrahi, Sepideh Gholian, Esmail Bakhshi	7.7%
Cluster 9: MEK (Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization)	Maryam Rajavi	0.3%
Cluster 10: Sunni Representative	Molavi Abdolhamid	3.0%
Cluster 11: Supporters of Other Individuals	None of the above, Other Individuals	20.0%

Cluster 1: Principlist (Conservative) Camp

This cluster includes Ali Khamenei, Mojtaba Khamenei, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Around 18% of the target population selected at least one of these three as their first or second choice.

This cluster clearly represents the traditional ruling faction of the Islamic Republic. The intra-cluster correlation between Ali Khamenei and Mojtaba Khamenei is very high, with a clear separation from other clusters. While Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears in this cluster, his branch connects to the Khamenei branch at a greater distance, indicating that a segment of public opinion still perceives him as part of the power structure, yet distinguishes him significantly from the Khamenei family.

Cluster 2: Reformist Camp

This cluster includes Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Mohammad Khatami, and Faezeh Hashemi. Around 15% of the target population selected at least one of these figures as their first or second choice.

While these figures are not part of the ruling establishment, they are known for advocating gradual reform within the framework of the Islamic Republic. The dendrogram structure shows that this cluster is divided into two distinct subclusters:

- **Green Movement Subcluster:**
Figures such as Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mostafa Tajzadeh, and Faezeh Hashemi belong here. Their proximity on the tree diagram reflects the tendency of respondents, still loyal to the leaders of the Green Movement and its more critical discourse toward the ruling system, to select them together. This group is often associated with narratives of structural change, the contested 2009 election, and criticism of the (so-called) Supreme Leader.
- **Traditional Reformist Subcluster:**
Figures like Mohammad Khatami and Mohammad Javad Zarif are part of this segment. They are recognized as more formal and symbolic representatives of reformism, with a support base among traditional reformist circles.

Notably, while the two subclusters are relatively close, they connect at a higher point in the dendrogram, indicating a degree of divergence in their support bases or in how voters perceive these two shades of reformism.

Cluster 3: Monarchists and Pro-Pahlavi Camp

This cluster includes Reza Pahlavi, Ali Karimi, and Amir Taheri. About 35% of the target population selected at least one of these three as their first or second choice.

Reza Pahlavi, as the main symbol of monarchist discourse, is at the center of this cluster. Ali Karimi, a prominent supporter of the pro-Pahlavi current, appears in close proximity to him, unsurprisingly given both their overlapping support base and similar public stances.

Cluster 4: Liberal Nationalists

This cluster includes Hossein Ronaghi, Majid Tavakoli, and Bahareh Hedayat, with a selected rate of 4.2%. All three are civil and political activists who, particularly after the 2009 and 2022 protests, have been recognized as younger political voices critical of the system with a liberal nationalist orientation.

Cluster 5: Civil and Human Rights Activists

This cluster includes Narges Mohammadi, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Shirin Ebadi, Kaveh Madani, Saeed Madani, Reza Alijani, and Faraj Sarkouhi. About 12% of the target population selected at least one of these figures as their first or second choice. The composition reflects a focus on human rights, civil liberties, environmental protection, and social justice. Most are known for their professional and social activism in human

rights and civil society, and many have been imprisoned. Their co-selection suggests public recognition of these figures as civil society advocates.

The dendrogram shows at least two main subclusters:

- **Human Rights Subcluster:**
Includes prominent human rights defenders such as Narges Mohammadi, Shirin Ebadi, and Nasrin Sotoudeh, with long-standing records defending the rights of political prisoners, women, and children, and with international recognition through major awards.
- **Environmental and Social Justice Subcluster:**
Includes figures such as Kaveh Madani and Saeed Madani, whose work in environmental issues, sociology, and social justice has brought them into public life. Political activists like Faraj Sarkouhi, Reza Alijani, and Ali Afshari are also here, aligned with social democratic and republican discourses.

Cluster 6: “Solidarity Council” Activists

This cluster includes Hamed Esmaeilion, Masih Alinejad, Abdollah Mohtadi, and Nazanin Boniadi, with a selection rate of 5.3%. Their main commonality was their membership or collaboration in the so-called “Solidarity Council,” formed in 2022 during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising alongside Reza Pahlavi and Shirin Ebadi. Although the council dissolved shortly after, with the departure of Reza Pahlavi and later Hamed Esmaeilion, their co-selection reflects the enduring public perception of them as linked figures.

