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Survey Report

Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and War



**The Group for Analyzing and
Measuring Attitudes in IRAN
(GAMAAN)**

In collaboration with



Psiphon

July 2026

Acknowledgments

GAMAAN is grateful to the Psiphon, Lantern, and MahsaNet teams for their voluntary assistance in disseminating the survey questionnaire. The author of this report also sincerely thanks all those who contributed to this research in various ways by offering advice and expert input. This research had no commissioner and was conducted independently by GAMAAN.

Access to Additional Survey Data

This public report presents the main findings from selected survey questions. Additional results, including questions not covered in this report, subgroup breakdowns, cross-tabulations, and extended analysis, are available in a supplementary professional report. Researchers, media organizations, policymakers, and other interested users may contact GAMAAN for access and licensing terms.

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Maleki, Ammar. 2026. *Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and War*. Published online, gamaan.org: GAMAAN.



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SURVEY SUMMARY

The survey *“Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and [39-Day] War”* was conducted across Iran over seven days, from June 20 to 27, 2026, with the voluntary collaboration of the **Psiphon, Lantern, and MahsaNet** VPN tools. The findings in this report are based on a weighted sample of **31,450** respondents inside Iran. The results are calibrated to the demographic profile of literate residents of Iran aged 15 and above. For estimates referring to this target population, the survey reports an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ± 3 percentage points.

The January 2026 Protests

- About 25% of the target population reported having participated in the January 2026 street protests, corresponding to an estimated 14 million literate people aged 15 and above. This estimate may encompass a range of forms of protest participation over several days. By contrast, about half of respondents said they had not participated in the protests, while about 25% preferred not to answer this question.
- Among those who participated in the January 2026 protests, the most frequently mentioned reason for joining the protests was “dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic,” at about 71%. This was followed by “high prices, inflation, and corruption” at about 62% and “Reza Pahlavi’s call to protest” at about 55%. “Solidarity with the bazaaris’ protests,” at about 19%, and “Donald Trump’s declaration of support for the protesters,” at about 10%, ranked next among the factors respondents mentioned as influencing their participation.
- In light of the mass killings and arrests carried out during the regime’s response to the January 2026 protests, about 80% of the target population regarded the regime’s handling of the protests as “wrong”; this includes about 75% who assessed it as “completely wrong” and about 5% who assessed it as “somewhat wrong.” Only about 14% had a positive assessment of the regime’s response. This assessment was strongly associated with respondents’ political orientation: while about 85% of principlists and 43% of reformists evaluated the regime’s performance positively, around 95% of transitionists and 98% of regime-change supporters considered it wrong.
- Among the slogans raised in gatherings, “Long live Iran” (94% agreement), “No to executions” (81%), “Death to the dictator” (79%), and “Woman, Life, Freedom” (74%) received the highest levels of public acceptance.
- Among slogans associated with monarchist or Pahlavi-oriented tendencies, the pattern of responses was more varied. “Reza Shah, bless your soul” received about 67% agreement and about 21% disagreement. By contrast, “Long live the Shah,” with about 54% agreement, 31% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, received less support than more general slogans in favor of the idea of Iran or against the current regime. “This is the final battle; Pahlavi will return,” with about

50% agreement, 34% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, was among the slogans that created greater division among respondents.

- Slogans closer to the official discourse of the Islamic Republic faced broad opposition in society: about 66% opposed “No compromise, no surrender; fight the United States,” about 62% opposed “Death to Israel,” and about 61% opposed “God’s hand was revealed; Khamenei became young again.”
- On the question of Iran’s flag, about 64% preferred one of the two designs bearing the lion-and-sun emblem: about 40% preferred the tricolor flag with the lion and sun, and about 24% preferred the tricolor flag with the lion, sun, and crown. By contrast, the current official flag of the Islamic Republic received about 19% support.

The 39-Day U.S.–Israeli War with the Islamic Republic of Iran

- Regarding the nature of the 39-day war, society is markedly divided: 42% considered the U.S. and Israeli military action to be “military aggression against Iran,” while nearly the same share disagreed with this assessment. About 40% viewed the U.S. and Israeli military operation as a form of “humanitarian intervention” (R2P), while about 48% disagreed with this interpretation.
- When asked about “foreign military intervention” as a means of effecting change in Iran, about 38% of society reported that they had supported military intervention both before and after the 39-day war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention both before and after the war. Among those whose position changed, a limited decline in support for foreign military intervention is visible: about 8% moved from support to opposition, while about 4% moved from opposition to support.
- In assessing two statements about the consequences of the war for the Islamic Republic, the results indicate that a substantial share of society held an unsympathetic view toward the regime: about 60% felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war. Regarding the killing of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, about 52% said they were not saddened, while about 24% said they were saddened and about 24% had no opinion.
- For all three statements concerning the Islamic Republic’s military policies, opposition exceeded agreement: about 51% disagreed that the missile program had increased the country’s security, about 47% did not consider closing the Strait of Hormuz to be the right action, and about 59% opposed Iran building nuclear weapons.
- Regarding the agreement signed between the United States and the Islamic Republic, about 68% of society believes that the agreement did not serve the interests of the Iranian people. This critical view appears across political orientations: about 81% of regime-change supporters, 65% of transitionists, and 62% of principlists oppose the agreement. The lowest level of opposition to the agreement, 48%, is seen among reformists.
- Public attitudes toward Donald Trump are almost evenly split: about 44% held a positive view and about 44% held a negative view of him. Attitudes toward

Benjamin Netanyahu are also polarized, but positive views were more common than negative views: about 51% held a positive view and about 38% a negative view. By contrast, Vladimir Putin was the most negatively viewed of the three leaders, with about 73% negative evaluations.

