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فارسی | GAMAAN | The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in IRAN

Report

Analytical Report on “Iranians’ Political Preferences in 2024”

August 20, 2025

The findings of this report are based on GAMAAN’s June 2024 survey. In this survey, 77,216 respondents from inside Iran participated. After weighting , a representative sample of Iran’s literate adult population, with an effective sample size of 20,492, was used to derive the results presented in this report.

The full report is available by clicking here.

Summary of Key Findings


Section One: The Islamic Republic and Political Orientations
  • A significant majority of Iranians (around 70%) oppose the continuation of the Islamic Republic. The highest level of opposition (81%) occurred during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising.
  • The dominant political orientation in society is “regime change as a precondition for change” (approximately 40%), followed by “structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic.” Support for regime change is more prevalent among the youth and the educated population.
  • Support for “the principles of the Islamic revolution and the Supreme Leader” has decreased (from 18% in 2022 to 11% in 2024).
  • Opposition to the Islamic Republic is higher among the youth, urban residents, and the highly educated.

Section Two: Forms of Governance
  • An overwhelming majority of Iranians (89%) support democracy.
  • About half of the population (43%) is open to authoritarian rule by a strong individual leader; this view is more common among rural residents and people with lower levels of education.
  • Governance based on religious law and military rule faces widespread opposition (66% and 71% respectively).

Section Three: Preferred Political System and Structure
  • Only about 20% of Iranians support the continuation of the Islamic Republic; the majority want a different political system, such as a (secular) republic, a (constitutional) monarchy, or a more decentralized democracy.
  • When it comes to preferred alternatives, about 26% favor a secular republic and around 21% support a monarchy. For 11%, the specific form of the alternative system is not important. About 22% report lacking sufficient information to choose an alternative system.
  • Around 15% support a federal system—either as a federal republic (10%) or federal monarchy (5%). Support for a federal structure is especially high in ethnic regions such as Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, and Sistan and Baluchestan.
  • Support for a republican and decentralized structure is higher among the youth and educated individuals. Support for monarchy is higher among men than women, and among those without higher education.
  • Supporters of the Islamic Republic and a non-federal monarchy show a higher tendency toward preferring individual authoritarian rule. In contrast, supporters of a non-federal secular republic, a federal republic, and a federal monarchy significantly oppose the idea of authoritarian governance.

Section Four: Party and Ideological Preferences
  • Iranians mostly favor hypothetical parties that prioritize individual freedoms and human rights (37%); seek social justice and workers’ rights (33%); or emphasize national pride and Iranian nationalism (26%).
  • Preferences for parties focusing on environmentalism (10%), free-market economics (9%), and decentralization and minority rights (8%) follow. Only about 5% support parties that prioritize traditional and religious values.
  • The youth and educated individuals show the highest support for parties promoting human rights, environmentalism, and free-market economics.
  • Support for social justice is higher among women (35%) than men (31%), while men show more support for a nationalist party (29% vs. 23%).
  • A general conception of human rights, with emphasis on individual freedoms, is the most popular ideological orientation among supporters of the secular republic (51%), federal republic (50%), and federal monarchy (53%).
  • Support for nationalism is most pronounced among monarchy supporters (43%).
  • Parties focused on human rights, the environment, free markets, and decentralization receive the least support among supporters of the Islamic Republic.

Section Five: Popularity of Civil and Political Figures
  • Among ruling-affiliated individuals, Ali Khamenei (9%), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (9%), and Mohammad Javad Zarif (6%) receive the most support. Among opposition figures, Reza Pahlavi (31%), Toomaj Salehi (6%), and Narges Mohammadi (5%) are the most popular.
  • Reza Pahlavi’s popularity has experienced a slight decline compared to past years, reflecting a relatively stable selection rate in recent years. At the same time, support for figures such as Toomaj Salehi, Narges Mohammadi, and Fatemeh Sepehri has grown.
  • Around 15% of the public express no preference for any of the political figures mentioned, higher than in previous surveys.
  • Support for Reza Pahlavi is higher among men (36%) than women (27%), among older individuals (34%) more than youth (29%), and among the less educated (33%) more than the educated (27%).
  • Reza Pahlavi garners the most support among monarchy (81%) and federal monarchy (74%) supporters. Among those who have no specific political system preference, 30% choose him, whereas only about 20% of republicans support him.
  • Reza Pahlavi’s highest levels of support are observed in Gilan (42%), Alborz (40%), and North Khorasan (38%). His lowest support is seen in Kurdistan (15%), West Azerbaijan (17%), and East Azerbaijan (20%).
  • A clustering of political figures based on public opinion reveals 11 distinct political groupings in society:
  1. Principlists (Khameneis, Ahmadinejad)
  2. Reformists (Mousavi, Khatami, Zarif, Tajzadeh, Faezeh Hashemi)
  3. Pahlavi supporters (Reza Pahlavi, Amir Taheri, Ali Karimi)
  4. Liberal nationalists (Hossein Ronaghi, Majid Tavakoli, Bahareh Hedayat)
  5. Civil/Human rights activists (Narges Mohammadi, Shirin Ebadi, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Kaveh Madani, Reza Alijani, Faraj Sarkouhi)
  6. Solidarity Council (Esmaeilion, Alinejad, Mehtadi, Bonyadi)
  7. Imprisoned civil activists (Fatemeh Sepehri, Mohammad Nourizad)
  8. Labor activists and protest artists (Sepideh Gholian, Esmail Bakhshi, Toomaj Salehi, Mehdi Yarrahi)
  9. Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (Rajavi)
  10. Sunni representative (Molavi Abdolhamid)
  11. Supporters of other individuals
Conclusion: A Diverse Society, Largely Discontented with the Religious Regime, and Seeking Change
  • Iranian society is politically and ideologically diverse and deeply transformed.
  • The majority of the population opposes religious rule and military governance; the demand for a democratic government is widespread among Iranians, though at the same time, a notable portion of society shows an inclination toward individual authoritarianism.
  • A majority of the population opposes the Islamic Republic and supports changing or transforming the political system.
  • Ideologies supporting individual freedom, human rights, and social justice enjoy the greatest support.
  • Nationalist orientations, centered on an idea of Iran, receive notable support; however, demands for decentralization, especially among ethnic and regional communities, are also significant.
  • No political or civil figure currently enjoys majority support in society. Each political cluster represents only a portion (between 5% to 35%) of the population, and no single opposition force is capable of representing the full diversity present within the country.