Cluster 7: Imprisoned Civil Activists

This cluster includes Fatemeh Sepehri and Mohammad Nourizad, with a selection rate of 6.6%. In recent years, both have been among the fiercest critics of the Islamic Republic, repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for their outspoken positions. Their appearance as a distinct cluster reflects their public image as independent, courageous, and willing to pay a high personal cost for dissent. Their distance from more organized clusters highlights their independent yet prominent standing in public perception.

Cluster 8: Labor Activists and Protest Artists

This cluster includes Sepideh Qolian, Esmail Bakhshi, Toomaj Salehi, and Mehdi Yarahi, four well-known figures inside Iran, bridging labor movements, civic protests, and protest art in recent years. About 8% of the target population selected at least one as their first or second choice.

The dendrogram shows two clear subclusters:

- **Labor Activists Subcluster:**
Includes Sepideh Qolian and Esmail Bakhshi, both prominent in recent labor protests. Their grouping reflects the public perception of them as critical labor and trade union activists.

- **Protest Artists Subcluster:**

Includes Toomaj Salehi (protest rapper) and Mehdi Yarahi (protest pop singer), who use music and media to voice the struggles of youth, the marginalized, and victims of street protests. Their arrests and the personal costs they have borne place them in the public mind alongside field activists.

The co-selection of members from both subclusters suggests that many see labor activists and protest artists as part of a shared front.

Cluster 9: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK)

The only member here is Maryam Rajavi, leader of the MEK, whose placement in a separate cluster reflects her ideological distance from other figures.

Cluster 10: Sunni Religious Leader

This cluster also has a single member – Molavi Abdolhamid – widely recognized as a leading Sunni figure in Iran, particularly during the 2022 uprising. His low rate of co-selection with other figures and his separate placement indicate his distinct identity and specific support base.

Cluster 11: Supporters of “Other” Individuals

This cluster includes those who selected “none” or “other individuals.” Its selection rate is 20%, meaning about one-fifth of respondents did not choose any of the listed political or civic figures, instead naming others. Their separate clustering suggests political disillusionment with the mentioned figures and a preference for alternative personalities.

5–3 Support Base of Reza Pahlavi

According to the June 2024 survey, about 31% of the target population selected Reza Pahlavi as either their first or second choice in a hypothetical free election. In the December 2022 survey, 33% had chosen him as their first choice. This slight decrease suggests a relatively stable selection rate over recent years.

Although neither Reza Pahlavi nor any other political or civil figure in Iran enjoys majority support, he has nonetheless maintained, in recent years, a relatively broader selection rate than other political and civil figures, both inside and outside the country. Part of this position is likely due to the symbolic weight of his family name and his unique status as the former crown prince of Iran. Therefore, this makes it worthwhile to examine his support base more closely.

5–3–1 Support for Reza Pahlavi by Demographic Group


Figure 21 shows the breakdown of Reza Pahlavi’s support across demographic groups.

His support is higher among men (36%) than women (27%). On the other hand, support for Reza Pahlavi increases with age. The highest level of support is observed

among those aged 50 and above (34%), and the lowest among those under 29 (29%). This may stem from the lived experience of older generations from the pre-1979 Revolution era or from a sense of nostalgia.

Those without university education show more support (33%) than those with higher education (27%). This aligns with earlier findings that more educated individuals tend to prefer republican systems and are less inclined toward monarchist figures.


Figure 21: Selection rate of Reza Pahlavi as first or second choice by demographic groups



Urban residents (33%) are more likely to support Reza Pahlavi than rural residents (27%). This gap may reflect the greater prevalence of conservative or religious sentiment in rural areas, which correlates with lower support for opposition figures.

Figure 22 shows the level of support for Reza Pahlavi across different provinces. The figure indicates that his popularity among survey population varies significantly depending on their province of residence.

Figure 22: Selection rate of Reza Pahlavi as first or second choice by province




The provinces of Gilan (42%), Alborz (40%), North Khorasan (38%), Hormozgan (37%), and Qazvin (36%) show the highest levels of support for Reza Pahlavi.