- Reza Pahlavi continues to receive positive evaluations from a substantial share of society: about 45% said their view of him had been positive before the protests and the 39-day war and remained positive. By contrast, about 28% held a consistently negative view. Overall, the data suggest a limited decline, about 4%, in positive views of him.

Consequences, Concerns, and Public Outlook Following the 39-Day War

- Regarding the economic consequences of the nationwide internet shutdown during the 2026 protests and war, about 36% reported “increased living costs,” 29% “reduced income,” 26% “business disruption or closure,” and 25% “loss of job or main source of income.” These results show that for a significant share of society, the internet shutdown was not merely a communications disruption but also had direct economic and livelihood consequences.
- The most important concern in the days after the protests and the 39-day war was “high prices, inflation, and economic pressures,” selected by 76%. This was followed by “the continuation of the current regime and ongoing repression of dissenters,” at about 60%; “family health and access to medical care and medicine,” at about 42%; and “unemployment or loss of income,” at about 36%. Concerns such as “the resumption of war,” at about 18%, and “political regime change and its possible consequences,” at about 14%, ranked lower.
- If the country’s current situation continues, society is almost divided between staying and wanting to migrate: about 46% have no desire to leave Iran, while about 43% indicated some form of desire to leave. Among the latter, about 32% said they would like to migrate legally but lack the means to do so, about 6% were planning or taking steps toward legal migration, and about 5% were considering seeking asylum. About 11% remained undecided about staying or leaving.

Political Orientations, Preferred Political System, and Perceived Methods for Bringing Change in the Country

- In this survey, the orientation seeking “regime change as a precondition for change” was the largest political tendency in society, at about 47%, marking an increase of about 5 percentage points compared with the previous year. The orientation seeking “structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic” followed at about 23%, showing an increase of about 2 percentage points. By contrast, the share of those identifying as “proponent of gradual reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic” fell to about 10%, and the share of those identifying as “proponent of the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader” fell to about 9%, with both declining by about 3 percentage points compared with the previous year.

- Regarding the preferred form of political system, about 34% of society preferred some form of monarchy (25% “non-federal monarchy” and about 9% “federal monarchy”). About 28% preferred a republican system (17% “non-federal republic” and 11% “federal republic”). By contrast, about 13% chose “Islamic Republic.” Compared with last year, preference for monarchy increased by about 5 percentage points and preference for a republic by about 6 percentage points, while support for the Islamic Republic declined by about 7 percentage points. About one-quarter of society either said that the form of the alternative system did not matter to them or stated that they lacked sufficient knowledge and information to choose an alternative system.
- Among methods considered effective for bringing change to the country, with respondents able to select more than one option, “civil protests, such as gatherings, strikes, or street protests” received the greatest support, at about 44%. This was followed by “foreign military intervention,” at about 30%. Next came “participation in elections,” at about 19%; “international pressure and sanctions,” at about 18%; and “violent struggles,” at about 14%. About 18% said “none” of these methods would be effective.

SECTION ONE: KEY SURVEY FINDINGS

All reported results are based on the weighted sample of participants residing inside Iran. The results are calibrated to the demographic profile of **literate residents of Iran aged 15 and above**, who represent approximately 90% of Iran’s population in this age group. After weighting, the effective sample size is approximately 6,211. For estimates referring to this target population, the survey reports an approximate **95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ± 3 percentage points**. In online non-probability surveys, credibility levels are commonly used as uncertainty measures analogous to confidence levels, and [credibility intervals are used analogously to margins of error](#) in probability-based surveys (complete details on methodology and sample characteristics are presented in Section Two.)


1-1 The January 2026 Protests

This survey assessed Iranians’ attitudes on a range of issues related to the January 2026 protests, including participation and motivations for joining the protests, the regime’s handling of protesters, slogans raised in gatherings, and the flag of Iran.

1-1-1 Participation and Motivations for Joining the Protests

In response to the question “Did you participate in the January 2026 street protests?,” about 25% of the target population reported having participated in these protests (Figure 1). Based on the [2022 Labor Force Survey](#), this corresponds to an estimated 14 million literate people aged 15 and above in the country.

Figure 1




This level of participation does not necessarily mean that all of these individuals were present in the streets continuously or for several days. Rather, it may encompass a range of forms of protest participation. Given that the January 2026 protests began on December 28, 2025, continued for several days, and, according to some [assessments](#), reportedly reached several million participants nationwide at their peak on January 8 and 9, this self-reported participation may include various forms of engagement: from a brief or temporary presence in the streets to participation in gatherings, marches, or small local protest actions during the January protest period.

The fact that 25% preferred not to answer this question may indicate the high sensitivity of the issue and the security environment in the country, and it may reflect caution or fear about explicitly stating a personal experience even in the context of an anonymous survey. By contrast, 50% said they had not participated in the street protests.

In another question, respondents who said they had participated in the January protests were asked: “Which of the following factors played a role in your decision to participate in the January protests?” Because respondents could select more than one option, the total percentages exceed 100%.

As shown in Figure 2, the most frequently selected factor for participating in the protests was “dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic,” at 71%. This was followed by “high prices, inflation, and corruption,” at about 62%. In addition, about 55% of participants stated that “Reza Pahlavi’s call to protest” was among the factors affecting their decision to join the protests. Next came “solidarity with the bazaaris’ protests,” at 19%, and “Donald Trump’s declaration of support for the protesters,” at 10%.

