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The survey “Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and [39-Day] War” was conducted across Iran over seven days, from June 20 to 27, 2026, with the voluntary collaboration of the Psiphon, Lantern, and MahsaNet VPN tools. The findings in this report are based on a weighted sample of 31,450 respondents inside Iran. The results are calibrated to the demographic profile of literate residents of Iran aged 15 and above. For estimates referring to this target population, the survey reports an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ±3 percentage points.
The full report is available by clicking here.
SURVEY SUMMARY
• About 25% of the target population reported having participated in the January 2026 street protests, corresponding to an estimated 14 million literate people aged 15 and above. This estimate may encompass a range of forms of protest participation over several days. By contrast, about half of respondents said they had not participated in the protests, while about 25% preferred not to answer this question.
• Among those who participated in the January 2026 protests, the most frequently mentioned reason for joining the protests was “dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic,” at about 71%. This was followed by “high prices, inflation, and corruption” at about 62% and “Reza Pahlavi’s call to protest” at about 55%. “Solidarity with the bazaaris’ protests,” at about 19%, and “Donald Trump’s declaration of support for the protesters,” at about 10%, ranked next among the factors respondents mentioned as influencing their participation.
• In light of the mass killings and arrests carried out during the regime’s response to the January 2026 protests, about 80% of the target population regarded the regime’s handling of the protests as “wrong”; this includes about 75% who assessed it as “completely wrong” and about 5% who assessed it as “somewhat wrong.” Only about 14% had a positive assessment of the regime’s response. This assessment was strongly associated with respondents’ political orientation: while about 85% of principlists and 43% of reformists evaluated the regime’s performance positively, around 95% of transitionists and 98% of regime-change supporters considered it wrong.
• Among the slogans raised in gatherings, “Long live Iran” (94% agreement), “No to executions” (81%), “Death to the dictator” (79%), and “Woman, Life, Freedom” (74%) received the highest levels of public acceptance.
• Among slogans associated with monarchist or Pahlavi-oriented tendencies, the pattern of responses was more varied. “Reza Shah, bless your soul” received about 67% agreement and about 21% disagreement. By contrast, “Long live the Shah,” with about 54% agreement, 31% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, received less support than more general slogans in favor of the idea of Iran or against the current regime. “This is the final battle; Pahlavi will return,” with about 50% agreement, 34% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, was among the slogans that created greater division among respondents.
• Slogans closer to the official discourse of the Islamic Republic faced broad opposition in society: about 66% opposed “No compromise, no surrender; fight the United States,” about 62% opposed “Death to Israel,” and about 61% opposed “God’s hand was revealed; Khamenei became young again.”
• On the question of Iran’s flag, about 64% preferred one of the two designs bearing the lion-and-sun emblem: about 40% preferred the tricolor flag with the lion and sun, and about 24% preferred the tricolor flag with the lion, sun, and crown. By contrast, the current official flag of the Islamic Republic received about 19% support.
The 39-Day U.S.–Israeli War with the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Regarding the nature of the 39-day war, society is markedly divided: 42% considered the U.S. and Israeli military action to be “military aggression against Iran,” while nearly the same share disagreed with this assessment. About 40% viewed the U.S. and Israeli military operation as a form of “humanitarian intervention” (R2P), while about 48% disagreed with this interpretation.
• When asked about “foreign military intervention” as a means of effecting change in Iran, about 38% of society reported that they had supported military intervention both before and after the 39-day war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention both before and after the war. Among those whose position changed, a limited decline in support for foreign military intervention is visible: about 8% moved from support to opposition, while about 4% moved from opposition to support.
• In assessing two statements about the consequences of the war for the Islamic Republic, the results indicate that a substantial share of society held an unsympathetic view toward the regime: about 60% felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war. Regarding the killing of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, about 52% said they were not saddened, while about 24% said they were saddened and about 24% had no opinion.
• For all three statements concerning the Islamic Republic’s military policies, opposition exceeded agreement: about 51% disagreed that the missile program had increased the country’s security, about 47% did not consider closing the Strait of Hormuz to be the right action, and about 59% opposed Iran building nuclear weapons.
• Regarding the agreement signed between the United States and the Islamic Republic, about 68% of society believes that the agreement did not serve the interests of the Iranian people. This critical view appears across political orientations: about 81% of regime-change supporters, 65% of transitionists, and 62% of principlists oppose the agreement. The lowest level of opposition to the agreement, 48%, is seen among reformists.
• Public attitudes toward Donald Trump are almost evenly split: about 44% held a positive view and about 44% held a negative view of him. Attitudes toward Benjamin Netanyahu are also polarized, but positive views were more common than negative views: about 51% held a positive view and about 38% a negative view. By contrast, Vladimir Putin was the most negatively viewed of the three leaders, with about 73% negative evaluations.
• Reza Pahlavi continues to receive positive evaluations from a substantial share of society: about 45% said their view of him had been positive before the protests and the 39-day war and remained positive. By contrast, about 28% held a consistently negative view. Overall, the data suggest a limited decline, about 4%, in positive views of him.
• Regarding the economic consequences of the nationwide internet shutdown during the 2026 protests and war, about 36% reported “increased living costs,” 29% “reduced income,” 26% “business disruption or closure,” and 25% “loss of job or main source of income.” These results show that for a significant share of society, the internet shutdown was not merely a communications disruption but also had direct economic and livelihood consequences.
• The most important concern in the days after the protests and the 39-day war was “high prices, inflation, and economic pressures,” selected by 76%. This was followed by “the continuation of the current regime and ongoing repression of dissenters,” at about 60%; “family health and access to medical care and medicine,” at about 42%; and “unemployment or loss of income,” at about 36%. Concerns such as “the resumption of war,” at about 18%, and “political regime change and its possible consequences,” at about 14%, ranked lower.
• If the country’s current situation continues, society is almost divided between staying and wanting to migrate: about 46% have no desire to leave Iran, while about 43% indicated some form of desire to leave. Among the latter, about 32% said they would like to migrate legally but lack the means to do so, about 6% were planning or taking steps toward legal migration, and about 5% were considering seeking asylum. About 11% remained undecided about staying or leaving.
• In this survey, the orientation seeking “regime change as a precondition for change” was the largest political tendency in society, at about 47%, marking an increase of about 5 percentage points compared with the previous year. The orientation seeking “structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic” followed at about 23%, showing an increase of about 2 percentage points. By contrast, the share of those identifying as “proponent of gradual reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic” fell to about 10%, and the share of those identifying as “proponent of the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader” fell to about 9%, with both declining by about 3 percentage points compared with the previous year.
• Regarding the preferred form of political system, about 34% of society preferred some form of monarchy (25% “non-federal monarchy” and about 9% “federal monarchy”). About 28% preferred a republican system (17% “non-federal republic” and 11% “federal republic”). By contrast, about 13% chose “Islamic Republic.” Compared with last year, preference for monarchy increased by about 5 percentage points and preference for a republic by about 6 percentage points, while support for the Islamic Republic declined by about 7 percentage points. About one-quarter of society either said that the form of the alternative system did not matter to them or stated that they lacked sufficient knowledge and information to choose an alternative system.
• Among methods considered effective for bringing change to the country, with respondents able to select more than one option, “civil protests, such as gatherings, strikes, or street protests” received the greatest support, at about 44%. This was followed by “foreign military intervention,” at about 30%. Next came “participation in elections,” at about 19%; “international pressure and sanctions,” at about 18%; and “violent struggles,” at about 14%. About 18% said “none” of these methods would be effective.