In contrast, the provinces of Kurdistan (15%), West Azerbaijan (17%), East Azerbaijan (20%), Ilam (20%), Ardabil (23%), and Sistan and Baluchestan (23%) show the lowest levels of support. This is likely due to ethno-identity factors, historical reasons, and local sensitivities toward the idea of monarchy and centralist tendencies.

5–3–2 Support for Reza Pahlavi by Preferred Political System

Figure 23 illustrates support for Reza Pahlavi among supporters of different political systems.

Figure 23: Selection rate of Reza Pahlavi among supporters of different political systems




Support is highest, unsurprisingly, among supporters of monarchy (81%) and federal monarchy (74%). Among those who said the system doesn't matter to them, 30% chose Reza Pahlavi. Among those who said they lack sufficient knowledge to choose an alternative to the Islamic Republic, 26% selected him, suggesting that name recognition and symbolic status influence support.

Support is lower among supporters of republican systems: about 20% among those who favor a unitary or federal republic. As expected, support for Reza Pahlavi among Islamic Republic supporters is just 1%.

5–3–3 Party Orientations Among Reza Pahlavi Supporters

Figure 24 compares the party preferences of Reza Pahlavi supporters with the general population.

Figure 24: Comparison of the party preferences of Reza Pahlavi’s supporters with those of the general population



His supporters show a distinct ideological profile: they strongly favor individual freedoms and national pride. Support for nationalism is particularly high among this group, 39.6%, compared to 26.1% in the general population. Similarly, 49% prioritize individual freedoms, about 12 percentage points above the national average.

Support for social justice is lower among Pahlavi supporters (27%) than the national average (33%). Their support for environmentalism (11.8%) and free-market economics (9%) is slightly above the national average. Support for decentralization and minority rights is lower than average (7.3% vs. 8.5%). Traditional and religious values receive the least support from this group: just 2.2%, about half the national average.

In summary, supporters of Reza Pahlavi generally emphasize individual freedom and Iranian nationalism, while attaching comparatively less importance to religious conservatism, economic justice, and decentralization.

Section Six: Survey Methodology

6-1 Sampling Method

The survey “Iranians’ Attitudes Towards the 2024 Snap Presidential Election” was conducted by the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) from June 17th to June 19th, 2024, over a period of 3 days. This survey was carried out online, utilizing a specialized and secure platform for sampling.

GAMAAN has employed innovative methods to systematically and scientifically measure and record viewpoints and opinions that, due to the nature of authoritarian regimes, cannot be measured using conventional survey methods.


The online questionnaire reached diverse demographic groups across Iran through random sampling via the popular Internet censorship circumvention provider Psiphon VPN, as well as ensuing sharing by respondents on social networks (Telegram, Instagram, WhatsApp, and X).

According to the latest statistics from the [International Telecommunication Union](#), about 82% of Iran’s population are internet users, and [a university research within Iran](#) indicates that 84% of these internet users utilize Internet censorship circumvention tools. Between 5 to 11 million people in Iran use [Psiphon](#) on daily basis. Distributing the survey through random sampling among users connected to Psiphon mitigated network bias (i.e., the likelihood of participants sharing similar views with the organizers).

Moreover, the [International Telecommunication Union data](#) shows that only about 55% Iranian households have a landline telephone. This means that random sampling via the internet and internet censorship circumvention tools can cover a broader segment of society than telephone surveys can (through landlines).

Figure 25 shows the distribution of respondents’ access to the survey questionnaire. One survey question revealed that only 26% of respondents had previously participated in GAMAAN’s surveys, indicating that the random sampling method was effective in distributing the questionnaire among a wide range of demographic groups, reaching far beyond networks familiar with GAMAAN.

Figure 25



6-2 Questionnaire and Sample Characteristics

In this survey, in addition to the main questions, respondents were asked about their demographic characteristics (gender, age group, level of education, province of residence, urban or rural area, employment status, household income level, spoken language at home, type of health insurance); respondents were also asked about their political orientation and past electoral behavior. Since respondents participated in the survey anonymously without questions about personal characteristics, it is estimated that they felt more secure in expressing their genuine opinions.