Figure 2




These results show that political and economic motivations both played a role in protesters' participation. Dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic was the top factor, but the high share of "high prices, inflation, and corruption" also indicates that livelihood and economic grievances were among the main drivers of street participation. The fact that more than half of protest participants selected "Reza Pahlavi's call to protest" also indicates that this call, at least in the self-reports of a substantial share of protesters, played a meaningful role in their decision to participate.

1-1-2 The Regime's Handling of the Protests

The January 2026 protests were met with an extremely harsh response by the Islamic Republic, including mass killings, numerous injuries, widespread arrests, and severe restrictions on communications. [International human rights organizations](#) described the killings as unprecedented in scale and raised serious concerns about unlawful killings and arbitrary arrests. In light of this response, the survey included a question asking respondents to evaluate the regime's handling of the January 2026 protests.

Figure 3 shows that respondents' assessment of the regime's handling of these protests was predominantly negative. The largest share of responses was "completely wrong," at about 75%, indicating that an overwhelming majority of respondents assessed the regime's response as entirely wrong. About 5% also considered it "somewhat wrong." Thus, overall, about 80% of respondents regarded the regime's handling of the protests as wrong.

Figure 3



By contrast, 13.5% of respondents had a positive assessment: 8.5% said the regime's response was "completely right," and 5% said it was "somewhat right." A further 6.5% said they had no opinion on this issue.

The breakdown of responses by political orientation in Figure 3 shows that this variable played a decisive role in assessments of the regime's handling of the January 2026 protests.

Among principlists, a large majority of respondents (85%) evaluated the regime's response positively: about 67% considered it "completely right," and about 18% "somewhat right." By contrast, only about 7% of principlists evaluated the regime's response as wrong. Among reformists, assessments were polarized: while about 43% considered the regime's response right or somewhat right, about 46% had a negative assessment and considered it wrong or somewhat wrong. About 12% of reformists expressed no opinion. By contrast, negative assessments were highly dominant among transitionists and regime-change supporters, with 95% and 98%, respectively, considering the regime's response wrong. In both groups, the share selecting "completely wrong" was very high.

This pattern shows that assessments of the regime's handling of the January 2026 protests are clearly associated with respondents' political position toward the Islamic Republic.


1-1-3 Popularity of Slogans

This survey assessed acceptance of slogans heard during and after the January protests at gatherings of different groups. Figure 4 shows that the level of agreement in the target population varies considerably depending on the political and symbolic content of each slogan.

The highest level of agreement was with the slogan "Long live Iran," at 94%. After that, "No to execution" and "Death to the dictator," with about 81% and 79% agreement respectively, were also among the slogans enjoying broad support. "Woman, Life, Freedom" also continued to enjoy a high level of support, with 74% agreement. The slogan "Poverty, corruption, high prices; we will continue until overthrow," at about 71% agreement, shows that a large share of respondents also supported slogans that express economic and political grievances simultaneously.

Two slogans—"Death to the three corrupt: mullahs, leftists, and mujahids" and "Death to the oppressor, whether Shah or Supreme Leader"—are among the more controversial and confrontational slogans used by forces opposing the Islamic Republic. Each has been emphasized by a segment of regime opponents and, in transnational public political discussions, is ordinarily interpreted not merely as a slogan against the regime but also as a slogan against political rivals.

Figure 4



Nevertheless, the survey results indicate that public perceptions of these slogans do not necessarily match the polarization among political activists. The slogan “Death to the three corrupt, ...” was agreed with by 63% and disagreed by 19%, while 18% expressed no opinion, indicating considerable support. “Death to the oppressor, ...” received about 59% agreement, about 28% disagreement, and 13% no opinion, showing a broadly similar level of support.

Notably, more than half of those who “completely agreed” with either of these two slogans also “completely agreed” with the other. This overlap shows that the polarization surrounding these slogans in the body of society is not as pronounced as it appears among opposition activists.

Among slogans associated with monarchist and Pahlavi-oriented tendencies, the pattern of responses was more varied. “Reza Shah, bless your soul” received about 67% agreement and about 21% disagreement. “Long live the Shah” received about 54% agreement, 31% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, indicating lower support than more general slogans in support of the ideal of Iran or against dictatorship. “This is the final battle; Pahlavi will return,” with about 50% agreement, 34% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, was also among the slogans that created greater division among respondents.

On the other hand, slogans such as “Death to Israel,” “No compromise, no surrender; fight the United States,” and “The hand of God was revealed; Khamenei was rejuvenated” faced broad opposition in the target population. About 66% of respondents opposed “No compromise, no surrender; fight the United States,” about 62% opposed “Death to Israel,” and about 61% opposed “The hand of God was revealed; Khamenei was rejuvenated.” These results show that slogans closer to the official discourse of the Islamic Republic have limited acceptance in society.


Overall, the numbers show that slogans centered on Iran, opposition to repression and executions, and criticism of authoritarianism received the greatest agreement and resonance among large segments of the target population. By contrast, slogans associated with the regime’s official discourse or with ideological confrontation against the United States and Israel generated the highest levels of opposition.

1-1-4 The Flag of Iran

The flag of Iran was one of the prominent symbolic issues in the January 2026 protests. During these protests, the tricolor flag bearing the lion-and-sun emblem was used as a protest symbol against the official flag of the Islamic Republic. The importance of this symbol reached the point that, [following a campaign on social media](#), the Iranian flag icon on the web version of X was also changed from the official flag of the Islamic Republic to the lion-and-sun flag. Given this context, respondents were asked which design they preferred as the flag of Iran. The image of each flag was shown to respondents alongside its description.

Figure 5 shows that designs based on the tricolor flag with the lion-and-sun emblem received the highest level of preference among the target population.