Over 83,000 respondents from inside and outside the country fully completed the survey questionnaire. Given the distribution of the questionnaire through a circumvention tool that only targeted users inside Iran and based on what respondents have stated about their place of residence, 97% of the respondents were residents of Iran. Iranians inside the country from all 31 provinces and from urban and rural areas participated in this survey (Table 5).

6-3 Sample Refinement

A question was placed to identify random or bot-entered responses. Incorrect responses to this question, as well as contradictory cases were removed from the refined sample (such as those who stated they were not of voting age in 2017 or 2021 but mentioned their age group as over 30 years, or those who said they were not of voting age in 2024 but had voted in 2021). After the refinements, **the final sample size from inside Iran was 77,216 respondents**. In this report, the term “raw sample” refers to the refined sample from within the country. Considering the standard age groups in publicly available census characteristics and statistical data, the final sample used in this analysis only includes respondents 20 years and older.

6-4 Extracting a Representative Sample

Online survey samples usually do not match the demographic characteristics of the target population; therefore, various balancing methods such as weighting and the sample matching method are used to balance the raw sample and align it with the main characteristics of the target population. **The target population for this survey are literate individuals 20 years and older**, residing in Iran (those who have the ability to use the internet and read survey questions, covering 90% of the adult population of Iran). In this report, the term ‘*population*’ refers specifically to the **survey’s target population**.

In this research, the raking weighting method was used to extract a representative sample from the raw sample. According to the [Pew Research Center](#), this weighting method, considering appropriate demographic variables, is one of the most effective and reliable methods for balancing online survey samples.

To convert the raw sample of respondents within the country into a representative sample of the target population, the raking method was used based on five demographic variables: age group, gender, level of education, residential area (urban or rural), and provincial population.

Also, upon examining the responses to the question about the political orientation of respondents, it was determined that in the sample of this survey, the percentage of those who support “the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader” was slightly higher than the social base of this group (about 11%) based on the results of the [former GAMAAN survey](#) and also [a recent survey by Stasis](#). This could be due to their greater motivation to participate in elections and related surveys. Therefore, the variable of political orientations was also applied for weighting to ensure that the social base of different political orientations in the final sample was balanced.

Given that the sampling method using a circumvention tool is similar to random sampling, this survey’s raw sample had a balanced distribution and high quality. After the weighting calculations, the effective sample size was 20,492, a very high sample size for a 95% credibility level and a 5% credibility interval. The sample weighting calculations were performed using a specialized tool of the Dutch company [Sample Weighting](#). To determine the most up-to-date demographic characteristics of the Iranian population, GAMAAN relied on the [2022 Labor Force Survey](#).

6-5 Sample Demographics

Tables 4 to 8 depict the distribution of population variables in the raw survey sample, the weighted sample, and the target population. It can be observed that the demographic characteristics of the weighted sample closely match those of the target population.

Table 4: Gender Distribution

Sex	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population, 20 years and older (work force statistics 2022)
Female	23.1% (17835)	47.9%	47.9%
Male	76.9% (59381)	52.1%	52.1%

Table 5: Rural/Urban Distribution

Region	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population, 20 years and older (work force statistics 2022)
Rural Areas	6.4% (4926)	19.7%	19.7%
Urban Areas	93.6% (72290)	80.3%	80.3%

Table 6: Age Group Distribution

Age groups	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population, 20 years and older (work force statistics 2022)
Between 20 and 29 years old	5.6% (4302)	19.9%	19.9%
Between 30 and 49 years old	56.9% (43957)	53.9%	53.9%
At least 50 years old	37.5% (28957)	26.2%	26.2%

Table 7: Education Level Distribution

Education level	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population, 20 years and older (work force statistics 2022)
Non-university educated	29.2% (22540)	72.3%	72.3%
University educated	70.9% (54676)	27.7%	27.7%

Table 8: Province Distribution

Province of residence	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population, 20 years and older (work force statistics 2022)
East Azerbaijan	4.9% (3789)	4.8%	4.8%
West Azerbaijan	2.2% (1708)	3.7%	3.7%
Ardabil	1.3% (972)	1.4%	1.4%
Isfahan	9.5% (7298)	6.9%	6.9%
Alborz	4.4% (3374)	3.8%	3.8%
Ilam	0.8% (648)	0.7%	0.7%
Bushehr	1.2% (898)	1.4%	1.4%
Tehran	27.7% (21413)	18.7%	18.7%
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	1.2% (919)	1.1%	1.1%
South Khorasan	1.1% (863)	0.9%	0.9%
Razavi Khorasan	6.8% (5274)	8.0%	8.0%
North Khorasan	0.8% (586)	0.9%	0.9%
Khuzestan	3.2% (2506)	5.5%	5.5%
Zanjan	1.0% (771)	1.3%	1.3%
Semnan	0.6% (458)	1.0%	1.0%
Sistan and Baluchistan	0.7% (544)	2.4%	2.4%
Fars	8.6% (6624)	6.2%	6.2%
Qazvin	1.0% (739)	1.6%	1.6%
Qom	1.0% (798)	1.6%	1.6%
Kurdistan	1.8% (1372)	1.8%	1.8%
Kerman	2.0% (1584)	3.9%	3.9%
Kermanshah	2.2% (1690)	2.3%	2.3%
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad	0.9% (671)	0.8%	0.8%
Golestan	2.2% (1660)	2.1%	2.1%
Gilan	3.1% (2430)	3.4%	3.4%
Lorestan	2.1% (1612)	2.0%	2.0%
Mazandaran	2.6% (2001)	4.5%	4.5%
Markazi	1.3% (1016)	1.8%	1.8%
Hormozgan	1.1% (833)	2.1%	2.1%
Hamadan	1.3% (987)	2.0%	2.0%
Yazd	1.5% (1178)	1.5%	1.5%

6-6 Reliability Checks

6-6-1 Comparison of Economic and Social Statistics

One of the methods that can be used to assess the credibility and representativeness of the weighted sample is to compare the results of the weighted sample with external evidence. Table 9 displays the employment status of individuals in the weighted sample compared to the target population at two levels, urban and rural, for the literate population above 19 years old, based on the annual [labor force report](#). As can be observed, the national employment ratio for the weighted sample is consistent with the target population.

Table 9: Employment

Employment status	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Workforce statistics (literate individuals, 20 years and older; 2022)
Whole country	56.2%	40.1%	42.2%
Urban areas	57.1%	40.7%	40.8%
Rural areas	43.0%	37.4%	47.8%

In this survey, participants were also asked about their household income status to compare the distribution of economic status in the sample with the target population. Table 10 illustrates the distribution of household income status. According to the definition, ten percent of households in the country are placed in each decile. As can be seen, the distribution of household income status for three groups, low income (comprising the first three deciles), medium income (comprising the middle three deciles), and high income (comprising the top four deciles) in the weighted sample aligns with recent [official statistics](#) on household income levels in society.

Table 10: Household Income Distribution in Iran (official exchange rate, [1 USD = 285,000 Rials](#))

Income level of different deciles according to the Statistical Center of Iran in 2023	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Distribution in society
First three lower deciles (household monthly income below 70 million Rials)	13.6%	25.8%	30%
Middle three deciles (household monthly income between 70 and 130 million Rials)	32.3%	40.4%	30%
Upper four deciles (household monthly income above 130 million Rials)	54.0%	33.8%	40%

In this survey, participants were also asked about the language spoken at home. As shown in Table 11, the distribution of spoken languages in the weighted sample closely matches the statistics provided by [Ethnologue](#) encyclopedia for Iran.

Table 11: Home Language Distribution in Iran

What language do you normally speak at home?	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Ethnologue statistics (2021, 24th ed.)
Farsi	73.2%	67.1%	60.1%
Azerbaijani/Turkic	10.6%	12.0%	12.9%
Kurdish	4.8%	5.5%	5.7%
Luri	4.4%	4.9%	4.8%
Baluchi	0.4%	1.3%	1.4%
Gilaki	1.3%	1.7%	2.9%
Mazandarani	1.0%	1.7%	2.7%
Arabic	0.5%	1.0%	1.8%
Laki	0.9%	1.1%	1.4%
Qashqai	0.5%	0.4%	1.1%
Turkmeni	0.3%	0.4%	0.9%
Dari (Afghan Persian)	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%
Tati	0.2%	0.3%	0.6%
Lari	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%
Armeni	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Other	1.5%	1.9%	3.1%

The distribution of respondents' health insurance types is another external evidence used for the validation of the weighted sample. In this survey, participants were asked about the type of health insurance they have. This question was also asked through a telephone survey by [ISPA in March 2022](#). Since the type of insurance coverage of individuals is considered a non-sensitive question, a comparison with the results can serve as a criterion for validating the weighted sample. As seen in Table 12, the distribution of health insurance coverage in the weighted sample closely aligns with the statistics provided by the ISPA survey.