Figure 5



The largest share of responses was for the “tricolor flag with the lion-and-sun emblem,” selected by about 40% of society. Next came the “tricolor flag with the lion, sun, and crown,” at about 24%. Thus, overall, about 64% of the population preferred one of the two designs bearing the lion-and-sun emblem. In [the February 2022 survey](#), support for the lion-and-sun flag was about 46%; comparison of these two results indicates a significant increase in support for this flag.

By contrast, the “tricolor flag with the Allah emblem,” the current official flag of the Islamic Republic, received support from about 19% of the population, a decline of about 10 percentage points compared with the February 2022 survey. About 11% of respondents preferred the “plain tricolor flag,” while about 6% selected “none / another option.”

1-2 The 39-Day U.S.–Israeli War with the Islamic Republic of Iran


This survey assessed respondents’ attitudes on the nature and consequences of the 39-day war, the military policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the suggestion of foreign military intervention, and other war-related topics.

1-2-1 The Nature of the Military Conflict

Figure 6 shows levels of agreement and disagreement with two statements about the nature of the military conflict involving the United States, Israel, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The results show that the target population is significantly divided in its assessment of the nature of the U.S. and Israeli military action.

For the first statement, “The U.S. and Israeli military attack was an act of military aggression against Iran,” responses were split almost evenly between agreement and disagreement. About 42% of the population agreed with this statement, and roughly the same share disagreed. About 15% said they had no opinion. This distribution shows that there is no clear consensus in the target population on interpreting the attack as “military aggression against Iran.”

Figure 6




For the second statement, “The U.S. and Israeli military operation was a form of humanitarian intervention (R2P) to protect the people of Iran”, disagreement was a bit higher, 48%, while 40% agreed and 12% expressed no opinion.

1-2-2 Consequences of the 39-Day War for the Islamic Republic

Figure 7 shows respondents’ levels of agreement and disagreement with two statements about their feelings regarding the consequences of the 39-day war for the Islamic Republic. The figure indicates that a substantial share of the target population viewed the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war with satisfaction.

Figure 7



For the first statement, “I was pleased by the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war,” 60% of the population agreed, comprising 47% who “completely agreed” and 13% who “somewhat agreed.” By contrast, 24% disagreed with the statement and 17% had no opinion.

For the second statement, “I was upset by the killing of the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader during the war”, 24% agreed, 52% disagreed, and 24% expressed no opinion.

Overall, the results show that the attitude of a large segment of the target population toward the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the 39-day war was positive, or at least unsympathetic toward the regime. At the same time, the high share of “no opinion” responses regarding the killing of the Supreme Leader indicates that this issue was more sensitive for some respondents or was associated with a degree of indifference.


1-2-3 The Islamic Republic’s Military Policies

Figure 8 shows levels of agreement and disagreement in society with three statements about the Islamic Republic’s military policies. The results indicate that in all three cases, disagreement exceeded agreement, although the intensity of opposition varied across issues.

Regarding the statement “Iran’s missile program has increased the country’s security,” 38% agreed, 51% disagreed, and 11% expressed no opinion. This result shows that although a substantial segment of the target population sees the missile program as a factor increasing security, the dominant view toward the statement is negative.

For the statement “Closing the Strait of Hormuz was the right action by the Islamic Republic,” 36% agreed and 47% disagreed. The share of “no opinion” responses was also notable at 17%, which may reflect uncertainty among some respondents about the consequences of such an action.

Figure 8



The highest level of opposition concerned the statement “Iran should build nuclear weapons”: 59% disagreed, 27% agreed, and 14% had no opinion.


Overall, the survey results show that the target population takes a predominantly critical approach toward tension-producing or militarized policies, especially the construction of nuclear weapons and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

1-2-4 The Agreement Signed Between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Figure 9 shows the extent to which society agrees or disagrees with the statement that “the agreement signed between the United States and the Islamic Republic does NOT serve the interests of the Iranian people.” The results show that a majority of the population, about 68%, believes that the agreement does not serve the interests of the Iranian people; only about 18% disagreed with this assessment. About 14% expressed no opinion.

Among regime-change supporters, opposition to the agreement is very high: about 81% of this group believe that the signed agreement does not serve the interests of the Iranian people, while only about 13% disagreed. Among transitionists, about 65% opposed the agreement and about 23% supported it. Among principlists as well, despite the group’s closer political affinity with the Islamic Republic, about 62% had a negative view of the signed agreement, while about 19% showed sympathy toward it. About 20% of principlists had no opinion.

Figure 9




Among reformists, the response pattern was more balanced. About 48% of reformists believed that the agreement does not serve the interests of the Iranian people, while about 35% saw it as serving those interests, and about 17% had no opinion.

Overall, the survey results show that a critical view of this agreement is present across political orientations, from strong supporters to opponents of the regime, with reformists alone supporting the agreement to a considerable extent. It appears that some hardline regime supporters, especially in a context in which the killing of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic was followed by calls for revenge against the United States, viewed the agreement as a form of compromise with the United States. By contrast, most regime opponents likely see it as serving to stabilize or strengthen the Islamic Republic. From this perspective, both groups may, for different reasons, view the agreement as failing to serve the interests of the Iranian people.

1-2-5 Foreign Military Intervention

Figure 10 shows the extent to which respondents' attitudes toward foreign military intervention changed or remained stable before and after the 39-day war. The results indicate that, overall, supporters of foreign military intervention make up a larger share of the target population; nevertheless, a substantial share also continues to oppose military intervention or refrains from expressing an opinion.

Figure 10



The largest group of respondents, about 38%, reported that they had supported military intervention before the 39-day war and continued to support it after the war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention before the war and remained opposed. About 23% had no opinion or preferred not to answer.


Among those whose position changed, the share who moved from support to opposition was about 8%, while about 4% said they had previously opposed military intervention but now supported it. These results indicate that the 39-day war caused a limited decline in support for foreign military intervention.

Overall, the findings show that although support for foreign military intervention after the 39-day war remains present among a substantial segment of society, the effect of the recent war on attitude change has been more in the direction of hesitation or opposition to military intervention. It should also be noted that the significant share of “no opinion / prefer not to answer” responses shows that this issue is sensitive or uncertain for some respondents.

1-2-6 Attitudes on Trump, Netanyahu, and Putin

Figure 11 shows respondents' overall views of three foreign political leaders: Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Vladimir Putin.

Figure 11



Regarding Donald Trump, assessments were nearly split in two: 44% held a positive view of the American president and 44% expressed a negative view, although the “very unfavorable” segment was larger than the “very favorable.” About 12% either had no opinion or said they did not know him. This pattern shows that, in the environment following the agreement signed between the United States and the Islamic Republic, Trump is a highly polarizing figure in Iranian society, with positive and negative views of him at almost equal levels.

Regarding Benjamin Netanyahu, positive assessments were somewhat more common than negative ones. About 51% of respondents held a “very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” view of him, while about 38% expressed a “very unfavorable” or “somewhat unfavorable” view. However, the substantial and nearly equal shares of “very favorable” and “very unfavorable” responses show that the target population’s view of Netanyahu is also highly polarized.


By contrast, Vladimir Putin had by far the most negative evaluation among the three leaders. About 73% held a negative view of him, while only 15% expressed a positive view.

1-2-7 Approval of Reza Pahlavi, Before and After the Protests and War

During the January 2026 protests and the 39-day war, Reza Pahlavi was one of the prominent figures in the political and media space related to Iran. The presence of his name in some protesters' slogans, his calls and positions regarding the protests, and his statements on foreign military intervention were among the factors that made his role in this period noteworthy. Respondents were therefore asked how their view of Reza Pahlavi had changed before and after the January protests and the 39-day war.

Figure 12 shows that the largest group of respondents, about 45%, reported that their view of Reza Pahlavi had been positive before the protests and the 39-day war and remained positive. By contrast, 28% said their view of him had been negative and remained negative.

Figure 12



Among those whose views changed, the share who moved from a positive to a negative view was 7%, while 3% said they had previously held a negative view but now had a positive one. These shifts indicate that, overall, positive views of Reza Pahlavi in the target population declined by about 4%.

Noteworthy is that 16% expressed no opinion. This can indicate that despite Reza Pahlavi's prominence in the mediatized transnational public sphere during this period, a substantial segment of Iranian society still had not taken a clear position toward him.

1-3 Consequences, Concerns, and Public Outlook following the 39-Day War


This survey also assessed the economic consequences of the nationwide internet shutdown policy, the most important concerns in society under the current conditions, and Iranians' views on migration if the present situation continues.

1-3-1 Economic Consequences of the Nationwide Internet Shutdown

One of the Islamic Republic's policies during the January 2026 protests and the 39-day war was the nationwide shutdown of the internet in Iran for 88 days—an action that [NetBlocks](#), the international internet monitoring organization, described as the longest recorded nationwide internet shutdown for a country.

Figure 13 shows the economic consequences of this shutdown in Iranian society. Because respondents could select more than one option, the total percentages exceed 100%.

Figure 13



According to the survey results, the most frequently reported economic consequence was “increase in living costs,” selected by 36% of the target population. This was followed by “decrease in income,” at about 29%, and “closure or serious disruption of a personal or family business,” at about 26%. About 25% of society also stated that

the internet shutdown had caused them to experience “loss of a job or main source of income.” Although this consequence was reported less frequently than the first three, in terms of economic severity it is among the heaviest consequences of the shutdown for households.


On the other hand, about 33% reported that they had experienced none of the listed economic consequences and 6% also pointed to other economic consequences not included among the options.

Overall, the data show that during the protests and the 39-day war, the internet shutdown was not limited to a communications disruption for a substantial share of the target population; it also had direct economic and livelihood consequences.

1-3-2 Society’s Most Important Concerns Under Current Conditions

Figure 14 shows respondents’ most important concerns in the days after the January 2026 protests and the 39-day war. Because more than one option could be selected, the total percentages exceed 100%.

Figure 14



According to the survey results, the most important concern in the target population was “high prices, inflation, and economic pressures,” mentioned by about 76% of the target population. This was followed by “the survival of the current regime and continued repression of dissent,” at about 60%, ranking second among concerns. This level indicates that political and security concerns, alongside economic pressures,

occupy a prominent place in the target population's assessment of the country's situation.


Next came "family members' health and access to medical treatment and medicine," at about 42%, and "unemployment or loss of income," at about 36%. These two options show that under current conditions, concerns over health, treatment, employment, and income worry a substantial segment of society. Among the concerns, options such as "the resumption of war," at 18%, and "political regime change and its possible consequences," at 14%, ranked lower. About 5% of respondents also mentioned other concerns.

Overall, the data show that economic and livelihood concerns are the most prominent in the target population. At the same time, the high share of concern about the continuation of the current regime and the repression of dissenters shows that, in respondents' view, the economic crisis is not separate from political and security concerns.

1-3-3 Considering Migration

Figure 15 shows how Iranians view migration if the country's current situation continues. The results indicate that the target population is almost divided between staying and wanting to migrate.