Table 12: Health Care Insurance Types in Iran

Which health care insurance do you currently have?	Refined sample	Weighted sample	ISPA Survey 2022 (March)
Social Security Organization	52.7%	48.5%	50.7%
Iran Health Insurance Organization	9.2%	10.9%	7.2%
Salamat	15.2%	9.8%	7.8%
Roostaa	2.3%	6.2%	9.8%
Armed Forces Insurance	3.0%	3.1%	3.4%
Other insurance	1.7%	1.3%	2.9%
I am not insured	15.8%	20.2%	17.6%

6-6-2 Validation Using the World Values Survey (WVS)

The [World Values Survey \(WVS\)](#) conducted a survey in Iran using face-to-face interviews in the spring of 2020. In the Iranians' Turnout in the 2024 Elections survey, some questions from the WVS survey were included alongside other questions to compare the results of the two surveys. To this end, a set of non-sensitive questions, alongside one sensitive question, were asked to compare the results of the two surveys.

Table 13: "Importance in Life" in WVS (spring 2020) and GAMAAN (June 2024) Surveys

For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life.		Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not Know
Family	WVS	93.9%	5.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	92.4%	4.7%	0.8%	1.1%	0.9%
Friends	WVS	28.6%	54.4%	11.2%	5.7%	0%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	30.8%	49.9%	12.9%	4.3%	2.0%
Work	WVS	78.0%	18.6%	1.9%	1.3%	0.2%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	86.1%	8.7%	1.5%	1.8%	1.9%
Religion	WVS	69.4%	22.8%	3.5%	4.2%	0.1%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	29.0%	18.4%	15.3%	34.1%	3.2%

As seen in Table 13, the overall importance ratings of non-sensitive topics (family, friends, and work) in both surveys show minor differences, while regarding a sensitive topic, religion, in the political and social context of Iran, the responses in the two surveys are entirely different. This comparative analysis corroborates the hypothesis that measuring people's real opinions regarding sensitive questions faces serious challenges if based on common survey modes like telephone and face-to-face interviews.

We at the non-profit research foundation GAMAAN would like to express our sincere gratitude to all of those who took the time to contribute to this survey.

We are professionally committed to sparing no effort in collecting the opinions and attitudes of Iranians from all levels of society and all walks of life. GAMAAN commits itself to ethical guidelines with regard to protecting respondents' submitted data and strives to employ scientific methods in extracting representative samples. We pledge to be transparent to the public and in explaining probable error levels.

Our team gladly receives any comments, suggestions, and criticisms. Scientists and scholars working at universities and research institutes can collaborate with us and request survey data, which can be granted upon agreement with GAMAAN's terms.

GAMAAN can be reached at info@gamaan.org.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ammar Maleki is the director of GAMAAN and assistant professor of comparative politics at Tilburg University. He was selected as Iran's national representative to the [World Association for Public Opinion Research](#) (WAPOR) for the 2025–2026 term.

ABOUT GAMAAN

GAMAAN, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran, is an independent, nonprofit research foundation registered in the Netherlands. We study Iranians' attitudes towards different social and political topics.

[GAMAAN](#) conducts online surveys to extract the (real) opinions of Iranians about sensitive topics. The rationale for GAMAAN's innovative approach, spreading surveys on a large variety of digital channels and collaborating with VPN-platforms, is the fact that conventional survey modes like face-to-face and telephone interviewing cannot yield valid results in the existing Iranian context. To obtain representative samples, we use matching and weighting methods; we then compare our results with external data and other survey institutes' results for nonsensitive questions. In this way, we strive to understand the extent to which our results can be said to be representative.

GAMAAN's findings have been cited and discussed in many international outlets, including The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, The Conversation, Deutsche Welle, New York Magazine, and Newsweek, and have been widely covered by Persian media. In 2022, GAMAAN was awarded the Market Research Society's President's Medal in London for making an "extraordinary contribution to research".