Figure 15



According to the survey results, 46% reported that they had no desire to leave Iran. By contrast, about 43% overall indicated some form of desire to leave the country: 32% said they wanted to migrate legally but lacked the means to do so; 6% were planning or taking steps toward legal migration; and 5% had no possibility of legal migration but were considering asylum. About 11% of respondents selected “don’t know,” showing that for part of society, the decision to stay or leave the country remains uncertain.

1-4 Political Orientations, Preferred Political System, and Perceived Methods for Bringing Change in the Country


As in previous GAMAAN surveys, this study also asked the target population about their political orientations, preferred political system, and views on effective methods for achieving change in the country.

1-4-1 Political Orientations

Figure 16 shows changes in Iranians' political orientations over the past five years. In this survey, conducted after the January 2026 protests and the 39-Day War, the share of those identified as "regime-change supporters" increased by about 5% compared to the previous year, and the orientation that "seeks structural transformation and transition" increased by 2 percentage points.

By contrast, the orientations commonly referred to as "reformist" and "principlist" each declined by about 3 percentage points. The share of those who selected "none" remained largely unchanged.

Figure 16




1-4-2 Preferred Political System

In this survey, as in several previous GAMAAN surveys, respondents were asked which form of political system they preferred. Figure 17 shows that 34% preferred monarchy; 25% selected “non-federal monarchy” and 9% “federal monarchy.” Compared with [last year’s survey results](#), preference for this political system increased by about 5 percentage points.

On the other hand, 28% preferred a republican system; 17% selected “non-federal republic” and 11% “federal republic.” Preference for this political system also increased by about 6 percentage points compared with last year. By contrast, about 13% chose the “Islamic Republic,” indicating a decline of about 7 percentage points compared with last year.

In addition, 6% said that the form of the system replacing the Islamic Republic did not matter to them, and 19% stated that they lacked sufficient knowledge and information to determine an alternative system. This substantial level of no opinion or absence of a specific choice shows that although preference for a system other than the Islamic Republic is visible among the majority of society, about one-quarter of the population still does not have a clear view about the precise form of an alternative system.

Figure 17



1-4-3 Effective Method for Changing the Country's Conditions


In this survey, as in several [previous GAMAAN studies](#), participants were asked about effective methods for bringing about change in the country's conditions (Figure 18). Since this time, unlike in previous surveys, respondents could select more than one option, the total percentages exceed 100%.

According to the survey results, the largest share of responses was for “civil protests, such as gatherings, strikes, or street protests,” which about 44% of respondents considered effective methods for creating change. This result shows that among the options presented, protest actions had the highest level of perceived credibility and effectiveness in the view of the target population. This was followed by “foreign military intervention,” at about 30%.

Next came “participation in elections,” at about 19%, and “international pressure and sanctions,” at 18%. These results indicate that electoral methods under the Islamic Republic and international sanctions are viewed as less effective than civil protests and foreign military intervention.

About 14% of respondents also considered “violent struggles” effective. In addition, 18% said that none of these methods is effective, and 12% had no opinion. These two options show that for a segment of society, there is no clear outlook regarding the possibility of change through the methods presented.

Figure 18



SECTION TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2-1 Sampling Method

The survey “Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and 39-day War” was conducted by the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) from June 20 to 27, 2026, over a period of 7 days. This survey was carried out online, utilizing a specialized and secure platform for sampling.

GAMAAN has employed innovative methods to systematically and scientifically measure and record viewpoints and opinions that, due to the nature of authoritarian regimes, cannot be measured using conventional survey methods.

The online questionnaire reached diverse demographic groups across Iran through random sampling via three popular circumvention platforms: **Psiphon, Lantern and MahsaNet.**

According to the latest statistics from the [International Telecommunication Union](#), about 85% of Iran’s population are internet users, and [a university study in Iran](#) indicates that 84% of these internet users utilize Internet censorship circumvention tools. After nationwide internet access was restored in Iran, about 3 to 5 million people in Iran [used Psiphon](#) on a daily basis.

This survey was distributed through random sampling among users connected to three widely used circumvention tools. Participant statistics show that about 97% received the survey link through Psiphon, 1.5% through MahsaNet, and about 1% through Lantern.

The results of one survey question also show that 23% had previously participated in GAMAAN surveys; these recurrent respondents comprise a diverse range of demographic groups and political orientations. Overall, the sampling method using circumvention tools, especially Psiphon, succeeded in reaching different demographic groups and people with diverse political orientations, with a majority of respondents participating in a GAMAAN survey for the first time.

2-2 Questionnaire and Sample Characteristics

In this survey, in addition to the main questions, respondents were asked about their demographic characteristics (gender, age group, level of education, province of residence, urban or rural area, employment status, marital status, household size, household income level, spoken language at home, type of health insurance) as well as political orientation. Since respondents participated in the survey anonymously without questions about personal characteristics, it is estimated that they felt more secure in expressing their genuine opinions.

Over 33,000 participants from inside and outside the country fully completed the survey questionnaire. Given the distribution of the questionnaire through the three circumvention platforms Psiphon, Lantern, and MahsaNet—which are sent only to users inside Iran—and based on what respondents reported about their place of residence, 99% of respondents resided in Iran. Iranians inside the country from all 31 provinces and from both urban and rural areas participated in this survey.

2-3 Sample Refinement

A question was placed to identify random or bot-entered responses. Incorrect responses to this question, as well as other inconsistent or incomplete responses, were removed from the final sample. After the refinements, **the final sample size from inside Iran was 31,450 respondents**. In this report, the term “raw sample” refers to the refined sample from within the country. Considering the standard age groups in publicly available census characteristics and statistical data, the final sample used in this analysis includes respondents **aged 15 and older**.

2-4 Extracting a Representative Sample

Online survey samples usually do not fully match the demographic characteristics of the target population; therefore, balancing methods such as weighting and the sample matching method are used to balance the raw sample and align it with the main characteristics of the target population. The target population for this survey consists of literate Iranian residents aged 15 and older (those with the ability to use the internet and read survey questions, covering about 90% of Iran’s population aged 15 and above). In this report, whenever the term “population” is used, it refers to the target population.

In this research, the raking weighting method was used to extract a representative sample from the raw sample. According to the [Pew Research Center](#), this weighting method, considering appropriate demographic variables, is one of the most effective and reliable methods for balancing online survey samples. In this report, raking was applied on the basis of five demographic variables: age group, gender, education level, place of residence (urban or rural), and provincial population.

Given that the sampling method using a circumvention tool is similar to random sampling, this survey’s raw sample had a balanced distribution and high quality. After weighting, the **effective sample size was 6,211**, which is more than sufficient for reporting estimates at an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ± 3 percentage points.

The sample weighting calculations were performed using a specialized tool of the Dutch company [Sample Weighting](#). To determine the most up-to-date demographic characteristics of the Iranian population, GAMAAN relied on the [2022 Labor Force Survey](#).

2-5 Sample Demographics

The tables below depict the distribution of population variables in the raw survey sample, the weighted sample, and the target population. It can be observed that the demographic characteristics of the weighted sample closely match those of the target population.

Table 1: Sex Distribution

Sex	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population aged 15 and older (workforce statistics 2022)
Female	22.8% (7,181)	47.8%	47.8%
Male	77.2% (24,269)	52.2%	52.2%

Table 2: Rural/Urban Distribution

Region	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population aged 15 and older (workforce statistics 2022)
Rural Areas	4.8% (1,519)	20.3%	20.3%
Urban Areas	95.2% (29,931)	79.7%	79.7%

Table 3: Age Group Distribution

Age groups	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population aged 15 and older (workforce statistics 2022)
15 to 29 years old	8.1% (2,542)	28.4%	28.4%
30 to 49 years old	50.7% (15,947)	48.2%	48.2%
50 years and older	41.2% (12,961)	23.4%	23.4%

Table 4: Education Level Distribution

Education level	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population aged 15 and older (workforce statistics 2022)
Non-university educated	32.1% (10,090)	74.4%	74.4%
University educated	67.9% (21,360)	25.6%	25.6%

Table 5: Province Distribution

Province of residence	Refined sample (number of samples)	Weighted sample	Literate population aged 15 and older (workforce statistics 2022)
East Azerbaijan	2.7% (853)	4.8%	4.8%
West Azerbaijan	1.1% (332)	3.7%	3.7%
Ardabil	0.6% (200)	1.4%	1.4%
Isfahan	14.5% (4,569)	6.8%	6.8%
Alborz	6.2% (1,955)	3.8%	3.8%
Ilam	0.3% (89)	0.7%	0.7%
Bushehr	0.9% (274)	1.4%	1.4%
Tehran	33.6% (10,568)	18.5%	18.5%
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	1.8% (559)	1.1%	1.1%
South Khorasan	0.5% (165)	0.9%	0.9%
Razavi Khorasan	4.0% (1,251)	8.0%	8.0%
North Khorasan	0.5% (150)	0.9%	0.9%
Khuzestan	2.8% (871)	5.6%	5.6%
Zanjan	0.6% (190)	1.3%	1.3%
Semnan	0.7% (233)	1.0%	1.0%
Sistan and Baluchistan	0.4% (136)	2.6%	2.6%
Fars	6.1% (1,915)	6.2%	6.2%
Qazvin	1.1% (336)	1.6%	1.6%
Qom	1.2% (382)	1.6%	1.6%
Kurdistan	0.9% (296)	1.8%	1.8%
Kerman	2.4% (770)	3.9%	3.9%
Kermanshah	1.4% (424)	2.3%	2.3%
Kohgiluyeh and BoyerAhmad	0.6% (201)	0.8%	0.8%
Golestan	1.3% (421)	2.2%	2.2%
Gilan	2.4% (760)	3.4%	3.4%
Lorestan	2.0% (613)	2.0%	2.0%
Mazandaran	3.8% (1,198)	4.4%	4.4%
Markazi	1.4% (448)	1.8%	1.8%
Hormozgan	1.0% (308)	2.1%	2.1%
Hamadan	1.4% (450)	2.0%	2.0%
Yazd	1.7% (533)	1.5%	1.5%

2-6 Reliability Checks

One way to assess the credibility and representativeness of the weighted sample is to examine how closely its results align with external evidence. In the following sections, the validity and representativeness of the sample are evaluated based on various external indicators.

2-6-1 Comparison of Economic and Social Statistics

Table 6 displays the employment status of individuals in the weighted sample compared to the target population at two levels, urban and rural, for the literate population aged 15 and older, based on the latest [Labor Force Survey report from winter 2026](#). As can be observed, the national employment ratio for the weighted sample is highly consistent with the target population.

Table 6: Employment Status

Employment status	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Workforce statistics (population aged 15 and older; winter 2026)
Whole country	50.8%	36.2%	36.6%
Urban areas	51.3%	35.9%	36.2%
Rural areas	42.1%	37.7%	38.3%

In this survey, participants were also asked about their household income status to compare the distribution of economic status in the sample with the target population. Table 7 illustrates the distribution of household income status. Under the [new subsidy-distribution policy](#), three deciles of society—about 28 million people—receive a 400,000-toman subsidy; five deciles—about 45 million people—are eligible for a 300,000-toman subsidy; and the top two deciles—about 13 million people—receive no subsidy. As shown, the distribution of households across low-income, middle-income, and high-income groups in the weighted sample aligns closely with the distribution of these three groups in society.

Table 7: Household Income Distribution in Iran

Income groups by subsidy received	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Distribution in society
Lower deciles (400,000-toman subsidy per household member)	20.9%	31.8%	30%
Middle deciles (300,000-toman subsidy per household member)	53.5%	51.5%	50%
Upper deciles (no subsidy)	25.6%	16.7%	20%

In this survey, participants were also asked about the language spoken at home. As shown in Table 8, the distribution of spoken languages in the weighted sample closely matches the statistics provided by [Ethnologue](#) encyclopedia for Iran.

Table 8: Home Language Distribution in Iran

What language do you normally speak at home?	Refined sample	Weighted sample	Ethnologue statistics (2021, 24th ed.)
Farsi	80.1%	69.7%	60.1%
Azerbaijani/Turkic	6.3%	10.1%	12.9%
Kurdish	2.8%	4.9%	5.7%
Luri / Bakhtiari	4.1%	4.3%	4.8%
Gilaki	1.0%	1.3%	2.9%
Mazandarani	1.0%	1.3%	2.7%
Arabic	0.3%	0.7%	1.8%
Baluchi	0.3%	1.9%	1.4%
Laki	0.7%	0.7%	1.4%
Qashqai	0.4%	0.6%	1.1%
Turkmeni	0.2%	0.7%	0.9%
Dari (Afghan Persian)	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%
Tati / Talyshi	0.2%	0.2%	0.6%
Lari / Achomi	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
Armeni	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Other	2.2%	3.1%	3.0%

The distribution of respondents' health insurance types is another external evidence used for the validation of the weighted sample. In this survey, participants were asked about the type of health insurance they have. This question was also asked through a telephone survey by [ISPA in March 2022](#). Since the type of insurance coverage of individuals is considered a non-sensitive question, a comparison with the results can serve as a criterion for validating the weighted sample. As seen in Table 9, the distribution of health insurance coverage in the weighted sample closely aligns with the statistics provided by the ISPA survey.

Table 9: Health Care Insurance Types in Iran

Which health care insurance do you currently have?	Refined sample	Weighted sample	ISPA Survey 2022 (March)
Social Security Organization	51.6%	48.3%	50.7%
Iran Health Insurance Organization	11.6%	7.9%	7.8%
Salamat	10.7%	12.0%	7.2%
Roostaa	1.7%	5.6%	9.8%
Armed Forces Insurance	2.9%	2.8%	3.4%
Other insurance	3.3%	2.8%	2.9%
Not insured	18.2%	20.5%	17.6%

2-6-2 Validation Using the World Values Survey (WVS)

The [World Values Survey \(WVS\)](#) conducted a survey in Iran using face-to-face interviews in the spring of 2020. In the “Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and [39-day] War” survey, some questions from the WVS survey were included alongside other questions to compare the results of the two surveys. To this end, a set of non-sensitive questions, alongside one sensitive question, were asked to compare the results of the two surveys.

Table 10: “Importance in Life” in WVS (spring 2020) and GAMAAN (June 2026) Surveys

For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life.		Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not know
Family	WVS	93.9%	5.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	88.9%	7.7%	1.5%	0.7%	1.3%
Friends	WVS	28.6%	54.4%	11.2%	5.7%	0%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	34.0%	47.8%	12.6%	3.4%	2.2%
Work	WVS	78.0%	18.6%	1.9%	1.3%	0.2%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	78.2%	14.3%	2.6%	1.5%	3.4%
Religion	WVS	69.4%	22.8%	3.5%	4.2%	0.1%
	GAMAAN (weighted)	22.2%	15.8%	15.0%	42.9%	4.1%

As seen in Table 10, the overall importance ratings of non-sensitive topics (family, friends, and work) in both surveys show minor differences, while regarding a sensitive topic, religion, in the political and social context of Iran, the responses in the two surveys are entirely different.

We at the non-profit research foundation **GAMAAN** would like to express our sincere gratitude to all of those who took the time to contribute to this survey.

We are professionally committed to sparing no effort in collecting the opinions and attitudes of Iranians from all levels of society and all walks of life. GAMAAN commits itself to ethical guidelines with regard to protecting respondents' submitted data and strives to employ scientific methods in extracting representative samples. We pledge to be transparent to the public and in explaining probable error levels.

Our team gladly receives any comments, suggestions, and criticisms. Scientists and scholars working at universities, research institutes and think tanks can collaborate with us and request survey data, which can be granted upon agreement with GAMAAN's terms.

GAMAAN can be reached at info@gamaan.org.

ABOUT GAMAAN

GAMAAN, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran, is an independent, non-profit research foundation registered in the Netherlands.

GAMAAN uses digital tools and different methods to extract the (real) opinions of Iranians about (sensitive) social and political topics. The rationale for GAMAAN's innovative approach is the fact that conventional survey methods cannot yield valid results in the existing Iranian context. GAMAAN's findings have been cited and discussed in many international outlets, including The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, The Conversation, Deutsche Welle, New York Magazine, and Newsweek, and have been widely covered by Persian media. In 2022, the Market Research Society in London awarded GAMAAN the President's Medal for making an "extraordinary contribution to research."

The author of this report and director of GAMAAN has served since 2025 as Iran's representative to the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR).



ABOUT PSIPHON

Psiphon Inc. is the global leader in anti-censorship, content delivery and user engagement technologies. Psiphon's open-source, multi-platform software enables millions of people around the world, including in Iran, to easily access online content in information-restricted environments. This survey was conducted in voluntary collaboration with Psiphon.

